

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian China

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ABSTRACT

Do the value changes in China imply a sign of democratization? This thesis illustrates the value system of “ideal personality” in the Chinese population, which fundamentally allows the authoritarian regime to rule the country. By using the method of triangulation in analyzing the intercultural project “I wish, China” and data from the World Values Survey (WVS), the thesis asks the question of whether the value system of “ideal personality” is being destroyed or changed, and if there is the possibility of democratization in China from a cultural perspective, or the authoritarian regime would maintain a concrete control on Chinese population with a cultural and social psychological tool.

Keywords:

Authoritarian rule, Democratisation, China studying, Intercultural impacts, value changes

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Chapter 1: Introduction

With the ending of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became a relic of history. Between 1974 and 1989, there were around 30 countries democratized (Huntington 1991:25-26).

Nevertheless, the CCP didn't follow the pace of the changing world. The march of democratization in China was stopped at the Tiananmen Square in 1989 by military force. The latest news in 2015 about this incident is that a participant of the protest in 1989 on Tiananmen Square, Chen Yunfei, was detained after he visited the grave of a victim in the massacre. Ever since, there never has been a real large-scale civil movement or any official statement oriented toward democratization.

Does it mean that there has been completely no process of democratization in China?

We have three possible answers to this questions: (1) Yes, there is a process of democratization in China; (2) No, there is totally no process of democratization in China or (3) No, there is no political progress in China, but the elements towards democratization are growing in Chinese society.

Finding an answer to that question is what this thesis explores through Chinese voices that provide insights into the state of democratization in China.. Before explaining the process of exploration, each possible answer is briefly summarized followed by an outline of the thesis and its theoretical bases and methodology.

Option 1: There is a process of democratization in China

Friedrich and Brzezinski in their book *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, first published in 1956, described the main characteristics of a totalitarian state as: “(a) an official ideology for everyone to follow; (b) a mass party headed by a charismatic leader; (c) terroristic police control; (d) a state monopoly on communication; (e) a state monopoly on the possession of arms; and (f) a centrally directed and controlled economy” (Christiansen, Rai, & Doak 1996:2). A. Barnett has analyzed the political system of China and attributed it to a totalitarian model. “At the top are the members of the Central Committee, who hold key posts in the government and army, as well as in the Party itself, throughout the country. They decide policy and supervise its execution” (Barnett, 1964: 6). Today, the ideology of communism is not believed nationwide, but it still dominates the language of governance in every official occasion. The new CCP leader, Xi Jinping is trying his best to be charismatic; the terroristic police are still working hard; the state uses strong censorship on

communication and controls the army totally; only the economy is not centrally directed any more, but the state still monopolizes the ownership of the land, natural resources and fundamental industries. In this case, the first answer cannot be right.

Option 2: There is totally no process of democratization in China

“During the reform era which began in 1978, structures of economic management have changed....The assumption is that these groups will not merely pander to the authority of those in power, but will claim political rights, seek to organize themselves in independent political organizations cross-cutting official boundaries of authority, formulate political platforms and programmes and seek to influence decision making so as to include their own interests. Such a development of civil society might eventually lead to democratization of the political system” (Christiansen, Rai, 1996: 15). Is it right? Let us examine some facts in the recent history: “The popular protest incidents in China increased from 8,700 in 1993 to 87,000 in 2005”(Jae Ho Chung, Hongyi Lai and Ming Xia). According to *Analysis of Chinese NGO basic Databank Report 2014* (中国民间公益组织基础数据库数据分析报告 2014) of the Narada Foundation in China, in 2013, there were 3602 NGOs registered in the databank; 810 of them have completed documents (中国民间公益组织基础数据库数据分析报告 2014: 4). In 2008, the manifesto Charter 08 was published to demand democratic political reformation in China. The initiator, Liu Xiaobo was given an 11-year sentence in 2009 (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/25/china-jails-liu-xiaobo>). Since 2010, several human rights lawyers and activists started the New Citizen Movement to support human rights and promote the civil spirit in China. The initiator, Xu Zhiyong earned a 4-year sentence for his activity (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/china-upholds-sentence-activist-xu-zhiyong>). In 2012, there was a wave to join in the government controlled election to local congress as independent candidates. All the active candidates were detained and were the victims of violence and threats (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/world/asia/china-clamps-down-on-even-a-by-the-book-campaign.html?_r=0). None of these incidents has the extensive participation of the Tiananmen Protest. But in all of them, people present a clear political appeal and take rational actions. Although most of the activists are in jails, we cannot say that it doesn't imply the initiation of civil society.

Option 3: There is no political progress toward democratization, but there are signs in Chinese society.

As long as we know the first two answers are not correct, we can deduce the third one to be the right answer. However, besides the facts listed for option 2, what are the elements towards democratization in China and what do we know about them? This is exactly the problem this thesis addresses.

Specifically, this thesis, analyses the political culture and value changes in a specific context: through the intercultural art project “I wish, China” combined with data from the World Values Survey (WVS).

The project “I wish, China” contains interview records and artistic renderings of the wishes related to value changes in China. In Chapter 2, I will explain the following about the study:

- What the project is about and which topics and materials have been generated during the project.
- What the purpose and process of the project.
- Who participated in this project.
- Why this project is applicable to the question of the status of democratization in China.

The World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) is a global network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life, led by an international team of scholars. The Values Survey in China has around 2200 responders with balanced proportion of differentiated background of gender, age, finance, and education. The results of the WVS for China are compared to those of other countries and the values identified by the survey are analyzed to determine if they match the values expressed by the Chinese interviewees for this project.

In Chapter 3, I review the theory of political culture, and explain why it is appropriate to explain the current state of democratization in China.

After the subject of the study and the corresponding theory are delineated, I answer the larger question about the status of democratization in China through a search for answers to two subordinate questions: work on the two major questions from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6:

Question A

Do the wishes expressed by the participants in the project show changing values which are possibly a driver of democratization in China? If yes, what do they show and how do they relate to Chinese society today?

Question B

How do the intercultural impact and globalization affect political culture and changing values in China?

In Chapter 4, I introduce an “ideal model of personality,” which fit in the CCP ruled society perfectly. This “ideal model of personality” consists of the models of “new man” and “old man” respectively originating from two periods in the history of CCP-ruled China: the period of Mao’s ruling and the period of post-Mao ruling. From Yan’an Rectification Movement to the Cultural Revolution, the CCP conducted the coercive persuasion to create “new man”, who could be systematically manipulated within communist ideology. After the liberalization of markets and the decline of communist ideology, “the contemporary party-state aims at arousing a sense of belonging in Chinese people to Chinese culture and traditions. (...) a collective identity in the Chinese “imagined community.” The way the party-state uses China's traditions can be understood in the light of cultural nationalism” (Janette, 2015:216). The CCP leadership intends to evoke the ethical values of “old man” in the population, who has Chinese traditional collective thinking and accept the hierarchy in the society.

Chapter 5 examines the concept of the “ideal model of personality.” The two questions above will be answered separately. Question A is addressed through the theories of political culture and democratization, especially the theory of Emancipative Value, which is initially defined by Christian Welzel in his book *<Freedom Rising>*, I list four cultural factors which describe the “ideal model of personality” through a qualitative analysis of the cases from the project “I wish, China.” The quantitative analysis with the data from the WVS is undertaken as triangulation to draw an outline for the qualitative analysis of the cases in the project “I wish, China,” and to provide further validation of the conclusions from the interviews.

Question B is addressed using the intercultural interaction cases and art concepts from the project “I wish, China.” I simulate the influence of globalization on Chinese society and examine if it infuses democratization in Chinese society.

Chapter 6 examines the intercultural impact in the changing values in China on the levels of cognition, interaction, and orientation. Chapter 7 provides conclusions as findings from the analysis are summarized.

This is the first art-concept method to be used in cultural research and through the discussion in the final chapter, I explain the advantage of integrating art into the methodology of cultural studies. Essentially I find that when the participants are experiencing art, they are mentally situated in a space separated from their daily lives. In this space, their cognition, perception, emotion and behavior are less controlled by their psychological inertia and implanted conception. In this space, they are forced to feel, to perceive, to think independently. Here, each of participant is closer to him/herself and expresses for a more intrinsic self. To this aspect, I assume that art can facilitate the culture research to include more particular and dynamic objects and provide a better access to the cognition of human being.

Through the research, I hypothesize how the political culture and changing values uncovered in the project “I wish, China” epitomize contemporary Chinese society. It explains the changing form and appeals in protests and actions for civil rights and the rule of law - none of them seem to be a movement with strong political ambition, but rather an irrepressible willing out of the developed political culture and changing values. What the Chinese activists demand is neither a concept of democracy, as the students demanded on Tiananmen Square in 1989, nor another ideology, but democracy in practice. Even it is still very difficult to predict the process that democratization will take in China, it will provide new insights into what we know about democratization.

Chapter 2: Background on “I wish, China”

In November 2012, I was wandering on the street of Beijing to talk with people and film them randomly. (Later these video clips were edited into a documentary video: <https://youtu.be/8AjRCGKNeVY>). That was the time when the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held. During the congress, the new leadership of Xi Jinping officially started; a new political era in China began.

The film I made in November 2012 was edited into my documentary video and media installation “The 18th Congress/ Beijing Map,” which presents a live view of the contemporary history during the special time of change. At the time, many Chinese liberal intellectuals were enthusiastic to talk about the family background and personal history of Xi Jinping, his father’s thoughts of constitutionalism, and how he would change China. An optimistic expectation for democratization was wildly shared on the Internet beside the official media.

Instead of the expectations being fulfilled since Xi Jinping’s tenure, however, censorship was reinforced. Human rights lawyers and civil activists were massively questioned, detained, and sentenced without legal reason and process. The number of political prisoners is continuously increasing. The surviving liberal intellectuals stopped talking about democratization, and began to discuss if Xin would realize his “Chinese Dream” by drawing China back to an airtight dictatorial state the same as it was under the rule of Mao.

Neither the former expectations nor the current worrying made little sense to me. Since the day I took up my camera for the project “The 18th Congress/ Beijing Map,” I had never seen any intent of Xin to promote freedom in China. When Xin increases his political depression domestically, neither can I see a possibility that a new dictatorship could hold Chinese society in balance. Technically, he is not able to shut down all the access to information inside of China and bring the whole population back to an isolated space where people know nothing about the outside world; economically, the economic policies he can use are limited, and will not be truly effective in an authoritarian, bureaucratic system. Therefore, I started the project “I wish, China” and *wish* this project could trigger a tinny fire and lighten the path to democracy in China.

In his controversial books *The End of History* and *The Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama (1992) describes “mankind as ‘a long wagon train strung out along the road, no matter in which

situation they are, the great majority of wagons will be making the slow journey into town, and most will eventually arrive there”(Fukuyama, 1992: 338-339). According to Fukuyama’s idea, the town is named liberal democracy. China is also one of the wagons on its way. The policy of the current leadership might make a detour and delay reaching the terminal of democratization, but it won’t erase the possibility in the future.

In the 1970s in China, everyone was bound to a fixed residence by his/her personal document. It was an offense to move in the country without permission. In the 1990s, although the inland migration of workers was already indispensable manpower for urbanization, they would be sent back by force to their original residence immediately if they were caught in a capital city without a temporary residence permit. Since 2010, a nationwide new citizen movement protested to ask for the equal right of education in the cities for the children of migrant workers. The policy of education was partly promoted due to this large-scale and strong request in 2012. Nevertheless, in January 2014, the initiator of the new citizen movement, human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong, received a four-year sentence because of his activities (Reported by *the Guardian*

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/china-upholds-sentence-activist-xu-zhiyong>).

In the last fifty years, although the essence of the CCP regime hasn’t really changed, the idea of self-identity of individuals under this regime has changed gradually. The generation born in the 1940s and 1950s want to survive the poverty and political movements; the generation born in the 1960s and 1970s can cry for their rights as citizens; the generation born in the 1980s and 1990s, began to long for a life with multiple possibilities and more space for personal dreams. Of course, the change is mostly along the longitude of central cities. The large population in the countryside is assumed to be sharing this progress much less. Even so, we shouldn’t overlook the political culture and changing values in China as part of the history. They are not going to be a visible milestone towards democratization in China, but are developing invisibly in the minds of the Chinese population. They are billions of individual images, vague or clear, of a future in China they want. These images are what I collect or induce in the art project “I wish, China.” The quantity of the records is certainly not comparable to a large-scale survey of the census, but it shows a profound view of human cognition regarding China.

It is popular for cultural scholars to debate if it is fair or appropriate to evaluate non-western cultures with western theories. Even though we are talking about freedom—something that might seem to transcend culture, cognitions do differ by collectivism and individualism

within a culture with a distinct difference between the former in China and the latter in the West. This distinction brings us back to Fukuyama's wagon metaphor: "while they (the wagons) are painted different colors and are constructed of varied materials, each has four wheels and is drawn by horses, while inside sits a family hoping and praying that their journey will be a safe one. The apparent differences in the situations of the wagons will not be seen as reflecting permanent and necessary differences between the people riding in the wagons, but is simply a product of their different positions along the road "(Fukuyama 1992: 339). Human being are seeking for emancipation and autonomy, no matter with which ethnic, cultural or political identity they carry. From this perspective, western or non-western, the efforts that people make to find out the truth of human societies are coherent.

The first interview approach on the street I made in Beijing in 2012, was rejected. Nevertheless, the middle-aged woman didn't walk away after she turned down my interview request, but showed great interest in who I am and what I was doing. I introduced myself as an innocent student from abroad who is doing social research. Once she made sure I was not recording. She began to talk about the danger of playing with politics—she couldn't stop herself from giving me a lecture about the political persecution she experienced. Before the last time she warned me to be careful on what I was doing, she claimed: "I totally agree with the rule of CCP. There is a dark side in every country."

The self-contradictory attitude of this woman represented a typical psychological complex of Chinese. The more interviews I conduct, the more I understand this complex attitude and deal with it in an appropriate way. When a Chinese defends the CCP's authority, it could come from fear, but more often, it is a psychological self-protection, to keep their values and worldview consistent with the life they live.

After gaining more experience, I learned how to establish an occasion in which they feel safe to open to the interview, how to control the flow of conversation, and know better when to stop or to explore more.

In the interview tour for the project "I wish, China" in 2014, many more people mentioned "freedom" than did in 2012

(The Project Documentary Video in 2012: https://youtu.be/x59j_AT1tXU

The Project Documentary Video in 2014: <https://youtu.be/xv7wgfQKkg8>).

I cannot say the freedom they want is the same, but based on the responses, freedom is basically about determination. For example, someone may believe: "I was not free to decide the governing structure as a Chinese citizen, but I am free to believe in my right to decide it. I

don't see any guarantee that what I do will realize the freedom in China, but I am free to decide what I will do for it. I cannot foresee when and how democracy will be performed in China, but I am free to dream it, even though it is in a future when I don't exist anymore.”

The intercultural project “I wish, China” includes the material and information concerning the political culture and changing values in contemporary China as expressed by average Chinese citizens. Thereby, it is necessary to give a comprehensive description of this project.

1) Motivation

Since the appearance of the Internet in China, the development of digital communication makes unofficial political discourse possible. More and more liberal and constitutional thinking emerges in the individual critiques on social affairs, which provide a democratic perspective on the social conflicts and destructive views on the authoritarian regime.

However, there is something lacking. Besides criticizing what Chinese have right now, I consider it more important to know what they want to have. The project was initiated and designed as a political culture primer to evoke the participants to think about what they want in a political concept, because under an authoritarian rule, the population is used to believing that what they want won't change the political situation. Both the interview and the art installations that are part of the project aim to weaken the lack of awareness of civil rights, because it could be a breaking point of the disempowerment cycle according to Emancipation Theory by Welzel, and initiate demand for a civic society.

Operation:

In the project, I collected wishes for China from Chinese and gave the wishes to artists in Berlin, who were inspired by the wishes and were interested in creating art pieces for the project. The art pieces and printed wishes were shown in exhibitions both in China and Germany. The project is ongoing. I am the only person responsible for the concept, operation, and development of the project. However, the project was made possible with assistance of volunteers and organizations. The basic question I asked the Chinese participants to collect their wishes was: “What is your wish for China?”

Most of the wishes are recorded in video; the rest of them in text. When there are wishes that have very similar content, I kept them as one. Until now, there are close to 80 separate ideas as personal wishes for China. All of the wishes are translated into English and German, part of them will be quoted as material in the later part of the research in English, and the complete records are found as an attached document to the thesis in text and video files. The

interviews were undertaken in capital cities. How the interviewee formed a wish in the interview is relevant to the occasion and context of the conversation.

The artists for this project are from multiple cultures, but all of them practice art in Berlin.

The art pieces created for the project are paintings, drawings, sketches, objects, installations, and performances.

2) The Timeline

2010 - The concept of the project is initiated. The first collection was called for on the Internet, close to 40 wishes were contributed, a small part of them from personal conversations.

2011 - The wishes were translated into English and given to invited artists. There were around 6-7 artists involved. Intensive communication occurred between artists and me (curator) concerning the Chinese issues coming out of the wishes.

At the end of the 2011, the first exhibition was held in a university in China. One Berlin-Polish artist, Alexandra Holownia, joined in the trip to China and gave lectures and a workshop there (<https://youtu.be/-yyvq-rbzxY>).

2012 - The second collection was performed, mainly person to person, on streets or public occasions, recorded in videos. More than 30 wishes were collected.

2013 - The new collection was translated into English. The whole collection was comprised of interviews translated into German. The interview video clips were edited into the first documentary video for the project (<https://youtu.be/OSDyu20nJew>).

Communication between artists and me continued. The materials and information which artists received were more diversified; the content of the communication is always extended into a more comprehensive level about Chinese issues, even an open discussion about the ability of practicing art on political vision.

In the summer of 2013, the second exhibition was held in the gallery of Kunsthaus ACUD in Berlin. There were 14 artists who contributed their art works. The visitors of the exhibition were local German, sojourners and migrants with multi-culture backgrounds. They responded strongly to the intercultural interaction, and felt a true connection between art and social concern.



I wish, China 2013 (https://youtu.be/x59j_AT1tXU)

2014 - New artists were invited to the project and worked for the concept. As I always do, I encouraged them to find their own ideas from the wishes, and told them stories and described the social background around the ideas. I let them to develop their ideas without guiding them on purpose. In addition to our conversations, I also contributed my personal reflection to their art as a curator and artist from time to time. In a way, I played two roles in our communication: I talked with them as a Chinese carrying different memories and experiences of politics and society; at the same time, I was simple a curator and artist who talked with them in the language of art.

In the middle of the year, the third exhibition was held in another university in Lanfang City in China. Art works from eight artists were exhibited. There were more than 50 wishes collected in China, around 20 of them from the visitors to the exhibition. The visitors were mostly students and teachers in the university and they were deeply impressed by the project idea and the art works. German artist Michael Ebert traveled to China with me to build up his installation “convert” on the exhibition. His trip was sponsored by IFA fund.

In the same year, the new collected wishes were translated into English and German. The second project documentary video was produced. The project was promoted by Kulturradio RBB (<https://youtu.be/xv7wgfQKkg8>). More details about the project could be found at the homepage:

<http://interartistic.wix.com/iwish>.

3) The intercultural communication

The essential driving force of the project is a complicated intercultural communication system. As the pivot of the system, I need to communicate with people from different cultures, with various perspectives on the project, and even with distinct political ideas. It skillful work to lead proper communication to motivate all those different people and trigger their passions. To provide leadership there are three types of communication in which I participated:

- a) with the interviewees
- b) with the artists
- c) between artists/curator and visitors on exhibition

In the later chapters, I analyse some cases of the intercultural communication in the project to compare to how globalization influences the value changes in China.

Why the art project "I wish, China" is applicable to this cultural research about Chinese democratization?

Nobel winner Svetlana Alexievich wrote her book *Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets* in the genre of investigative journalism and documented personal stories of "little people" who went through the course of Soviet and post-Soviet eras. "Die Mehrheit fühlte sich von der Freiheit genervt: »Ich habe drei Zeitungen gekauft, und in jeder steht eine andere Wahrheit. Wo ist die richtige Wahrheit? Früher hast du morgens die Prawda gelesen und wusstest Bescheid. Hast alles verstanden" (Svetlana Alexievich, 2013:12).

Translation:

"The majority felt the freedom annoying: 'I bought three newspapers this morning and on each of them you see a different truth. Before, you read Prawda and you got it. You could understand everything.'"

"(...)den niemans hat uns Freiheit gelehrt. Nur, wie man für die Freiheit stirbt." (Svetlana Alexievich, 2013:14)

Translation:

"No one taught us what freedom was, but only how to die for freedom."

As a political model, democracy provides human beings a procedure to rule the society where they live together. However, it doesn't mean that democracy is the only premise of human autonomy. Naturally, all the thinking, desire, behavior, and action of each human are relevant to the history in the making. Alexievich neither describes nor analyzes the change of politics

in Russia, but in her writing, we see the model history of Russia which includes destiny and determination of millions of “little people”.

American journalist Milton Mayer conducted a study of lives of ten ordinary Germans, members of Nazi Party, when he had a position as a research professor at the University of Frankfurt and lived a small town after the war. He interviewed them about their experiences between 1933 to 1945 and tried to find out why and how they intergrated their identity of Nazi into their daily lives. The book *They Thought They Were Free: The Germans 1933-1945* was first published in 1955. From Mayer’s perspective, the reason why Nazism gained a place in their lives and grew up in their society, was not because they were German, but essentially because they were human in a specified cultural and historical context.

The individuals are not just victims of the authoritarian system, they could also be accomplices to the system at the same time. Both democracy and authoritarianism are machines, which are used to run societies. Behind the panels of the machines are human beings, who drive, operate, or manipulate it day to day.

An authoritarian community includes the ruling state and the ruled population. Similar to the two previously mentioned books, the project “I wish, China” also focused on the individual samples in the ruled population through way of interviews. Opposite of Alexievich and Mayer, I did not ask the interviewees about their memories in a previous authoritarian state, because the authoritarian regime still dominates in China. My question for them was about the future, what they wish for China. But the initiation behind their wishes must involve their past and present and their values and worldviews. These deep insights into human beings are exactly what I need for the cultural study in this thesis.

Moreover, the records of the project are not only in written, but also in visual and media form, which includes multiple types of information, such as the eye expressions, the tones and the gestures of the interviewees. These records make it possible to explore a more perceptual methodology in culture studying.

Chapter 3: Theoretical bases: Political Culture and Emancipative values

As a major concern, the project 'I wish, China' is analyzed in the framework of political culture theory. Therefore, it is necessary to set out at the beginning, what is political culture and why it is applicable to this project.

What is political culture?

“Politics, in its broadest sense, is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live”(Heywood 2002:4). At the same time, the culture of a society, “is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies,” (Spencer-Oatey 2008:3) that could also be formed and reformed by the rules under which people live. “Cultural systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action” (Kroeber, Kluckhohn 1952: 181; cited by Adler 1997: 14). It means, consequently, the formed or reformed culture will also influence how people make, preserve and amend the political system in the future along the process of the history.

In short, we could say, that the theory of political culture is a study of the mechanism about how politics and culture work with one another. “This relationship between the attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through the concepts of political culture” (Almond, Verba 1963:33).

There is no intention to develop political theory in my study, but only to apply to it to examine the value changes shown in the art project “I wish, China.” Therefore, I will focus on three books and the parts of them which are relevant to the analysis in this research. The books are: *The Civic Culture*, *The Silent Revolution*, and *Freedom Rising*.

1. The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in 5 nations

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) published *The Civic Culture*, in which the political culture approach is established in a global context based on comparative analysis of political attitudes. Since then, the theory of political culture has been developed along the changing of the world. The research methods they used and the conclusion they made in 1963 could not explain the new situation any more. Whereas, how they employed the concept of culture-“the meaning of psychological orientation towards social objects,” (Almond, Verba, 1963:14) and how they attributed the distinguished orientations and identified different classes of political objects are still enlightening:

(1) ‘cognitive orientations’ involve knowledge and beliefs about a political system, its roles, inputs and outputs; (2) ‘affective orientations’ or feelings about a political system, its roles, personnel, and performance; (3) ‘orientations’, the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.

“Three d classes of objects: (1) specific roles or structures, such as legislative bodies, executives, or bureaucracies; (2) incumbents of roles, such as particular monarchs, legislators, and administrators, and (3) particular public policies, decisions, or enforcements of decisions.”(Almond and Verba 1963:15)

Under the concept above, Almond and Verba point out: “the term political culture thus refers to the specific political orientation-attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of self in the system” (Almond and Verba 1963:13). They identified three ideal types of political culture: (1) ***parochial political culture***, (2) ***subject political culture***, and (3) ***participant political culture***

The ***parochial political culture*** exists in societies where there are no specialized political roles. People are unaware of the government and its policies and do not see themselves as involved in the political process.

The ***subject political culture*** occurs in societies where individuals are aware of specialized governmental authority, but there is no differentiated input structure. In other words, the individuals understand how politics will influence their lives, but they don’t think they can change or influence the politics in any case.

The ***participant political culture*** “exists in functional democratic societies. The individuals are aware of government, the processes of political input, and the outputs of government. “They tend to be oriented toward an ‘activist’ role of the self in the policy” (Almond, Verba 1963:19). People have proper knowledge about their rights and how to claim them. They are active to express their preferences in legal political processes.

Almond and Verba also stressed that the parochial, subject, and participant political cultures are ideal-typical models. “There are two aspects of cultural heterogeneity or culture ‘mix’. The ‘citizen’ is a particular mix of participant, subject, and parochial orientations, and the civic culture is a particular mix of citizens, subjects, and parochial orientations” (Almond, Verba 1963:20). “In general, a parochial, subject, or participant culture would be most

congruent with, respectively, a traditional political structure, a centralized authoritarian structure, and a democratic political structure” (Almond, Verba 1963:21).

“Political systems change, and we are justified in assuming that culture and structure are often incongruent with each other” (Almond, Verba 1963:21). “Rather than assuming congruence, we must ascertain the extent and character of the congruence or incongruence, and the trends in political, cultural and structural development that may affect the ‘fit’ between culture and structure” (Almond, Verba 1963:34).

In this book, the concepts of political cognition and political culture was firstly brought out and the relationship between political system and the orientation of social culture became a researching object. This is a luminous idea to understand specific culture and values in according political circumstance.

2 The silent revolution

In his book *The Silent Revolution*, Ronald Inglehart stressed that “the values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life” (Inglehart 1977:3). The survey data in his research shows a phenomenon of value changing from Materialist to Post-Materialist. What does he mean by ‘the quality of life’? The following figures from this book present a clear idea:

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism




FIGURE 2-1. Items Used in 1973 Surveys and Needs They Were Intended To Tap.





FIGURE 2-4. Job Goals by Value Type. First choice among "things which are most important in a job." Based on combined nine-nation European Community sample, 1973 (N = 13,484).

As we can see in the figures: in a Post-Materialist society, free speech is more important than maintaining order; having individual ideas respected and valued is more important than economic growth; working with people you like is more important than a good salary; a feeling of accomplishment is more important than having no risk of unemployment. The belonging needs, demands for social equality would become more salient than demands for sheer economic equality; self-expression is taking higher priority gradually. More autonomous groups are needed, in which each member has a voice in how the job is done. "Such groups seem to provide the individual with a greater sense of belonging and of participating in a meaningful way" (Inglehart,1963:69).

According to Inglehart, "the political expression of new values is facilitated by a shift in the balance of political skills between elites and masses(...) the principal evolutionary drift is the result of structural changes taking place in advanced industrial societies and is unlikely to be changed unless there are major alterations in the very nature of those societies"(Inglehart,1963:4).

This value change on an individual level results in changing the political system subsequently, there are sources and consequences of these changes, as in the following figure.



But Inglehart also says, that “it doesn’t mean that if increasing numbers of people hold given values, their political system will automatically adopt policies which reflect those values. It depends partly on how politically skilled those people are. And it depends at least equally on the political institutions of the given country. What the people get is conditioned not only by what the people want, but by whether they have one dominant party or several competitive political parties; a Presidential system or a Parliamentary system, a free press or a controlled press; and numerous other institutional factors. It depends, in short, on their country’s political structure” (Inglehart,1963:6).

In this book, “value changes” was pointed out to present the evolution and standard of civilization. It established a deep insight and reliable methodology to analyze the development of democracy in the recent western history.

3. Freedom Rising: human empowerment and the quest for emancipation

Christian Welzel, a colleague of Inglehart elaborates the idea of human development and value changing in his political culture theory into a concrete concept: emancipative value.

“The book is about the human quest for freedoms and its inspirational source -- the desire for emancipation -- an existence free from domination. Wherever and whenever this desire awakens, it is visible in what I call *emancipative values*” (Welzel, 2013:2). In *Freedom Rising*, Welzel focuses on the rise of these values, examining their content, drivers, and consequences.

Beyond the research of Inglehart in *The Silent Revolution* whose data is limited to the Western world and democratic countries, Welzel emphasizes the importance that the emancipative values are also emerging outside the Western world, in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and part of Africa. Emancipative values are the inspirational source of the human empowerment process, they empower people psychologically, strengthening their motivations to exercise freedoms. Individualization increases the importance of people's values as a guide for their actions. However, the emphasis on freedom is not selfish but coupled with an emphasis on equality of opportunities. This directs people's attention to issues of social justice. As a consequence, people become more easily upset about incidents of discrimination. Emancipative values imply more tolerance of deviant behaviors that leave other people's personal integrity untouched; and also mean less tolerance of behaviors that violate other people's integrity.

Welzel argues that "Emancipative values are the inspirational source of the human empowerment process" (Welzel, 2013:6).

In summary, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba proved the relationship between political structure and political attitudes of members in a society, they officially built up the framework of political culture research and defined the fundamental elements of political culture theory. Ronald Inglehart included the views of Materialist and Post-Materialist into the theory and emphasized the changing value along the technical and economic development in societies-cognitive mobilization. Christian Welzel brings up a new concept "emancipative values," which stress the evaluation on freedom. He describes it as an essential nature of human being and one of the drivers of democratization.

Why do the theories of political culture and Emancipative Values applicable to Chinese democratization?

When Myanmar's democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi was addressing an interactive program organized by BP Koirala Chintan Pratisthan in Kathmandu, she said: The democracy is not just a way of government, not just a political idea, it's a culture. And building the democratic culture is difficult, it's not something we can achieve overnight."

<http://youtu.be/dJfbYjhgnWs>(04:35'-57').

In this research, the defined ‘democratization’, is not only a process of changing a regime, but also a society in the future where the democracy effectively works.

The brilliant point of the political culture theory, is how the scholars puts emphasis on human development. According to the existing research, how people are and how people govern or are governed is a social-cultural mechanism. The authoritarian systems form a culture, and a kind of personality which is congruent with their authoritarian social structures. In other words, in the cognition of the citizenry, autocratic governance is necessary.

Focusing on the case of China, we see a very complicated social structure and unusual process of modern history. A collective ownership based on free market, an ideology full of contradictions, an economic benefit oriented and government controlled media/culture industry. In a way, we could say, there are social changes happening in the authoritarian China, which has been happening mostly in democratized countries. How do the values change in this Chinese complex? In the existing values, which of them are still supporting an authoritarian government, which of them are looking forward to autonomy and freedom? Can the value changes in China play an important role for the democratization?

To answer the questions, the political culture theories provide valuable and universal perspectives and referable concepts, as the input and output of the political culture, critical citizens, Post materialist, human empowerment, emancipative values, and so on.

With the political culture theory, the values being showed in the project “I wish, China” will be revealed and analyzed. Moreover, it is also possible to make a systematic picture connecting the project and the Chinese contemporary society.

Chapter 4: “New Man” and “Old Man”

Why people can live with an authoritarian regime? The reason is not that the regime is powerful enough to depress everyone, but that the population is also integrated into the system and hold values towards the authoritarian regime.

Mayer wrote: “As we know Nazism, it was a naked, total tyranny which degraded its adherents and enslaved its opponents and adherents alike; terrorism and terror dominated daily life, private and public;” but the nine Germans whom he interviewed “knew it absolutely otherwise, and they still know it otherwise. ... lived under it, served it, and indeed, made it” (Mayer,1955:47).

According to the data of WVS (World Values Survey) 2010-2014, most of Chinese believe that China is democratic.

V141.- And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?

	TOTAL	How democratically is this country being governed today									
		Not at all democratic	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Completely democratic
China	(2,300)	1.6	2.2	4.2	5.4	11.0	14.4	18.6	17.7	6.5	3.8

“Politics fundamentally involves the actions of individuals who decide how they will behave in any given political situation even if the pressures of the social context establish clearly preferable alternatives. People are taught from early in life how to evaluate and respond to ‘political’ situations” (Solomon, 1971:2).

For the Chinese who believe that China is democratic, the truth is not important. They believe so because it is what the regime claims and it is easier to live if they just take this given idea.

The coherence between an authoritarian regime and the culture in an authoritarian land could be decisive to political evolution. According to Almond & Verba, the subject political culture is responsible to the authoritarian regime, with which the members of the society don’t think they are empowered to influence the authority.

The data of WVS (World Values Survey) 2010-2014 of China shows that Chinese respondents have a low level of intention and experiences in signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstration, joining strikes, or other protests (V85-89).

In fact, it is always an essential concern of the authoritarian regime to maintain the subject political culture. It means that the regime needs the population to be subject to its authority. As a citizen being subject to the authority, I define it as “ideal model of personality,” with which CCP regime has been making great effort to frame the Chinese population by

monopolizing the distribution of information and education, controlling public media and conducting censorship.

“The CCP approach to organizing and controlling the large Chinese population has been to rely on a complex mixture of coercion and persuasion” (Schein, 1960:8). In the history of CCP, the first move of this manipulation was “thought reform” began in 1950s, whose purpose “was to create a ‘new man’ whose basic character and attitudes would be ideally fitted for the communist society of the future” (Schein, 1960:11).

“New man” is a political concept which was invented by Mao Zedong when he entered the leadership of CCP. “The ‘proletarian revolution new men’ ensured the cadres of CCP highly unified in thought and political orientation during the civil war and after the founding of the state” (Gao Hua, 2012:178).

“With the Party’s introduction of a market-oriented economy in 1978, the decline in the influence of Maxism-Maosim has been palpable”(Janette Ai, 2015:215). The concept of “new man” doesn’t have an appeal in the population as much as in the era of Mao Zedong. So that, the CCP leadership after Mao have to establish something else to frame their people instead of “new man.” “The party-state has promoted China’s tradition as a package. It has lifted out the original content of China’s tradition and invented new ones. The newly-invented content includes the love of the party-state and loyalty to the communist party(...)the party-state portrays itself as the legitimate custodian of China’s traditions, having the power to decide what traditions to include, use and promote”(Janette Ai, 2015:216-217). In a way we can say, the current leadership of CCP is trying to evoke the traditional ethical values in Chinese population and use nationalism to keep their legitimacy.

The combination of “new man” and “old man” is exactly the essence of “ideal personality.” I will explain the figures of the two concepts in details and why they are necessary for the ruling of CCP regime in the rest part of this chapter.

The birth of “new man”

In order to explain what the “new man” is and how the CCP created it, I will introduce two documents. One is the article “*“新人” 的诞生 (The Birth of “New Man”)*” written by Chinese historian, Gao Hua (2012:177-206), who spent nearly 20 years researching and writing about the CCP campaign known as the Yan'an Rectification Movement, which lasted from 1942 to 1944; another one is the psychological research “Brainwashing” on American captives back from China conducted by Edgar H. Schein (1960).

The two documents were written differently. The first one was published in Chinese in China. A large number of official historical files and records of CCP were selected and rearranged. The emphases of the content were skillfully concealed in neutralized words by the author as an inside survivor of the CCP regime. The second one was written by a Western observer, who analyzed the limited information in the time of cold war to deduce and conclude this manipulation of CCP regarding the purpose of his psychological research. Nevertheless, the findings and contributions about CCP's *thought reform* in the two documents overlap in a great measure and prove one another.

1942-1945年的延安整风运动是中共历史上进行的第一次全党范围内的大规模的政治运动，其中对广大党员干部进行思想改造——即用毛泽东的理论和概念转换党员干部的思想意识，是延安整风运动重要的一环。毛泽东领导的这场浩大的思想改造工程迄今已五十多年，笔者认为，无论从毛泽东的个人创造力，抑或是从思想改造对日后中国人的广泛影响而言，延安整风期间锻造“新人”的经验都是值得充分研究的。(高华《革命年代》 2012:177)

Translation:

The Yan'an Rectification Movement from 1942 to 1945 was the first large scale political campaign inside of CCP. The reform imposed on the members of CCP, especially on the cadres, by using the theories and concepts of Mao Zedong to change the ideology of the members and cadres in CCP, was an important part of the Yan'an Rectification Movement. Until now, this project of the mind remolding started by Mao has been undertaken for more than fifty years. I argue, that it deserves more attention from scholars considering both Mao's personal creativity and its extensive influence on Chinese afterwards (Gao Hua, 2012:177).

In the finding of the Chinese historian Gao, the major results of the Yan'an Rectification Movement could be concluded as the following:

1. The diversity of Communist ideology was eliminated. Mao made himself the only legitimate interpreter and successor of Marxism-Leninism. The minds of adherents of communism were unified ultimately according to Mao's interpretation of Communist ideology. 毛泽东成为革命理想，革命道德，革命胜利的人格化身。(Gao Hua 2012:206). The translation reads: Mao Zedong became the soul of the ideal of revolution, the morality of revolution, the victory of revolution. The liberalism was defined as dangerous and harmful to CCP's revolution.毛泽东表示，一定要在整风中“统一思想”，“统一行动”。为此，付出任何代价也在所不惜。(Gao Hua, 2012:195. The translation: Mao Zedong stated that through the Rectification Movement, we must unify our minds, our action. It is worth it to pay any price to realize this purpose.

2. The CCP's leadership was reformed during the movement. Mao enhanced his core position in the leadership and established a new team made up of younger CCP cadres who can report and respond to him directly. During the movement, this team took over the executive from the former leadership. The members of the team replaced the earlier CCP founders gradually in the organization afterward (interpreted from: Gao Hua 2012:205) .

The results of *thought reform* were homogenous to the establishment of a new regime in feudal time of China: *the reinforcement of centralism and a cult of personality*.

The Methods applied to *thought reform* in Gao Hua's description could be attributed to the concept of **group forces**:

1. intensive studying and discussion in group meeting, in which it was usually impossible to hide true feelings under the scrutiny of other group members
2. self-exposure and report each other about: If you or others made critics in private occasion on the Party, or held ideas otherwise from the Mao's interpretation of Maxism-Leninism.
3. self-examination in written form to confess the hidden liberal thoughts and attitudes
4. expose personal history and biography in details and reveal others'

In 1960, Schein also wrote about The Yan'an Rectification Movement in the paper "brainwashing." His finding proved the large scale participation of all members of CCP in Yan'an, and the methods of **group forces**, which were developed to unify the thoughts and action of all participants. A decade later, the same methods were used again to treat the captured United Nations soldiers in order to change their ideas about CCP.

Briefly, those methods were:

- 1) monopolize the values in organization – all members were encouraged to make critique on non-communist groups and the communist ideals were interpreted into justice against all grievances caused by non-communist groups;
- 2) use group discussion to perish the boundary between public and private space of spirit -- each member was demanded to make a complete exposure of his thought and feeling to the scrutiny and analysis of others;
- 3) the exposed individual thought and feeling must be critiqued by oneself in the group in order to enhance the given values in one's psychological system. If one did cut off

the tie with the values and ideas which one had held individually, one will be rewarded by group leaders;

- 4) anyone not willing to engage in this group exercise and take the given values would be under a unmistakable threat of expulsion from the Party.

By using the **social and interpersonal forces**, the CCP leaders created a situation in which one could not hide his or her true thought and feeling. When one perceived clearly the reward of taking and the threat of not taking, one would very possible to take the given values and attitudes by the group leaders of CCP.

Above, we can see both Gao and Schein put emphasis the concept of **group forces** in their research. To the nationwide reality in PR China, the **group forces** can be regarded as the **politics of collective living**, including the military, the administrators, the people's communes, education institutions, the regulations of Hukou, the social groups in "Danwei" (the employment of state organs or state-owned business) and so on. Once individuals accept this collective living as normality and rely on the group they are in, there is not boundary separating the private and public space both spiritually and physically, and the members are neither aware their rights to keep private space from the state control.

On the premise that the whole population is included in this collective living and under the influence of the group forces, there are two fundamental conditions to create "new man" in population:

- 1) Centralized ideology: the *positive ideals* and unified ideology are imposed on the population through state centrally controlled media press and education. The Communist morality is popularized in the society, that the *self-exposure* to the organizations of CCP should be valued over personal space; the relationship with the state of CCP should be valued over personal relationship; fitting into the interdependency and interrelationship in social groups is more rightful than keeping individual thought.
- 2) Monopolized material and action resources: in an unofficial way, the individuals are led to learn their opportunities to gain benefit from being adherent to the authority from CCP monopolized political and economic facilities and the threat for not to be.

Only a "new man" could possibly find a place to exist and develop in the system of CCP, as Schein wrote: "the major implicit purposes of *thought reform* appeared to be the creation of citizens and cadres, and the conversion of an entrenched bureaucracy and intelligentsia into an arm of the communist state. In a sense *thought reform* was an elaborate initiation rite

which everyone who wished to acquire any status in the new Communist society had to undergo” (1960:12).

What are the figures of “new man?”


“To be a good Communist in the end was tantamount to being unselfish, modest, considerate, willing to take responsibility and soon, each defined, of course, in term of the person’s relationship to the government”(Schein, 1960:10).

(新人)最重要的特征是集战斗精神和忠诚于一体 (...) “听毛主席的话, 跟共产党走” (Gao Hua 2012:205). The translation is: The most important characteristic of him (new man) is to have the combination of fighting spirit and loyalty: follow the orders of Chairman Mao, act with CCP.

Combined the descriptions of GAO Hua and Edgar H Schein, we can conclude the features of “new man” created by the means of *thought reform*.

1. “New man” will be highly obedient to the authority.
2. “New man” will only find his/her very existence in collective living, and not be able to make individual decision.
3. “New man” will not think independently, but only take the given values and worldview.
4. “New man” will be easily mobilized to act in group.
5. The traditional interpersonal ties, as in family, in friendship, in partnership could be sacrificed by “New man” for the sake of CCP and its revolution.

In Graphic 1.1, we can see what is the “new man,” and under which conditions, by which means, “new man” could be created.



Graphic 1.1


The return of “old man”

After the death of Mao and the end of Cultural Revolution, the dictatorship of Mao was gradually replaced by authoritarian interest groups. When the growth of liberalism inside of CCP during the opening in 1980s was cut off at the Tiananmen Square in 1989, the communist ideology and its values began to decline among the population in PR China. In order to refill the absence of national ideology, the Communist party-state has been trying to transfer China's tradition into Cultural Nationalism. "The party-state argues that China's traditions are useful to generate a sense of belonging...Using these traditional ideas, the contemporary party-state aims at arousing a sense of belonging in Chinese people to Chinese culture and traditions. When Chinese culture and traditions are referred to, deep emotions are aroused which express a collective identity in the Chinese 'imagined community' (Janette Ai, 2015:216).

Meanwhile, CCP leaders expect the return of "old man," who regards the CCP regime as the legitimate authority and carries the characteristics of feudal Confucian tradition:


1. "They (Chinese) prefer to seek economic security through reliance on authority in a world of material scarcity and uncertain employment In feudal China, social authority has not been generalized to a set of universal principles or laws; the image of state power is still personified and paternal" (Solomon, 1971:137-138). An "old man" holds secular values. However, he doesn't seek a modernized political system and human autonomy, but believes that a strong authority of paternity can discipline the population and prevent disorder and violence in the society.
2. "There is an all-or-nothing quality about this style of (Chinese) social relations: either the full trust and reliance characteristic of "dependency," or apprehension and avoidance of outsiders" (Solomon, 1971:103). An "old man" builds up his or her life in a closed collective living and secures his or her life based on the interpersonal relationship in this group.
3. "The fundamentals of Confucianism are centered around hierarchical structures of authority" (Christiansen, Rai, 1996:23). An "old man" accepts the hierarchy and existing system in society. He or she will fulfill his or her personal interest in a way of winning interpersonal competition and climbing the ladder of social hierarchy rather than changing the system.
4. "The Party seeks to perpetuate its legitimacy through nationalistic presentations, embedded with a thinly disguised political message, designed to create historical memory depicting the CCP as the savior and protector of China" (McDaniel, 2014:33). An "old man" finds his belongingness in nationalism and is proud of his or

her cultural identity in PR China. In the cognition of an “old man,” the CCP, the state, and the concept of China are not distinguished.



Graphic 1.2

Thus, how can “new man” and “old man” be combined and integrate one another as two parts of the “ideal personality” in the authoritarian regime of CCP?



Graphic 2

In Graphic 2, we can see that the essential qualities of “new man” and “old man” are coherent: low level of individualization, high level of acceptance of authority and hierarchy, reliance on interpersonal relationship. The only difference is that the “new man” finds his new cultural identity from the national shared ideology of Communist, but “old man” takes nationalism instead. It means that as a result of CCP’s ruling, “...the communist ideology, itself of Western origin, has not changed the society as much as one would have expected, given the major emphasis of the government in earlier decades to educate its people with the

communist ideas and eliminate the traditional, Confucian teaching” (Chen, Ling; Hui, Jung; Yeh, Becky 2014:63).

The similarity between “new man” and “old man” suggests the reason why the communist ideology failed: essentially, the key method of how CCP leadership organized and developed their organization since the era of Mao is to use the social and interpersonal forces which have root in feudal China. “Their (the ruling elite in CCP) relative influence in the leadership originated in their capacity to control relative segments of the bureaucracy or the military, and especially through their personal links to each other...The emergence within the leadership of contending political factions was based on this type of personal tie”(Christiansen, Rai, 1996:5).

The regime of CCP is not established on the constitution, but on an unmodernized brotherhood and the key leader of CCP is more close to a feudal monarch than a modern politician. “The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) form a tightly knit brotherhood of experienced, competent, devoted, tough revolutionaries. At the top are the members of the Central Committee, who hold key posts in the government and army, as well as in the Party itself, throughout the country. They decide policy and supervise its execution” (Barnett, 1964: 6).

Although Mao advocated to fight against Confucian traditions in the creation of “new man”, both his way to take over the central position in CCP and his manipulative strategies in ruling the organization of CCP imply a heritage of China’s feudal tradition. The dictatorship of Mao was not only a personalized Communist ideal, but also a fulfillment of expectation for a national paternal authority, which the population could follow blindly. Under the surface of advocating revolution, the authoritarian regime of CCP is also the heir of traditional culture out of feudal China, considering the interpersonal relationship in collectives, power distribution, people’s cognition and attitudes toward politics. The coherence between the authoritarian regime of CCP and the authoritarian regime of feudal monarchy is easily observed.

Milton Mayer explained that the dictatorship of Nazism from 1933 to 1945 “was what most Germans wanted—or, under pressure of combined reality and illusion, came to want. They wanted it; they got it; and they liked it” (Mayer, 1955: ix). In other words, Nazism found a way to adapt itself to fit in the German’s reality and illusion.

Each kind of dictatorship has its roots in history, social psychology, culture and human nature. The “ideal model of personality” that the current authority tries to maintain, also has its roots in history and culture. Both the competition among “new men” to scrutinize and

report one another to the Party, and the competition among “old men” who may “cooperate in doing something, but in the middle of things they might get to fighting over their personal interests...” (Solomon 1971:102) come out of the human nature: to evaluate their relationships with different objects based on their need for survival.

Both the establishment and the continuance of the CCP regime depend on a sustaining adaptation to the gene in the culture of an unmodernized China. Whereas, history is running forwards, culture is changing continuously. In the next chapter, we will find out if the “ideal model of personality” is being destroyed in Chinese society today.

Chapter 5: Values Changes in China

What is the political culture in PR China today? Considering the mass protests and new citizen movements mentioned in Chapter 1, it could be assumed that there is a mixed subject-participant culture in PR China, in which “a substantial part of the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist set of self-orientations, while most of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientations” (Almond, Verba, 1963:25). In this chapter, a qualitative analysis of the art project “I wish, China” and a quantitative analysis of the data of WVS 2014(World Value Survey) will be combined to examine this assumption and find out if there are emancipative values toward democratization appearing in Chinese culture.

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism

Welzel says: “Emancipation theory refers to everyone’s freedoms; it is a theory of the utility of universal freedoms and evolutionary origin of this utility” (2013: xxiv). Nevertheless, the findings and methodological settings of Emancipation theory in his book *Freedom Rising* are not always applicable to the case of China. For instance, in the regression analysis to show the effect of Technological Advancement on the Coherence of Emancipative values, China is not included.





FIGURE 2.1 The Effect of Technological Advancement on the Coherence of Emancipative Values (before and after controlling for societies’ belonging to the West and their democratic tradition).


(Welzel, 2013:76)

In the regression analysis to show the effect of economic growth on rising emancipative values, China is not included.



(Welzel, 2013:147)

According to Welzel in 2013, “there is a dynamic association between material wealth and emancipative values” (Welzel, 2013:148). On the figure of his regression analysis, China stays far away from the regression line with a low degree of Change in Emancipative Values.



Data of the World Bank

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-CN-DE-RU-US?display=graph>

According to the Data of The World Bank, from 1996 to 2015, the GDP growth in China was much higher than Germany, the United States, Russian Federation and the average of world. Nevertheless, in the following Table which Welzel made with the Data of WVS, the human empowerment in China stayed on a Modicum-Low stage.

To be a summary of the information above, Chinese situation is not plausible to prove the associations between technological advances, material wealth and Emancipative values.

Does it mean that the emancipation theory is not applicable to the case of China? I would suggest that the reason of this mismatching is rooted in Welzel’s research logic and methodology, which are initiated and prioritized by his western cultural identity and his cognition situated in democratic society. His findings can include non-democratic and non-western lands to a certain extent, but are not efficient to measure the situation in China specifically.

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism

TABLE I.3 Culture Zones and Stages of Human Empowerment (for ninety-five societies covered by the World Values Surveys/European Values Study.

CULTURE ZONES	STAGES OF HUMAN EMPOWERMENT				
	Suffering Stage	Struggling Stage			Thriving Stage
	Low	Modicum-Low	Modicum	Modicum-High	
Islamic East	Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey			
Indic East	Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan	India, Malaysia	Philippines, Singapore, Thailand		
Sinic East	Vietnam	China	Hong Kong	S. Korea, Taiwan	Japan
Orthodox East	Azerbaijan	Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan., Russia, Serbia, Ukraine	Macedonia, Moldova, Romania	Bulgaria	
Old West				Cyprus, Greece, Israel	Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Ireland Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal, Spain
Reformed West					Denmark, Finland, Germany (W.), Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden Switzerland, United Kingdom

(Welzel, 2013:23)

Welzel claims also by himself: “we cannot simply assume the alien nature of emancipative values to non-Western cultures; it must be examined. It is an empirical question whether and to what extent emancipative values exist and develop in non-Western cultures” (Welzel, 2013:74). Thus, as an experimental variation of Welzel’s research, I will set up a research tool based on a specified Chinese context.

In the last Chapter, an “ideal personality” of a citizen in an authoritarian regime is illustrated. There are four dimensions that could be used to profile the characteristics of this “ideal personality”:

1. **Acceptance of social hierarchy:** with “ideal personality,” one can highly accept the social hierarchy and the resulting unfairness in the distribution of social resources. One prefers to obey and follow the authority in order to climb up in the social hierarchy rather than act to reduce the unfairness in the construction of hierarchy.
2. **Closed mind:** with “ideal personality,” one takes only the given ideas and hardly thinks and acts independently.
3. **Survival orientation:** with “ideal personality,” one holds a strong survival orientation. One prioritizes extrinsic well-being over intrinsic well-being.
4. **Interdependency:** with “ideal personality,” one regards interpersonal relationship as a social facility to build up self-protection and interest alliance. One believes that the distributable social resources are limited. One situates oneself in a closed social group and feels competitive tension in interpersonal relationships constantly.

Against the four dimensions, we will define four cultural facts concerning emancipative values which are destructive to “ideal personality” and positive for democratization. It means that when the addressed cultural facts increase in society, the influence of “ideal personality” on individuals will be reduced, destroyed, and erased. As a result, a tendency toward democratization could be detected. After delineating the four cultural facts, I explain their derivation in emancipation theory and use quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine them in the framework of *Chinese Context*, at the end of this chapter, I will summarize how these four cultural facts could work together on the democratization in China.

The First Cultural Fact: the awareness of civic rights/recognizing the utility of freedom

“The distinction we draw between participant and subject political cultures turns in part on the presence or absence of orientation toward specialized input structures”(Almond and Verba 1963:16). Welzel’s “evolutionary theory of emancipation links human well-being and human empowerment in ways that explain three striking features in the history of civilization:

1. societies are easily and often for long times trapped in a self-sustaining cycle of disempowerment;
2. a cycle of empowerment only emerges under demanding conditions but, once in motion, is self-sustaining as well;
3. societies in the disempowering cycle become unstable when confronted with societies in the empowering cycle.” (Welzel, 2013:52)

Figure 1.2 schematizes the opposing cycles. Both cycles shape the entire fabric of societies (Welzel, 2013:52).

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism




FIGURE 1.2 Cycles of Empowerment and Disempowerment

To be aware of the civic rights and motivated to learn the usage of civic rights is the breaking point to bring human empowerment into the disempowering cycle and an evolution from subject political culture to participant political culture. It could be the most direct driver of democratization in China.

In the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989, there wasn't a proposal for political reformation including civic rights being initiated. But ever since, there is more and more emphasis on civil rights written in the Chinese constitution through petitions and protests in China. But, in general, to what degree can we see the awareness of civic rights in Chinese society?

WVS (2010-2014) provides data from 2300 Chinese responders, with which we can use quantitative analysis to have an insight.

	Have done	Might do	Would never do
V85. Signing a petition	1	2	3
V86. Joining in boycotts	1	2	3
V87. Attending peaceful demonstrations	1	2	3
V88. Joining strikes	1	2	3
V89. Any other act of protest?	1	2	3

The questionnaires V85-V88 provide an insight into responders' recognition of political input structures. I take the data of *Have done* and *Might do* together from China, Japan, Germany and United States as the reference to the awareness of civic rights and make a cross-national comparison.

In Figure 1.1 At the cases of signing a petition and joining in boycotts, people will not risk so much political oppression from the authority in China. We can see the percentage of the responders who have done or might do in China is higher than in Japan, and the difference between China and Germany is not very big.




Figure 1.1

In Figure 1.2, the cases of attending peaceful demonstration and joining strikes in China, shows people will take more risk, so the results in China are not very different from Japan, but are remarkably different from Germany and the USA.

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism




Figure 1.2

The survey asks:

V130. Would you say Having a democratic political system is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

There I calculate the percentage of very good and fairly good together.

V140. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?

I calculate the percentage on the scale 9 and 10 together.

There we can see the desire of Chinese responders to live in a democratic system is not weaker than Japanese responders, even close to responders in US.




Figure 1.3

Since we have seen that Chinese responders have a high expectation on “democratic government,” what should a democratic government be for them? The following two questions of Figure 1.4 will give us an insight.

The survey asks:

Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy.

Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”:

V133 People choose their leaders in free elections.

V136 Civil rights protect people from state oppression.

I calculate the percentage on the scale 9 and 10 together of these two questions.




Figure 1.4

According to what Figure 1.4 shows, I assume that Chinese responders build up their understanding of *democracy* from their realistic experiences: they have never experienced the function of a free election but feel a strong threat from the state. So that the concept “democracy” for Chinese is more significant to protect themselves from the state power.

Feeling threatened by the state, what do Chinese expect from the state at the meanwhile? We will see how the Chinese responders answered to the WVS.

The survey asks:

V62. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):

Maintaining order in the nation

Giving people more say in important government decisions

Fighting rising prices

Protecting freedom of speech




Figure 1.5





Figure 1.6


According to what Figure 1.5 and 1.6 show, compared to the responders in other selected countries, Chinese responders give much more priority to *Maintaining order in the nation* and *Fighting rising prices* than *Giving people more say in important government decisions* and *Protecting freedom of speech*. This result comes very likely from a fact that Chinese responders don't realize that *Giving people more say in important government decisions* and *Protecting freedom of speech* are democratic utilities which can help them to get what they want from the state, such as *Maintaining order in the nation* and *Fighting rising prices*.

In accordance with the above quantitative analysis, I suggest that the concept of civic rights and democracy are generally concerned in Chinese society as a positive political orientation, on the other hand, the mechanism of democratic politics and civic rights are not fully understood by the mainstream of population. Although Chinese hold secular values and prefer to follow the authority in order to survive, they will also question the authority when the state power threatens their survival. So that, what will Chinese do when they want to claim their rights against the state? The following qualitative analysis will provide a deeper insight with the cases of human rights activists in China.


In the project “I wish, China,” *democracy* is one of the key points often mentioned by the interviewed Chinese in their wishes for China. Especially when petitioners, protesters and human rights activists are interviewed, *democracy* is mentioned almost in every wish. Combined with democracy, rule of law and human rights often appear in their wishes too. For example, Cheng Lin, a civic rights activist wishes: *China could be a constitutional democratic country, in which there is freedom in thinking and tolerance in culture, values are multiple, human rights are respected, civic rights are fully protected.*



Li Shuangde, a voluntary legal consultant for petitioner wishes: *there is democracy, institutional government, multiple political parties (in China). Everyone has right to elect or to be elected; everyone has right to participate politics equally.*



Huang Xiaomin, a human rights activist wishes: *(China) could be a free land with democracy, rule of law and human rights being respected.*



Apparently, the interviewed human rights activists in Chinese express a much more specified idea about what democracy should be in China, by mentioning freedom of thinking, rule of law, right to elect or to be elected, multiple political parties, and civic rights. Moreover, all of them practice their ideas in the activities of demanding free election, protesting for human rights and supporting legal procedures.

At the end of March 2016, I interviewed He Bing in person, a leader of labour rights activity. His case makes a remarkable example of how the civic rights could be proceed in China.

He Bing suffers from pneumoconiosis because of working in privately owned mines without any labor protection arranged by the employer from 1990 to 2003. There were four members in his family who worked in mines together and got sick, He Bing, his father and his two older brothers. One of his brothers already passed away of pneumoconiosis. There were altogether more than 200 people from their village who worked in those mines. When he began to work in the mine, he was 13 years old and dropped out from his primary school. From 13 to 26 years old, he spent his life working in mines at least 10 hours per day for a daily wage without weekends and legal contract, same as other workers in that area of mines. In 2003, because misoperation caused incidents and environmental problems, these private mines were confiscated by local governments and auctioned off; all miners were dismissed without a physical examination. From 2005 to 2006, a large number of the former miners became ill and some of them died. Under a doctor's suggestion, they began to realize that the cause of pneumoconiosis was the working condition in mines and began to gather information about occupational disease. In 2007, He Bing and other former miners suffering from pneumoconiosis in his village started to work together and prepare a labour rights petition.

The first difficulty they faced was to testify that their pneumoconiosis was an occupational disease. According to the regulation of that time, if the employer didn't sign the testimony, any occupational disease of the employees would not be testified. The mines were auctioned off and the legal entity of their former employers didn't exist anymore, they could not find any responsible person to sign the testimony. More importantly, even if their former employers were still there, they would not sign the testimony-no one will sign a testimony against themselves. The regulation of that time about how to testify occupational diseases had a flaw.

In 2009, He Bing and his group applied for a peaceful demonstration in the local police office, in order to ask the responsible governmental institution to mend this regulation. They

pressed the local government to take responsibility of their former employers because when the mines were auctioned off, the local government took the money from the auction. They even sued several governmental institutions such as the Health Bureau and Security Bureau, because they had neither checked the situation in those mines nor visited there to give some instruction and information about labor protection.

The application for a demonstration wasn't accepted by the police office. But the local government began to pay for part of their medical bills. That payment was far away from what they needed, but more former miners came to join in their petition because they saw the return of their action. With more participants, they could increase their influence in society and gained more advantage in the negotiation with local government.

In 2010, the ministry of Public Health replied to the Labour Department that an employee need only have three colleagues to testify that it was an occupational disease instead of signature of the employer. The regulation was amended because of their effort.

Today, according to He Bing's estimation, of the total number of 30,000 former miners from that area, there are more than 7000 of them suffering from pneumoconiosis. More than 4000 of them are testified as occupational disease. They receive free treatment in hospitals, a small amount of monthly payment for cost of living, and some social well-being for housing and education.

There are very few cases that petitioners can win compensation from government at the end. He Bing and his fellows achieved one of them. However, the government has never admitted their responsibility in this case and only gives the compensation with the definition of "social aid."

During their petition, He Bing and his group were often humiliated, threatened, controlled, detained or slandered as troublemakers and rioters without sense. Their families and relatives were often harassed too. But the activists found their own way to fight back. They always did research on the officers who dealt with their case in order to access their personal information, as such their address, where their partners work, to which school their kids go. When an officer depressed their case or slandered their petition, they crowded to his home to explain the laws and social responsibility on occupation disease. In negotiation, they mentioned some names or locations related to the private life of officers from time to time without any concrete context. They even visited the family of the officer one by one. Each of them brought an apple without saying anything.

Another important strategy is to block down a key person in the government. This key person is normally only responsible to depress and silence the petitioners and not entitled to handle

the case. People in this position usually only answer to upper officers and don't care about what the petitioners suffer. When He Bing and his group made the big move to show the key person and his upper officers that the petitioners were able to do anything because they had nothing to lose, the upper officers of the key person would get seriously angry. But sometimes, when the key person came to negotiate with them, they talked with him and withdrew. This provided a chance for the key person to show his upper officers his capability of coping with an urgent situation. Soon after, the key person would understand the benefit of being in cooperation with the sick petitioners and begin to play a positive role in the negotiation between the petitioners and local government. In the lasting bargain, He Bing and his group switched their behavior between pushing a request and making a compromise, and the key person leaked information from the government to them and passed their requests to his upper officers. Each time, they made a small step forwards and increased the compensation that all sick miners receive.

In 2012, He Bing received concrete information that the local government made a decision to perish him. In order to protect himself, he organized an activity: around 400 miners who were suffering from pneumoconiosis signed papers together to donate their corneas to the Chinese Red Cross if they died of pneumoconiosis in the future. He said he didn't believe the operation of Chinese Red Cross personally, but with this case he made himself a moral figure and won some public support. Thereby, the local government hesitated to perform their plan and finally stopped making threats on them (Danyang Zhao 2016: Video clips HeBing01-11). He Bing didn't finish his primary education, there were also only former miners out of remote villages in his petitioning group. Nevertheless, they identified the responsible institutions; they collected legal knowledge and information to prepare themselves in their case; they organized themselves to act efficiently; they made wise plans against the suppression of the local government within the framework of the law and built up their own position. What they did in this ten years of petitions, showed a high level of human empowerment including professional political performance and broke the disempowering cycle.

However, it seems these actions are neither applicable to the theory of Materialist/Post-materialist by Ronald Inglehart nor to Welzel's theory -- He Bing and his group are clearly not educationally, technically, or economically advanced. But in another way, they are self-educated to acquire all necessary information and knowledge for their action. There are three conceptual bases which they identified to justify their action:

1. the reason of their protest: they are victims of occupational disease;

2. the target of their protest: the local government took the payment when the private mines were publicly sold, so that they are responsible to the former employees of these mines;

3. The method of their protest: they protested for the flaw in governmental regulation.

With the three conceptual bases, their action is justified both constitutionally and morally. This case shows a missing point when the two western scholars built up their theories: the function of advanced education, technique, and material wealth is varied in different countries according to different political system, history, and culture. In PR China, the educational system is controlled by the authority to promote “ideal personality,” so that the people spent less years in school have perhaps more chance to free their mind and have advanced political cognition as long as they are capable to educate themselves. The group lives in a village where they cannot have advanced technical devices. But it is also the reason they will not be distracted by overflowed information and political propaganda, but only focus on the most necessary information and communication. They are not wealthy, but the group is used to act with low cost. It empowers them to fulfill a continuous long-term protest with a limited budget.


The motivation of this protest of He Bing and his group is the same as for all peasant rebels throughout Chinese history the past two thousand years: to survive. And the crucial measure they took to win is also rooted in Chinese tradition: a strategy concerning interpersonal relationships. The only new fact in this petition is that they applied to laws and civic rights to justify their action and requests.

He Bing is still suffering from pneumoconiosis degree 2. He says this disease will never be completely healed, but right now it is under control. He is still fighting with the local government to ask them to admit their responsibility and travels in China to consult labour collectives on how to protect their rights in cases of occupational disease. He always talks with clear logic and dynamic expression. He had around 60 members in his petition group and 12 of them passed by. When he mentioned someone he lost, his talking gently slowed down but stayed calm and went on. He didn't let his sentiment flow out.

When they became ill, He Bing and other miners stayed at a very low position in the Chinese social hierarchy. The most possible future for them was to spend all their savings during the 13-year long mining work on hospital bills and then die of pneumoconiosis when they cannot pay their medical bills at the end. The governors and officers would have never even known or seen their death if they had not stood out. In their case, we can see not only their survival,

but how they made themselves equal with the governors and officers on the stage to bargain and claim their civic rights.

He Bing's wish for China is: *No matter rich or poor, having or not having social power, each one could equally have his/her dignity (in China) as in a democratic country.*



This idea belongs to modernized and civilized culture and values system, neither Chinese tradition nor communism.

The Second Culture Fact: individualization /Human Autonomy

In emancipation theory, individualism is an orientation that regards each human being, first and foremost, as an autonomous entity rather than a member of a group. Individualism doesn't mean that the connection among people is less important than individual benefit, but a way to cut through boundaries between "us" and "others," by prioritizing the individual rights both in "our group" and "other groups." It could be seen as a universal form of humanity in modernized and globalized world. According to Welzel, when one only concerns other members in one's immediate in-group, it is simply group egoism, which is valued in primordial collectivism. "Individualization diminishes people's dependence on support groups they have not chosen at the same time as it increases their chances to join and form groups which they prefer"(Welzel, 2013: 194). It means that there are three steps in the transition from the primordial collectivism to individualism: get out the interdependency of one's social group based on immediate relations, see self and others as equal autonomous entities on the world, join in or form groups with free will.

For 30 years, the flow of migrant workers from countryside to cities has reconstructed traditional social groups in China based on immediate relations. There are more possibilities for people to change the location of their livelihood. Besides the state monopolized industries, in the growing new industries, people can find more possibilities for career development and occupations. Is Chinese culture in a process of individualization? To answer that questions, I did the same as in the previous section: I selected the relevant data from

WVS 2010-2014 to provide quantitative analysis to support the interview findings. The questions that apply in the survey are:

For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is (very important/ rather important/ not very important/ not at all important)?

- V4. Family
- V5. Friends

I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?

- V102. Your Family
- V103. Your neighborhood




Figure 2.1

In Figure 2.1, I calculate the difference of the importance (*very important*) between Family and Friends, and the difference of trust (completely) between Family and neighborhood. The relations with friends come from individual decision, and the immediate relations are not choosable. When the friendship means not much less important than immediate relations for the responders, it suggests that individualism is increasing in society. Based on the results, it appears that the role immediate relations play in China is less important than in Japan, and similar to in USA, although China and Japan share the similar collective tradition rooted in Confucian culture. In societies with Confucian culture, the immediate relations are always prioritized in collective living. The data suggests that the traditional collective life style in China has been more destructed than in Japan during modernization. The difference of importance between family and friends for Chinese responders is also less than Japanese responders and closer to American responders. It suggests that, to the aspect of traditional social relations, China is in the process of individualism.

The recent CCP leadership employs the Chinese national identity to fill in the ideological gap after the Communist ideology failed in unifying the population. And by finding out how well this strategy works, we will know to which degree that Chinese responders take given ideas.

There are questions on the survey about nationality:

V211. How proud are you to be [Nationality]?

V 66. Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?




Figure 2.2

What we can see in Figure 2.2 is a little bit confusing: Chinese responders are not especially proud of being Chinese, but they are strongly willing to fight for China in case there is a war. It might suggest: the effort of CCP doesn't create a very positive cultural belongingness, but how Chinese understand global conflicts stays on the level of cold war, the idea of being threatened by imperialism is still embedded in the cognition of Chinese. In an indirect way, the propaganda and controlling on public opinions of CCP regime still works.

Opposite of the worldwide accusations, the CCP regime states its governing as democratic and denies human rights violation in China. To what extent do Chinese accept this statement?

The next questions address that issue.

V141.- And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely democratic," what position would you choose?

	TOTAL	How democratically is this country being governed today									
		Not at all democratic	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Completely democratic
China	(2,300)	1.6	2.2	4.2	5.4	11.0	14.4	18.6	17.7	6.5	3.8

V142.- How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this country?. Do you feel there is:

	TOTAL	How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this country						
		A great deal of respect for individual human rights	Fairly much respect	Not much respect	No respect at all	Inappropriate	No answer	Don't know
China	2,300	17.9	51.4	12.5	1.9	-	5.8	10.5

Figure 2.3-1




Figure 2.3-2

Figure 2.3-1 shows that 61% of the Chinese responders think the governance is fairly democratic (on a Scale of 6-10 being Completely democratic) and 69.3% think human rights are being respected (A great deal of respect for individual human rights+Fairly much respect).

There are 17.9 percent of Chinese responders who are fully coherent with CCP's statement that there is a great deal of respect for individual human rights in China. Showed on Figure 2.3-2, this percentage is even higher than for American responders. This result suggests that CCP's publicity can still make a strong influence on public opinions, and keep their governance legitimated.

Since the mind control of CCP is still quite effective on the political cognition of the population, it suggests that individualization generally doesn't progress much on the layer of perceiving, thinking and reasoning. Whereas, how much is the cognition of Chinese individualized, when it does not concern to political issues, but personal issues? There are two relevant questions in the survey:

V143. How often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of life?




Figure 2.4-1

V55. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out:




Figure 2.4-2

In combined Figure 2.4-1 and 2.4-2, we see another paradox of social psychology of Chinese responders. For American responders, the situation is quite coordinated: a lot of them think about the meaning and purpose of life and a lot of them feel they have choices and can control over their lives. There are more than 75% Japanese responders thinking about life, and not more than 20% of them feeling empowered to control their lives. It is an unfortunate situation but reasonable: one feels the limitation on his or her choices and capability, when one has his or her purpose in life to archive. Comparing to the other three countries, more Chinese responders feel having a great deal of choices and fewer Chinese responders think about the purpose of life. This result may suggest, that the modernization in Chinese material life is much more advanced than the process of the civilization in Chinese culture and the individualization of Chinese cognition: when the social structure is changing and the individuals have more freedom to make decision for themselves, most of them still live with the mind-set of "ideal personality."

Although the results of the survey do not show a particular progress of individualization on the layer of Chinese cognition, I will still assume that there are some changes under the visible surface before the individualization is totally socialized and turn to be notable social phenomenon. My assumption will be examined in the following questions out of the survey:

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?

V12. Independence

V14. Feeling of responsibility

V15. Imagination

V16. Tolerance and respect for other people

V21. Obedience

V22. Self-expression




Figure 2.5-1




Figure 2.5-2

In Figure 2.5-1. I draw lines to show how the individualism socialized in the four countries:

Having *Imagination* is a way of independent thinking and establishing individual identity on the cognitive level.

Self-Expression is a way to state individual opinions and establishing individual identity on the communication level.

Having *Independence* is a condition to live on as an adult in society.

Feeling of responsibility is a part of establishing individual identity on the social and public level.

Tolerance and respect for other people is a sign of maturely socialized individual identity.

The line of the US shows a smooth development along the process of socialization and the line of China shows lower degrees of individualism according to every item except

Independence, which is yet more related to practical aspects.

However, when we assume that there is a low level of individualism in China, we should notice that V22. *Obedience* is the least mentioned by Chinese responders. It is totally opposite to the reality according to the common knowledge about Chinese education. I will assume, that at least, Chinese responders begin to doubt if *Obedience* is a laudable character.

In accordance with the above quantitative analysis, I argue that there is an initiation of individualization in Chinese society, but it has not begun to work on social cognition and the dominant culture to a remarkable extent. The interview records of the project “I wish, China” often include the word “freedom.” But only a small number of interviewees specified the freedom as: freedom of publishing, freedom of speech, or freedom in education

(https://youtu.be/x59j_AT1tXU 0’53-0’57). In most cases, the interviewees described as a very vague and general idea of “freedom” (<https://youtu.be/xv7wgfQKkg8> 5’27-5’38).

What is the freedom they want? Although PR China is ruled by an authoritarian government, the majority of the population doesn’t confront a direct political oppression. The freedom they want, I would argue is opposite of the social and cultural restraint on individualization. They describe freedom as not having to be caught up in the bustle of work and the demands to succeed so that they have more free time to pursue their own lives and interests. To support this interpretation, are the following wishes from the interviewees:

Each Chinese could be a king.

Human rights, Individuality, personality could be respected.

Each of us would live with creative ideas, not only runs after money.

We live in a blundering time. I feel quite stressed every day. I wish that one day all of us would slow down, not so hurry to success, and we could keep peace inside.

There would be more clever people in China.

China could be completely different from what it is right now.

People could regain their mental peace in the bustling world.

China is a country which is not always in hurry.

Chinese people could care more about spiritual life, instead of only working hard to fill their endless material needs.

It is not so necessary to make a striking economic success. I wish ...China would be a land where people could live with equality, happiness and harmony.

<https://youtu.be/xv7wgfOKkg8>

https://youtu.be/x59j_AT1tXU

How the German artist Kiddy Citny responded to the wish “*Each Chinese could be a king*” draws a clear outline of individualization in Welzel’s emancipation theory. He transferred his Berlin Wall painting elements “king and hearts” onto a canvas.


It is theoretically impossible in human society that everyone is a “king” in the literal sense. But if there would be such a situation, it means everyone has equal political rights and can control his or her own life. When people internalize their autonomous rights and free their minds to find individual happiness, they have individualized agency in civil society. When one understands others autonomous rights being equal to his or hers and respect others’ rights, it is a socialized individual in civil society.





“I feel honored that my paintings with the kings and hearts are strewn all over the world. It’s wonderful to be able to witness it — my wall art as a monument,” said Citny. “It’s fantastic to be part of the falling of the wall. After the unification my images were interpreted as symbols of hope and freedom”

(Kiddy Citny 2014: <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/art/art-berlin-wall-25-years-later/>).



- *China could be completely different from what it is right now.*

The lady who made this wish explained: “I perceive the stupidity in public opinions. In many cases, one can figure out as long as he or she would have used their brain. But I don’t understand why they don’t do it. I see people always make public comment immediately without thinking. The society will be better if there are more *clever people*.”

Apparently, by *clever people* she means people who can think independently. When one usually thinks independently, it means that one is cognizant of his or her responsibility in what to think and what to say. *Clever people* in this sense are qualified agents for democratic political input in participant political culture (2016 VideoClip: KamenIwish.m4v).

Quite opposite to what Figure 2.5-2 shows, the Berlin-based Chinese artist Meng Huang described another fact about “Obedience.”



He said: “It is definitely bad if you are not obedient. In school, they ask you: ‘why aren’t you obedient to the teachers?’ In Danwei (Chinese institutional employer), they ask you: ‘why aren’t you obedient to your leaders?’ But no one has ever explained to you the principle of right and wrong. It seems that it is wrong as long as you are not obedient, but they don’t tell you why they are right. So we learned this idea gradually since we were kids that the one has power is always right.”

The change of mind on “obedience” is supposed to happen because of the open market. When the employment of people is not limited in *Danwei*, they are more motivated to move with their own decisions in order to be competitive on the market. “Obedience” is not always a laudable quality anymore. Thereby, I assume that the process of modernization has forced the destruction of “obedience,” an essential characteristics of the “ideal personality.”

“They (Chinese) were willing to change their career goals in order to make profits. Yet, as long as they made money and became rich, they are looked up to and they inspire others to do the same. In a sense, money has become the top priority and a sole measure of one’s success. What used to be a shameful conduct in traditional China is now shown in these dramas as merely asking for individual’s rights. Because of the overall focus on money in the society...people realize that the way to demonstrate that power is through the possession of material goods” (Zhong, Mei 2014:284-286).

The modernization of trading and business behavior is not enough to initiate the real individualization; but it only creates a stream towards economic success:

People have high levels of “Independence” in the sense of material life. They feel a lot of possibility in their lives, although they don’t often think about what they want in their lives (Figure 2.4-1; 2.4-2; 2.5-1).

The artist Meng Huang who participated in this project said: “No matter you have money or not, you have power or not, no one feels safe in this country. So they do all they can to gather money and materials. They want everything as much as possible, except cancer. They feel safer when they have more. Same as in an experiment, a small rat is running fast on wheel, it doesn’t know it will never reach the end. Faster it runs, faster the wheel rolls. In this process, the meaning of life fucks down.”

In his comment, we have a dilemma caused by the modernized material life and disadvantaged political system in China. And the interviewed Chinese in the project of “I wish, China” expressed similar thoughts:

The society *is blundering, bustling* and always *in hurry*.

People feel *stressed, no peace inside*.

When people begin to look for their own happiness and their own way to live, there will be a real initiation of individualization. And such values are also shown in the wishes:

Each of us would live with creative ideas, not only run after money.

It is not so necessary to make a striking economic success. I wish ...China would be a land where people could live with equality, happiness and harmony.

Combined the quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis above, we can see that Chinese are being individualized to the aspect of interpersonal relationship. A large number of Chinese might be independent financially, but not mentally. The majority of population are still under the influence of governmental propaganda, but the CCP ideology cannot provide a solution for the dilemmas of social psychology. The contradiction between modernized material life and the absence of independent thinking causes reflection and criticism. This suggests a beginning of individualization on the spiritual level.

The Third Cultural Fact: free from in-group living/ a globalized worldview

If we regard individualization as a process through which Chinese initiate their own worldview and get rid of the mind-set of CCP authority, I assume that the Chinese in this process also look for a social group where they can share their worldview consciously or unconsciously. This social group could be an abstract collective, in which people wish to mentally step out of the closed ideological island of PR China and look for a new cultural identity. In this process, people alienate themselves from the culture in which they are originally situated, moreover, reevaluate it and criticize it. Their critical behaviors infuse the culture and trigger the evolution. In China, the critiques are often brought up with cross-national comparison and in a globalized context.

By examining what the WWS data shows, we will find out the major worldview of Chinese from three perspectives—opinions about the role of the state, values, and world issues:

First, regarding the state there are two questions on the survey:

V60. *People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?*

1. *A high level of economic growth*
2. *Making sure this country has strong defense forces*
3. *Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities*
4. *Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful*




Figure 3.1-1

The second question is as follows:

V64. *Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important?*

1. *A stable economy*
2. *Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society*
3. *Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money*
4. *The fight against crime*




Figure 3.1-2

Seeing Figure 3.1-1 and 3.1-2, the data can support the wishes I quoted before being a plausible cultural fact: Chinese responders put less emphasis on the economy than Japanese and American responders. On the other side, Chinese show stronger concern for the defence of force than the other three countries and less attention to “*people have more say and human society.*” The result means that Chinese expect a state which can guarantee the quality of living environment, security, and livelihood of the population, but they might not realize the importance of participation of citizens in decision making in order to make such a state.

The second perspective is regarding the basic values in human society:

The survey asked the responders to value three possibilities listed from V67 to V69 as follows, and answer if they think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or they don’t mind.

The results are shown in figures 3.2-1, -2, -3.

V67. *Less importance placed on work in our lives*




Figure 3.2-1

V68. *More emphasis on the development of technology*




Figure 3.2-2

V69. Greater respect for authority




Figure 3.2-3

Confucian values which have been dominant in China and Japan since ancient times value hard work and look for solutions to social issues from interpersonal relationship and social hierarchy, but not from the development of technology and the conquest of nature. In Figure 3.2-1, the importance placed on work is highly valued. It is coherent to the Confucian value that the personal effort will be rewarded. At the same time, it should be considered that this value is also necessary for modernization. In Figure 3.2-2, the development of technology is highly valued in China and Japan. In figure 3.2-3, a greater respect for authority is less valued in China and Japan than in Germany and USA. According to the results of the survey, we see that two of the major values of Confucianism in China and Japan decline: more Chinese and Japanese responders look upon the development of technology as a good thing than German and American responders; less Chinese and Japanese responders than German and American responders see the respect for authority as a good thing. If we assume that the reason is that the Chinese and Japanese responders keep or abandon the Confucian values regarding if they are positive to modernization, the results make a clear suggestion that Confucian traditions in the East Asian culture zone are gradually changed and partly replaced by western values in the globalization.

The third perspective is regarding the world issues and there are two questions that garner information:

V80. Please indicate which of the following problems you consider the most serious one for the world as a whole?

1. People living in poverty and need
2. Discrimination against girls and women
3. Poor sanitation and infectious diseases
4. Inadequate education
5. Environmental pollution




Figure 3.3-1

V81. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?

- 1 Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.
- 2 Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.
- 3 Other answer




Figure 3.3-2

In Figure 3.3-1 we see that Chinese responders show their concern towards each problem on a middle degree comparing to responders from other three countries, neither the most one nor the least one. It means that Chinese are taking various issues in consideration for the world as

a whole. There is not an explicit orientation shown in the answers of the Chinese responders, for instance, like there are much more Japanese responders regard the environmental pollution as the most serious issue for the world as a whole. At the same time, we should notice that the answering rate of Chinese is lowest in the four selected countries. It might imply that cognitively, Chinese do not see themselves as “world citizen” and regard issues of the world as pressing issues related to their own lives. One proof of this hypothesis is, in the Figure3.3-2, when the question is not “for the world as a whole,” but emphasizes on personal opinion, the Chinese responders show an explicit orientation: the lowest coherence with the idea of “economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent” and the highest coherence with the idea “protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.” This result is explained by the well-known and increasing problem of pollution in China. Interviewees made several references to the environmental issues in China and their desire to see it improved. For example:

I wish China was a land where the sky's blue, the water's clean, the milk's drinkable and experts speak the truth.

I wish all Chinese citizens were free to come and go as they please so they could see the world.

I wish China were not a feudal society anymore and would become a habitable land for human beings.

I wish China was a country where everyone trusted one other and worked for the common good.

I wish China would become a country where people need not worry about food and water, but can live happily for just being human.

People would live here with a sense of belonging and security.

From the interview records of the project “I wish, China,” there is a strong voice for environmental protection that is consistent with the WVS data and even a clearer tendency to an evolution of culture and society, through which humanity will matter more than right now.

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism



This student in the video was born in a peasant family and was going to graduate from university when he took the interview. He remembers clearly how his parents worked hard to feed the family and struggled for survival. Generally, only when the peasant families have ambition to let their children climb up the social hierarchy, the parents will strive to support them to complete education in university. But this young man doesn't see the life of peasants

as a disadvantage to escape, but denies the Confucian value and points out that it is not right to distribute people in the social hierarchy regarding what they do.

He disagrees with his classmates from cities because they only think about how to have a stable material life after graduation, but do not care about the real fulfillment in life.

He doesn't deny the effort of his parents to support him to have a life different from working in field. But he claims that if he would also work hard for his children as his parents had, he will not expect the same as his parents expect from him: climb the social hierarchy or get richer. He will only expect the children to live with dignity and a good heart, knowing what he or she wants in life.

It is a vivid example of cultural transition that the young man presents: He respects the values of his parents and holds gratitude, but he doesn't inherit the survival values of his parents. He wants to promote the evolution of values between generations.

Against the dominant opinions around him, he is individualized and looks for an inner fulfillment. On the other side, same as his parents, he puts a lot of concern on what he can do for his children in the future. From him, we could see the mechanism of how changing values infuse the cultural transition: people take new values and put critiques on current culture, but at the same time, they carry the culture partly and are motivated by the culture unconsciously. Because culture exists not only in social norms or habits, more importantly, the dynamic of culture is contributed by individuals with their faith, values and passion. The continuation of culture is never a simple stream of blind following. The elements of culture can last only when they fit into a psychological system, both on the level of collective and individual.

According to the quantitative analysis of WVS data, the worldview of contemporary Chinese is changing under the influence of globalization; the traditional and conservative Confucianism is declining in Chinese culture. According to the qualitative analysis of the project records, I assume that there are a certain number of individualized Chinese trying to free themselves from the in-group living because they cannot simply take the shared values in group. And the reason they cannot simply take the shared values is because the culture including these values is "*trapped in a self-sustaining cycle of disempowerment*," as Welzel defined(2013:52). They don't find any solution in this value system for the problems in society and life which they are experiencing. Therefore, they look for a bigger view, a globalized worldview which can assist them to find the solution for a better life.

Considering the mechanism of cultural transition, we could understand better how Chinese society proceeds toward value changes: when people ask for spiritual goodness over the

material benefits, in fact, they look for a way to survive from an overloaded materialism in China, which is destroying both the environment and human's life. When Chinese take or refer to values from western or globalized culture, they are looking for an ideology which can coordinate the modernization, the changing structure of culture and individual needs of human being.

The Fourth Culture Fact: pursuing human dignity



不要有强拆，人民安居乐业，
社会公平。

There is no forced-eviction. People can live safely and have pleasure in livelihood. The society is fair.

Wang Rongwen was born in 1953. Until 2006, she had lived with her son and parents in the central district of Qingyang in Chengdu City. In 2003, the local government decided to reform the community into a shopping and consuming area with a historical and cultural concept. The inhabitants should move out with regulated compensation.

Similar to many other eviction cases, the process was mismanaged by corrupt officers. The family of Wang Rongwen didn't get reasonable compensation according to the regulation of eviction and therefore, they didn't move out.

During four years of harassment and the threats by the local government, her father got sick and passed away. A year later, the local officers broke into their home, her mother fell down from the building and died because of the violence. The local police officers kept Wang Rongwen in custody and forced her to sign a document to admit that her mother committed suicide, but she refused.

After the death of her mother, Wang Rongwen began to visit higher government officials and to protest to ask for justice. Because of her activities, she was detained, threatened, and controlled by a four-member team of local officers 24 hours per day until 2008, when the famous Sichuan earthquake occurred and the local officers had a more urgent situation to attend to.

Her son studied in Sichuan University when she was controlled. The young man was also harassed by local officers constantly, and became depressed because of the pressure. Therefore, he was not able to finish his studies and began his career as other students

graduated. Throughout her protesting, Wang Rongwen got to know other petitioners and human rights activists. She was not only acting from her own grievance, but she was also paying attention and caring about others. She says that she learned a lot from human rights activists about how to protest wisely, how to protect herself and how to claim rights.

Gradually, she became the connection between human rights activists and petitioners, to organize collective actions, spread information and news.

After ten years of petitions and protest, Wang Rongwen understands that she has very few chances to get compensation from the government. Nevertheless, she won't stop protesting. She says that she is doing "Happy Protest:" the government and its executives won't feel peace and the injustice won't be forgotten as long as she keeps protesting.

It means, that through her protesting, she emphasizes her existence as a human, and her rights as a citizen. She says that there are quite a number of petitioners having a similar idea of "Happy Protest."

According to Welzel (2013) "Human empowerment is the process through which people acquire what is needed to be in control of their lives. All empowerment processes originate from an inherently emancipatory **desire to exist free from external domination**" (56).

"Happy Protest" is a variant of self-empowerment in an authoritarian system. The reason they do "Happy Protest" is not to gain material success, but to achieve human dignity. In the wish of Wang Rongwen, we don't see a specific demand for democratization or political reform.

But her impulse to keep protesting is toward a democratic system. Her

Happy Protests" illustrate what Fukuyama (1992) concluded about the evolution of Communist societies:

Communist societies, in particular, despite their commitment to principles of freedom and equality, were exposed as modern variants of slave-holding ones, in which the dignity of the great mass of people went unrecognized. The collapse of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s reflected, in a sense, the achievement of a higher level of rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and their realization that rational universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order. . . . (205).

The good political order needs to be something more than a mutual non-aggression pact. . . . it must also satisfy man's just desire for recognition of his dignity and worth" (170).


Wang Rongwen has neither an advanced education background nor an affluent life.

Nevertheless, through "Happy Protest," she feels empowered against injustice, to free herself from the authority, to claim her civic rights, and to realize her dignity as human being, which

is prioritized in her life over material needs, even bodily security. Fukuyama further observed that “Revolutionary situations cannot occur unless at least some people are willing to risk their lives and their comfort for a cause” (180). Wang Rongwen and her petitioners’ group, and the connected human rights activists, have each experienced violence and depression, even spent time in jails, varied from one to twenty years sentences. In an authoritarian system, the way to insist on individual rights, interests, and beliefs is also a way to be freed from the dominant power in society and to realize individual dignity. Welzel (2013) further explained what Wang Rongwen’s illustrates when he noted that “Evolution has shaped the human mind as a device to pursue control over reality. Pursuing control over reality involves a quest for freedoms. ...we act to assert the freedoms that we value (value activation). Finally, the more freedoms we assert successfully, the more satisfaction we gain in the currency of self-esteem (action satisfaction)” (261).

“Happy Protest” provides psychological support to citizens in an authoritarian country to act for civil rights and political reformation. In these ongoing civic actions in China, the psychological mechanism of pursuing human dignity is not only distributed among the intellectuals, but also is found widely in groups with relatively less education. This phenomenon could be assumed to be a result of the combined development of techniques which provide people more possibilities to acquire information and knowledge by themselves and the negative effect of *brainwashing* in official education-the well-educated population has less freedom in mind.


To summarize, how can the four cultural facts in Chinese society work together to destroy the “ideal personality” and infuse democracy? The following illustration provides a way of visualizing what was revealed in the World Values Survey and the “I wish, China” project:



Graphic 2.1

In Graphic 2.1, we see a figure of the “ideal personality” with four limbs of the body: Acceptance of social hierarchy; survival orientation; closed mind; interdependency.

Acceptance of social hierarchy implies the confucian traditions; survival orientation implies the values of materialism; closed mind implies absence of independent thinking; interdependency implies the collective in-group living style.



Graphic 2.2

. I transformed the four figures of the “ideal personality” to the according cultural factors by making Graphic 2.2. On it, we see how the four cultural facts, awareness of civil rights, individualization, being free from in-group living and pursuing human dignity work together.

According to the emancipation theory, the first cultural fact—the awareness of civil rights is equal to recognizing the utility of freedom. It is the most direct driver for human agents to ask for democracy. It provides individuals a knowledge base of what constitutes fairness in society and how to achieve it. Moreover, it legitimates actions for civil rights. When more and more Chinese have knowledge about their civil rights, concealing the rights violations which are committed by authority will be more and more difficult. It will inflame more and more discontent in the population, through which the CCP could lose its legitimization. But the real psychological driver which can bring human agents from the level of awareness and knowledge to a level of action for political reform is the fourth cultural fact—pursuing human dignity. With the threat from authority, one will not move if one merely takes his or her interest in consideration. One can even take benefits and stay on the side of authority instead of asking for individual rights and autonomy. But the impulse is to fulfill the justice one believes cannot be satisfied with material goods. It produces a psychological awareness of constant civil rights activities.

The first and the fourth cultural facts are directly related to action for democratization. The second and the third cultural facts, individualization and being free from in-group living infuse the process of democratization indirectly. When more and more Chinese individualized and having a globalized worldview, the CCP's propaganda and media control will be less and less effective on public opinion, and the civil rights activities will arouse more empathy and understanding in society. It means that the authority will take more and more risks to avoid losing legitimacy when they depress the activities and protest.

I argue, that the four cultural facts and the values changes behind them are destroying the “ideal personality” and the disempowering cycle. If the “ideal personality” is not a dominant social psychology any more, democratization in China will be in process.

Chapter 6: Intercultural impacts in the changing values

Sixty years ago, Hilton Mayer found none of his German friends “ever know, or now knows, Nazism as we knew and know it” (1955:47). Today, the attitude of how Germans regard their history of Nazism is quite different. In the last sixty years, the values and cultural cognitions of Germans changed a lot under the influence of globalization and intercultural impact, which enhanced civil society and liberal democracy in Germany. The model Germans make the profoundest reflection on the history of Nazism in the world. How did globalization and intercultural impact work on the cognition of German? Is there a similar function in the value changes in Chinese society?

The project “I wish, China” provides simulations of intercultural effects on value changes of Chinese. Through analysis of the cases, I observed how the process works on the levels of cognition, interaction, and orientation. By analyzing and summarizing the project cases on the three levels one by one, we will have a comprehensive view to understand the function of intercultural impact and the answer of the above questions.

On the level of cognition

I wish China could be a land, where flowers are everywhere.

German Artist Kai Teichert made a giant painting for this wish, on which he illustrated a tree of human bodies and sexual figures on each flower. Homosexual figures are also included.





<https://youtu.be/xv7wgfQKkg8> 1'55 - 2'24

When this painting was exhibited in China, a female visitor expressed her idea about homosexuality: “Although homosexuality has no legal protection in China, we should understand and accept this based on humanity, because this is also human instinct.”

Alex Wang is a volunteer in the LGBT NGO office in Beijing. He spoke for the project interview: “From the affirmative action in the 1970s to homosexual activities in 2016, there is a big change in the USA. Although the progress in the USA is a bit radical, I am not sure if there will be a similar progress in China even after one hundred years. Nevertheless, I wish there will be such a progress in China too” (VIDEOclip: AlexWang).

Alex Wang first announced his homosexual identity when he was in high school and has struggled for a better integration with this identity in conservative social groups. Right now, he works in a company with capital and origin from a Western country in Beijing, and feels comfortable in his working place.

His concerns are not only the rights of LGBT, but also offer an extended perspective. He posts on his social media to criticize conservative values of family: “With these values, the unmarried people are regarded as miserable. The heterosexual marriage is advocated. At the same time, in the form of conservative family, the situation of violence, unfairness of financial rights, woman rights is not improved.”



Alex wang 同志中心

随着城市发展福利完善，终身单身和长期不婚同居的人会越来越多，单身社会是发展的趋势。而中国的社会和家庭，还在鼓励传统异性恋婚姻家庭，污名化大龄未婚女青年，把不婚主义者当作不幸的人，对单身人士逼婚逼生的声音不绝于耳，催生大量相亲网站，甚至不惜以愚孝来作为借口。然而传统家庭中的家庭暴力、经济分配不平等、重男轻女等问题却并没有大的改进。'

23 hours ago



Kai Teichert experienced the 1968 student movement in Germany and has still vivid memories about how conservative values were dominant in German society. His artistic interpretation of the wish is originated from a spiritual beauty of multiple human natures and tolerance.

The homosexual depictions in his painting and the relevant interview records of Chinese show that the changing values and attitudes toward LGBT group in Chinese society are inspired and associated by the global rights movement.





<https://youtu.be/ROcrLGRcfQY>

Michaela Brülle made her installation with female and male underwear to represent the wish “I wish China would become a country where women outnumber men.” For someone who has a good knowledge of modern Chinese society, there are more young men than young women due to the One-Child Policy and the tradition of valuing the male child only in family. The one who made this wish is clearly complaining about the social predicament that Chinese young men nowadays are struggling for a chance to get married because of the unbalanced proportion of male and female. The female artist is from former West Germany, where women had to have the permission of her husband to go to work, and had been through the movement for women’s rights and liberty. Her interpretation of this wish is formed as a competition of female and male, a rising of women’s physical and emotional appeal in the society. From a glance, the initiation of the wish and the art piece run in totally different directions. But if we can go more deeply, we find they meet up behind the surface and match each other perfectly.

The Chinese predicament of “men outnumber women” is a result of the heritage of the traditional thinking that a female child is not as important as a male child. Another fact of it is the unfulfilled women’ rights in Chinese society, especially in the countryside. The female artist does not know China well, but the motivation and concern of her art piece is rooted in her experiences of the social change in Germany and her personal identity as a female artist being free from the male-dominant society.

Sensing the intrinsic cause of the wish, her work presents a winning female identity and a balanced society, which is also the only solution to the wish referred to in the predicament in China. Because it is also the solution she believes for issues in German society.



Nadja Schöllhammer joined the project for the second tour in China. The materials she got were not only the wishes in text, but also documentary videos with interviews and the projects. She asked for several women’s magazines from China, and made a series of paper installations out of them, for the consumer-based life without peace. She says that she needs the touchable materials to embody her feeling for this project. When she sees the content of

these magazines which are full of over-embellished images of women and products, she sees also a prettified and illusory world, which provokes her to destroy and to damage.

This represents a consensus of several wishes: “I wish China could be completely different from what it is right now.” “I wish China were a country located as far from me as far as possible.” or “I wish hypocritical Chinese officials would learn to speak the truth and treat citizens properly.” Her works speak of an unreliable beauty and unsteady material world.

The most important cognitive factor in the process of globalization is to know what people think, react to and their behavior in another political system or culture. When individuals are depressed by the discrimination and injustices in China, neither the communist nor China’s traditions can provide a solution. This is why the concept of “human rights,” civil society and emancipative values could be “globalized” into Chinese society and influence the values changes in China.

On the level of interaction



<https://youtu.be/ItRDKVesZxo>

LAN Hung is a Berlin-based Taiwanese artist who also spent years in France. His interactive performance was arranged at his birthday party. At the party, he set up rules and games for the participants and always left them to decide what to do when they had no idea what would happen. The participants tried different plans and even ended up with organizing themselves in teamwork. After the party, Lan said that this performance was to evoke democratic behaviors and to respond to the wishes which mentioned democracy.



<https://youtu.be/DaKEiCYwfdI>

German artist **Richard Rabensaat** made his performance ‘Balance’ out of the whole collection. He extracted a key word from each chosen wish and wrote it on a balloon—for instance, “efficiency,” “dream,” “government,” “trust,” and so on. Afterwards, he hung up the balloons as a complicated construction in balance, which is compared to the Chinese society. When he was burning out the balloons one by one with a gas lighter, the balance of the ‘society’ collapsed. This performance matches the idea of the project: “individual appeals should be respected” seamlessly.



<https://youtu.be/KWGfjNANuf0>

Berlin-based French artist **Sandra Riche** made her interactive performance ‘Besetzt’ (‘occupied’ in English). In the performance, she led the participants to take the ‘besetzt’ seats back—an action to rebuild the opportunity for equality and to emphasize the individual rights over the political or economic power which monopolizes the opportunities in each society. Next to the performance of Richard Rabensaat, her performance reflects the project from

another viewpoint and brings value to all the actions which were taken in the project: “We will do something for what we want and what we deserve.”

No intercultural impact has a single effect. Both parts will be primed and developed in the interaction. The most important interactive factor in the process of globalization is to understand the perspective of people in other political systems or cultures. The three artists are all in Berlin, but have different cultural backgrounds. In each art concept, we see a differentiated perspective on Chinese issues represented by the wishes: organizational, constructional and practical. This reflects a profound proposition in political reform in China after 1989, which could be perceived in the human rights activities I introduced in the last chapters.

On the level of orientation



<https://youtu.be/Ghnlde9VxF4>

The young German artist **Kevin Gray** perceived depression as a result of the polluted living conditions from several wishes. For example: “I wish China was a land where the sky is blue, the water is clean, the milk is drinkable and experts speak the truth.” Or “I wish China would become a country where people need not worry about food and water, but can live happily for just being human.” He made a painting with a lonely figure standing in a misty atmosphere who seems to be losing self-identity. As a qualified painter, Kevin Gray is good at capturing the emotion and embodying it on his canvas. The pollution is represented abstractly, but he

Understand the value changing in a complex of authoritarian capitalism

makes an emphasis on the feeling of individuals in the pollution, the feeling of being lost and helpless.



<https://youtu.be/djy67WhT9Nc>

Janine Gerber is a German artist who experienced the last ten years of the DDR. Her paper installation consists of shadow and light. Through cracks on the hanging paper, an unknown space could be perceived, implying another possibility of future growing in people's imaginations. This installation was exhibited in a university library in China.



<https://youtu.be/9PQXuyswO9c>

Michael Ebert built a video installation beside the exhibition space in the Chinese university in 2014. There, the sky of Berlin could be seen fascinatingly 2 meters deep underground. In a summer night in China, some Chinese young men and women who never got to know another culture outside of China, looked down to another side of the earth and saw the cloud floating in the light sky of Berlin, the wind going through the wobbling leaves. In the 4 days of work for the exhibition, Michael Ebert gave the students a lecture, worked closely with their assistance and ate with them in the dining hall of the university. The students showed great excitement and enthusiasm to be around him. In a way, the students saw the artist himself as “the sky of Berlin.”



<https://youtu.be/tcLXG2e1T9M>

Barbara Eitel is a German artist. As a participant artist of the project “I wish, China,” she believes that art could make the imagination broader and generate more possibilities. She responded to the wish: “*I wish all Chinese citizens were free to come and go as they please so they could see the world.*” Her work represents how travel experiences assist her to understand the world and build up a personal orientation about to exist and integrate into the world.





The same as Kai Teichert, German artist **Birgit Cauer** made her art pieces according to the wish “*I wish China could be a land, where flowers are everywhere.*” Different from Teichert, Cauer used “real materials,” original Chinese calligraphy and dry flowers to construct her works. She regards the flowers and words as symbols of individual ideas. The wish is interpreted into individualized personal identity and orientation in life.

From the range in projects from of Kevin Gray to Birgit Cauer, we can see a reflection of the changing values on the level of orientation in the globalization: Loss of self-identity, looking for another value system, getting close and catching different value systems, reforming, and adjusting one’s self value system by integrating the new experiences—individualized personal identity. This is a process for a modernizing nation and for all the individuals in the nation to generate new dynamic in the globalization.

As a conclusion, we find that Chinese society is also being influenced by intercultural impact and in a process of changing. Although the specific context of China defines every details of this process, we believe that the essential mechanism of it is congruent to how it worked in Germany.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The participant artist Kai Teichert answered the interview of Kulturradio about why he was motivated to be part of the project “I wish, China.” He said that the project was the first interactive platform organized by individual, not an official institution to communicate with Chinese on political and social issues. He got a deep insight about China by joining in the project, which he had not gotten through German media.



https://youtu.be/x59j_AT1tXU

Another participant, artist Babara Eitel, said that it was a personal dialogue to create attention for the current situation in China.

The project “I wish, China” includes around 100 Chinese, who expressed their wishes for China. The quantity of the responders cannot make a convincing representation of Chinese population, but the quality of the project records is remarkable. As an art project, “I wish, China” created an unusual circumstance for the interviewees, where they cannot use an indoctrinated idea in their minds and daily knowledge to answer, where they have to think and respond independently. This is why the records of project can provide a profound and essential reflection on value changes in China and inspire artists in Berlin to create art pieces. Moreover, the artworks and exhibitions enrich the project as a return and encourage more Chinese to develop their idea about the future of China.

It is the first time that an art project is taken as the fundamental basis for political and cultural research. And the result demonstrates the value of art practice in cultural and intercultural studying.

What does democracy mean to Chinese? In 1999, a book titled *First Signs of History Promised Half a Century Ago* was published in the Peoples Republic of China, and was banned soon after the publication. The author, Xiao Shu, collected and edited a large number

of expressions made by CCP elite about their advocacy for democracy in this book. This included rights of election, freedom of speech and their criticisms of media censorship, the one-party system, and political oppression. There are some translated quotations as follows: The way to measure democracy, is to see if the human rights, political rights, and property rights and other rights of freedom are protected. If not, there is no democracy at all (...)

<*Jiefang Daily*> May 26, 1941

The key point to carry out democracy today, is to finish the one-party system (...)

<*Jiefang Daily*> October 28, 1941

It is clear that democracy and freedom of speech are inseparable. We should take the experiences of democratic countries as references to realize our democracy.

<*Xinhua Daily*> April 19, 1944

In order to realize the freedom of publishing, the current censorship must be abolished.

<*Xinhua Daily*> June 26, 1944

<http://mingshi.qlteacher.com/studio/weiyaofan/Article/11001>

As a former participant of the demonstration on Tiananmen Square in 1989, Xiao Shu showed the irony of the governors of CCP, who abandoned their advocacy and created a governance system worse than the one they critiqued.

What is the essential reason that CCP leadership abandoned their advocacy of democracy?


Through the study in this thesis, we assume that the essential reason for the failure of political modernization in China is the dominance of the “ideal personality” in the national values and culture. After the Second World War, the top concern of the Chinese population was to have a powerful authority which could hold the nation together and protect it from *Western Imperialism*, so that the nation and its population would not be threatened by the civil wars or invasion as what they had gone through in the past half century. This tendency can still be seen in the WVS 2014 survey reported in this thesis. The dictatorship of Mao created an illusion of a strong nation which fulfilled this expectation of the population with an “ideal personality” and saved “New Man” and “Old Man” from the fear of wars and deprivation. After the Opening in the 1980s, the top concern of the Chinese population has been getting rid of the poverty and the deprivation in material life. As Fukuyama (1992) explained: “For if a country's goal is economic growth above all other considerations, the truly winning combination would appear to be neither liberal democracy nor socialism of either a Leninist

or democratic variety, but the combination of liberal economics and authoritarian politics that some observers have labeled the ‘bureaucratic- authoritarian state,’ or what we might term a ‘market-oriented authoritarianism’ (123). In this case, the CCP authority plays the right role in order to guarantee the economic growth. Whereas, the cold war ended 25 years earlier and the development of technology has improved the living condition of a large scale of human beings worldwide. The values of Chinese in the last 80 years which legitimate the rule of CCP cannot always stay same when the social environment has changed.

In the finding and analysis of the WVS

(<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>), data from Chinese responders shows a high orientation of combined Survival and Secular-Rational Values, as it is shown in the Cultural map.

Cultural map - WVS wave 6 (2010-2014)



Survival values are not positive for emancipative values and human empowerment according to Welzel. However, when the CCP regime shows less and less function on the environmental issue, the human rights issue, and the security of food and water in modernizing China, the illusion of an omnipotent paternal authority is collapsing, and the population feels it is being threatened by the authority rather than protected by the authority. “Chinese hold a

paradoxical orientation to social authority which draws its inspiration from this tension between unity and conflict. On the one hand, they look to authority for security against conflict and material deprivation,(...) On the other hand, however, they express concern with the manipulative harsh qualities of that same authority, and seek to avoid contact with what is seen as the “tiger” of governmental power”(Solomon 1971: 104). In the globalizing era, the modern political concepts are more and more referred to by Chinese to critique their authority. They are not only to avoid contact with the governmental power, but also to seek a way to restrain it.

We can assume that there will be a point of transition, where the threat from CCP authority is going to overwhelm the worry of conflict and material deprivation, or where the population doesn't see the CCP authority as a security against conflict and material deprivation. On the point of transition, the survival values could turn to be a motivation to look for human empowerment; the political modernization and democratization would be initiated.

“[T]hese values change people's life priorities and, hence, most likely their life strategies as well. And emancipative values do this in the same way wherever they become widely shared. As these values spread, they encourage people to follow their own intrinsic impulses.”
(Welzel 2013:189)

Combining the cases of the project “I wish, China” and data from the WVS 2014, we conclude: China is on the way to economic and social modernization. The dominant value of “ideal personality” up to now is not always feasible in the changing social mechanism and interpersonal relationships. However, the pace of changing values and political culture is not as rapid as the pace of economic and social modernization. The in between difference cause confusion, cultural and moral contradictions, which are facilitating the destructing of “ideal personality.”

In the last twenty years, globalization provides possibility for the Chinese to access modern political concepts and ideologies. But because of the media censorship and monopolized education system, the knowledge and information acquired is more up to the motivation of individuals. On one hand, although there is a tendency to demand democracy in Chinese society, the cognition and knowledge of the democratic mechanism in a society are not profound enough to initiate the democratization. On the other hand, the effective civic and rights activities are undertaken more by people without strong educational backgrounds. The extrinsic reason of their activities is to strive for survival; however, the intrinsic reason of their activities is the rising emancipative values related to human empowerment and dignity.

The intercultural impact doesn't apply to the value changing in China as much as in Germany and Japan after the Second World War because the nation had been totally isolated by the red communist border in the era of Cold War and is still in censorship until today. But it provides a convincing reference for the faction of Chinese who begin to look for solutions to their predicament.

According to the cases in project "I wish, China," I assume that the most efficient progress to approach real democratization in China will not be an immediate breakdown of the CCP regime, but the interest and position switching of the individuals inside of the CCP authoritarian system. The Chinese wagon is on its own way to the destination of democracy.

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