

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA; A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM

*Disclaimer: kindly note that this PhD Thesis is basically hinged on a Masters Dissertation with a related discourse and theme submitted for the completion of Masters of International Studies and Diplomacy, at the School of Oriental and African Studies, SOAS, at the University of London, London (2012). The dissertation was authored by the researcher himself. Hence, I have the intention to pursue and advance this thesis within the context of the Masters Dissertation and broaden it to encompass other areas.



SELINUS UNIVERSITY
OF SCIENCES AND LITERATURE

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN AFRICA; A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM**

BY

GAFAR ADEKUNLE ADENEKAN

Supervised by

Prof. Salvatore Fava Ph.D.

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Abstract

This thesis examines two fundamental causal mechanisms; one, the causal factors that have been articulated by different scholars in explaining the countervailing pressures that have been responsible for undermining Nigeria's diplomatic efforts in containing violence and insurgencies in Africa. Second, and closely linked to the first, is the assessment of the two major theoretical arguments regarding the causal mechanisms of insurgency using the predominant theories of grievances and opportunities in the context of Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria. While there is a widely-held argument that Nigeria's inability and inconsistencies in her diplomatic engagements are functions of atypically corruption, state failure/weak governance, grievances and opportunity explanations have been the two conventional theories scholars have employed to understand how insurgencies begin. The failed state thesis regarding the fundamentals of governance has also prompted debates on the links between insurgency and failed state.

While these arguments may partly explain the causal factors, however, these opinions tend to be one-sided. They concentrated excessively on the domestic factors, and seemed to pay inadequate attention to other factors that could be responsible for the rebels' rational decision and the failure of Nigeria's diplomacy outside the domestic sphere. As a result, this thesis argues that this line of thought is inadequate, as it could result to a relative distortion of an analytical understanding of facts that shape issues and situations.

Moreover, the failed state discourse is ill-conceived as most of its assumptions are based on the neo-liberal understanding of governance and stability. Hence, a convincing

explanation about the countervailing pressures that have tormented Nigeria's diplomatic capabilities in promoting peace and security in Africa, which eventually led to the rise of Boko Haram insurgency, should be located outside the domestic context of Nigerian society. This thesis contends that Nigeria's constraints and the attendant Boko Haram insurgency could be explained within the framework of the neo-liberal policies of the western capitalism. The undue interference of neo-liberal actors in the domestic affairs of Nigeria, and the attendant implications of their policies on socio-economic conditions - which is justified, on ideological grounds by some group of aggrieved elements in the Nigerian society who aspire to resist liberal values and norms using ideological argument - had overwhelmed Nigeria's capabilities on all fronts.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

On several occasions, Nigeria has, often times, been at the center of efforts in restoring normalcy and enforcing cease fire agreements to many countries in conflicts in Africa. Her diplomatic role - in terms of peace-keeping and mediation efforts - has been quite evident and profound in bringing peace and development to West Africa in particular, and Africa at large. Abuja has severally intervened and mediated in several frozen conflicts while standing for African Union at several international levels (Oshewolo, 2021). The Sierra Leone and Liberia experiences were quite distinct and evident in Nigeria's unequivocal commitment to championing the course of promoting peace and security in Africa.

Nevertheless, in spite of Nigeria's unequivocal diplomatic commitment in promoting peace, security and political stability in Africa, and perhaps in the global South (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2016; Akinterinwa, 1987; Adetula, 2015; Adebajo, 2002b:48; Alli, 2012; Bach, 2007, Channels TV, 2013; Cook 2011:18, Ebegbulem, 2019; Gambari, 1980; Galadima, 2007; Isiaq, 2012; Muritala et al. 2018; Ogunnubi et al. 2016; Onoja, 1996; Ozoemena, 2003; Saliu, 2006), there has been a widely-held argument that her diplomatic engagements apparently have often recorded 'limited successes and sometimes failures' in restoring normalcy and enforcing cease fire agreements to many countries in conflicts in

Africa. Moreover, the sleeping giant's reputation had suffered harsh criticisms from various quarters for her reluctance to committedly intervene in some conflicts of grave – humanitarian – concerns in Africa (Akopari, 2016; Bach, 2007; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018, Ogunnubi, 2014). A good instance was Nigeria's astonishing volte-face posture in the wake of Cote d'Ivoire's post-election conflict in 2010.

Hence, there have been increasing volumes of scholarly contestations and intellectual publications from various quarters on the factors that have threatened Nigeria's ability in a bid to conveniently and successfully play the role of a regional power. This was as a result of a few inconsistencies that have undermined the country's diplomatic engagements towards her contribution to the stability and development of Africa.

Moreover, there is a widely-held argument that these inability and inconsistencies are functions of atypically corruption, state failure/weak governance (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

These factors, according to their proponents, play a critical role in infringing on the accomplishments of Nigeria in her leadership responsibility in Africa. These presumptions and understanding have apparently continued to influence considerable number of academic writings and policy making in explaining the causal mechanisms for the country's inability to play the role of a regional power in her continental engagements.

This thesis, nevertheless, critically assesses two fundamental factors; one, the causal factors that have been articulated by different scholars in explaining the countervailing pressures that have been responsible for undermining Nigeria's

diplomatic efforts in containing violence and insurgencies in Africa. Second, and closely linked to the first, is the assessment of the two major theoretical arguments regarding the causal mechanisms of insurgency using the predominant theories of grievances and opportunities in the context of Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria. The paper also assesses the weak state discourse in explaining the causative factors for insurgencies and established the context in which this thesis is used and how it can taint conventional understanding and knowledge of international security issues if the cause of insurgency is viewed only through the lens of weak state.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

From independent, Nigeria's diplomatic engagement revolves around her Afrocentric principles which were clearly articulated in parliament by the first Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on the 20th August, 1960.

Consequently, Nigeria's diplomacy had been successfully deployed in several occasions in containing conflicts, in influencing United Nations debates and actions; such as the arms embargo against Yugoslavia, and United Nations sanctions against former Liberia warlord, Charles Taylor; a sanction that came at the request of ECOWAS, which was visibly influenced by Nigeria.

However, in spite of Nigeria's significant leading roles and unwavering commitments to regional diplomatic engagements in the region, Nigeria's (under) performance and limited successes in its Afrocentric principles have been a subject of debate in several diplomatic quarters. This was consequently

predicated on her inability to translate unequivocal assets, such as economic strength, military potentials, population and the likes into real and concrete power.

In a clear term, the success of Nigeria's diplomatic practices seems to be a great deal less impressive than compared to her potentialities. Moreover, the limited successes have equally been undermined by a few inconsistencies, which consequently resulted in the country's reputation being compromised and harshly criticised as well. Also, the recurrent reluctance and inactivity of Nigeria to engage in some conflictual situations have been quite worrisome for several governments and diplomatic stakeholders in various quarters.

Hence, this thesis critically evaluates scholars' accounts of the 'countervailing pressures' that have bedevilled the realization of the country's Afro-centric policies, and how the interrelatedness of these considerations reinforces Nigeria's diplomatic role in Africa. This is especially true in terms of her perceived leadership status in the continent. And the thesis finally identifies the real causal factors that have constrained the country in her bid to fulfil her so-called manifest destiny in promoting security and development in Africa, and what informed the decisions of Boko Haram's decision to engage in insurgency.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Basically, the thesis is influenced by the need to;

- 1 Make a theoretical contribution to the existing wealth of knowledge on the employment of instrument of diplomacy in conflicts and conflicts resolution;

- 2 Access Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Africa and its achievements so far based on her commitment to the Afro-centric principles both within the Sub-region and Africa at large;
- 3 Critically analyse and articulate a logical and consistent causal mechanisms that have undermined Nigeria's performance in her regional engagements;
- 4 Provide a fair and balanced analysis on what informed Boko Haram's decision to engage in insurgency;
- 5 Understand Nigeria's current challenges of conflict resolution in Africa in the face of growing extremist organizations.

1.4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

In spite of Nigeria's commitment to Afro-centric principles, there is no gainsaying in the fact that Nigeria's role conception and diplomatic priorities vis-a-vis its leadership posture in Africa - which is guided by a wide range of themes that simultaneously give finesse, form and focus to its diplomacy - was fast depleting by interactions of several related factors. Hence, the amalgamation of these factors engendered an infringement on the achievement of a hushed hegemonic interest and played critical role in conditioning Nigeria's diplomatic outlook as an imputed regional hegemon.

Despite the dearth of explanation scholars have put forward as the roots of this challenge, apparently, these explanations have been found to be somewhat ill-conceived as most of its assumptions are based on the neo-liberal understanding of governance and stability.

Hence, the thesis aims a critical analysis of the countervailing pressures that have undermined the country's performance in fulfilling her manifest destiny especially in areas such as restoring normalcy and ceasefire agreements to several nation states in conflicts. Furthermore, it seeks to establish the causal mechanism that informed Boko Haram's decision to get involved in insurgency. Hence, the recommendation and conclusion of this thesis will go a long way in influencing the understanding of policy makers and other diplomatic stakeholders in decision making enterprise. Also, it makes them have a more robust understanding of the causal mechanisms that thwart the country's achievements.

1.5. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

In view of the fact that this thesis attempts a critical assessment of Nigeria's diplomacy in the context of the causal mechanisms that have undermined her Afro-centric policies, and how this phenomenon influenced the understanding of scholars and diplomats' demands that the approach to be employed has to be analytical on the one hand. While on the other hand, there has been growing need to take some other several successful peace efforts and unsuccessful alike involved in by the country into consideration to resolve some conflictual situations in Africa. Hence, negotiations, conflict resolutions, and bilateral and multilateral negotiations taken by the country, the AU, ECOWAS will be briefly examined. Hence, such a work demands basically descriptive approach. As a result, the thesis employs both analytical and descriptive analytical approaches.

The sources of data are secondary sources. Materials such as academic literatures, journals, articles, books, opinion writings, media publications, official documents and internet materials are conscientiously examined and subjected to a critical and well-informed analysis.

1.6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions this thesis seeks to answer may include though not limited to: (a) what is the role of Nigeria's diplomacy in ensuring peace and security in Africa? (b) what is the real strategic national interest of Nigeria in Africa? (c) what has been responsible for Nigeria's inability to translate her unequivocal assets, such as economic strength, military potentials, population and the likes into real and concrete diplomatic power? (d) what is the real causative factors that have motivated the insurgency groups especially in the context of Boko Haram?

1.7. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Given the scope of this research work, the feasibility to make the details of this thesis a working document might not be conceivable. However, the research may be considered a fundamental roadmap and guide to future goals and studies upon which subsequent studies can be conducted based on the data used to supplement the findings and recommendations made by the thesis.

1.8. LIMITATIONS

Considering the objective and scope for which this thesis is intended, and owing largely to time interval for research process, restricted data and intelligence systems of the government, the research work is hinged on and restricted to issues related to Nigeria's diplomacy in conflict resolutions, peace and security developments, national interests, and Boko Haram insurgency.

Hence, the work may not be able to holistically cover all facets of diplomacy. However, detailed description, and analysis of the issues under discussion will be critically addressed and analysed in relation to international relations theories and elements of power and national interests. Apparently, engaging in all of the above raised issues in a critical manner may be rather complicated and complex, however, a careful and thorough approach, based on the main objective of the thesis, would be employed to restrict the analysis.

1.9. CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

1.9.1. CONFLICT

Fundamentally, conflict is an etymological derivation of the Latin verb *confligere*; meaning to clash or engage in a fight. It implies a sort of confrontation between at least two or certain individuals and parties as a result of irreconcilable interests over goals, power, status and resources (Schmid,2001). This aligns with Diller's submission (1997) that conflict as any sort of confrontation between two or more parties as a result of having incompatible goals (Diller,1997).

Dahrendorf (1959) on his own, perceives conflict as “a contest competition, dispute and tensions as well as manifest clashes between social forces”. Furthermore, Boulding (1978) notes that conflict “is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of the potential future position and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other”. Moreover, Coser (1956) explicates conflict as “the struggle over values or claims of status, power, and scarce resources in which the aims of the group or individuals involved are not only to obtain the desired values, but to neutralise, injure or eliminate rivals”. In Stephens Robbins’ (2007) account, conflict is a “process in which an effort is purposefully made by one person or unit to block another that results in frustrating the attainment of others goals or the furthering of his or her interests” (Robbins and Judge, 2007).

Drawing on these scholars’ works, and their conceptions about conflicts, this thesis considers Conflict, in a general term, as a disagreement between two or more parties. When the probability to reach a consensus between these parties becomes questionable, hence, conflict ensues. (see Adenekan, 2008). According to Schmid, “the range of outcomes includes victory, defeat, domination, surrender, neutralisation, conversion, coercion, injury or destruction and elimination of opposite party, or alternatively the solution, settlement or transformation of conflict issue”. (Schmid, 2001)

Hence, it may be argued that conflict is inexorable in the international system, because it is, according to Mathew, et al, (1984:2), “a consequence of relationships and interaction among groups of people who live in a condition of

anarchy". The dynamism and erraticism of human nature, apparently, will continue to fuel the prospect and imminence of conflict in the world, as perceptions and interpretations of situations will also remain antithetical. In the international community, perceptions are generally based over cultures, values, beliefs and other variables. Hence, conflict responses are somewhat filled with feelings and ideas that, sometimes, can become extremely persuasive guides to people's sense of likely solutions (see Adenekan, 2008).

The prevalent nature of conflicts in all regions of the world further gives credence to the assertion that conflict remains largely an instinctive and intermittent phenomenon in international relations and the global community at large (Adeleke, 2007). In a global environment whose resources are being ruled by scarcity and finiteness, it is imminent that each of the interacting agents –with their contrasting and diverse cultures and nationalism – will intensify their efforts in the pursuit of their national interest. In a clear term, the interacting agents, both state and non-state actors, will have their diplomatic objectives hinged on *raison d'état* (national or organizational interests) rather than on prejudice, personal ambition, or religious doctrine or sentiment (Adeleke, 2007). Hence, as long as national interests prevail over prejudice, the prospect for social satisfaction and harmony might be a mirage.

1.9.2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution could be understood in the light of finding a peaceful and acceptable solution to two or more parties in conflicts. When two or more parties attempt to find a truce and resolutions to a specific dispute or disputes,

to the fulfilment of all parties involved, conflict resolution is somewhat taking place. The idiosyncrasies and inevitability of conflict in the international system demands that international actors such as states and non-state alike should expedite a strategic approach of ameliorating its consequences, curtailing its intensity, and identify a means of bringing parties involved in conflicts to a state of peace (Adeleke, 2007). This procedure based approach falls under the rubric of conflict resolution mechanisms in international relations.

1.9.3. DIPLOMACY

Fundamentally, diplomacy refers to the use of common sense, tact, and intelligence to reach compromises, agreements, and settlements with other – state and non-state - actors. Conventionally, it is regarded as the official state – to-state contact of communication usually through the representatives of such states (see Adenekan, 2008). According to Freeman and Marks, (2020), diplomacy could be understood in the context of decision and behavioural changes - that take place as a result of established procedure - that influence others through the instrumentality of negotiation, mediation, and other diplomatic procedures devoid of war or violence (Freeman and Marks, 2020). Akokpari, (2005) on his own notes that diplomacy as a concept is “generally used with the aim of achieving specific objectives and it is often explained in relation to foreign policy”.

According to Hans Morgenthau (2006),

In Reed’s (2010) opinion, diplomacy, basically, involves a constant evaluation of other nation-states power potentials, anticipated crucial interests, relationship

with other actors and interested parties, in an attempt to realize one's freedom of action with the overarching goal of assuring the attainment of the country's fundamental national interests, the crucial of which is survival.

In his famous book "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace" Hans Morgenthau explained that aside from the fact that it greases the wheels of the international relations, diplomacy could be understood in the context of "the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels, the highest as well as the subordinate". He explains further that it is the "art of bringing the different elements of the national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation that concern the national interest most directly". (Morgenthau, 2006) The conduct of a nation's foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national power in war. Save for the use of force in international system, diplomacy seems to offer an outstanding apparatus for ameliorating conflicts (Adeleke, 2007).

Of all the components that constitute a nation's power, the most distinctive, however erratic, is the quality of such country's diplomacy. He contended further that all other elements of national power such as geography, natural resources, industrial capabilities, quality of leadership, quantity and quality of population, armed forces, and technology, are raw materials from which the power of a country is assembled. If diplomacy's vision is blurred, thence, its judgement will be defective and its determination becomes feeble, as all the advantages of the elements of power in this world will avail the country a little in the long run (Morgenthau, 2006).

Thus, diplomacy largely remains a fundamental institution of international system. However, it must be established that diplomacy, as a paradigm, operates within the sphere of foreign policy and international relations (Adeleke, 2007). It is symbolic of the class of politics we anticipate to experience in the international system, however, there is considerably more to deduce from a critical appraisal of diplomacy as a pivotal institution more than as a perception of the official method of communication and negotiation between nation states (Egede & Sutch, 2013).

One of the prominent constructive accomplishments of diplomacy in the international system, according to Adam Watson, is the upsurge in post-World War II in grand international institutions such as UN, WTO, IMF, etc. (Egede & Sutch, 2013). The League of Nations' efforts at institutionalizing peace and security at international level could also be translated as an attempt to identify an internationally recognized procedure to achieving peace (Codrean, 2017).

1.9.4. INSURGENCY

A nuanced examination of the fundamentals of the concept of insurgency has revealed that it incorporates a violent, and armed revolt against the recognised government of a country, and threat or actual use of violence against non-combatant civilians, despite the anonymous status of the insurgents. According to the U.S. department of the Army Field manual, insurgency is an "organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle

designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control". (US COIN FM, 3-24, 1-1)

One of the strategic armaments adopted by insurgents is an attempt to legalize grievances and discontentment, such as lack of transparencies, and accountability, corruption, prevalent social, economic, and political challenges, as well as tribal and religious nepotism, to demonstrate the illegitimacy of such government (Lopez 2007:249).

A few prominent scholars such as Tse-tung have contended that some nation states with weak military capabilities mostly result to insurgency sometimes to emancipate themselves from the oppression of powerful nation states. A good example of such was when China employed insurgency to free herself from the imperial Japan (Tse-tung, 1937). However, it is necessary to emphasize that, in spite of its objectives and distinctive qualities, insurgency – on its own – lacks the capability to provide solutions to struggle as it lacks the quality of independence.

1.9.5. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Counterinsurgency typically incorporates the overall coordinated approach, military strategy and techniques, which include but not limited to law enforcement, military, diplomacy, tactics and intelligence, employed by the constituted authority of a nation state, to crush or repel the violent of insurgency. It is a governmental strategy to employ the instruments of national power of a state to subdue insurgency, its organization, and its network so as to render the group incapacitated of employing violence to instil fear in the

population, and to coerce the constituted authority or her populace to react in conformity with insurgent goals.

it is widely believed that counterinsurgency is a daunting and exhausting operation to conduct. And inevitably, it involves strenuous and painful efforts (2008:1). Counterinsurgency has been evaluated to be arduous operations in a manner that the campaign is never about astounding defeat or crush of the enemy, and victory or success is not determined based on the statistics of injured, captured or dead insurgents or soldiers. Rather, it is more about winning the confidence and support of the populace, through the principle of 'winning hearts and minds', as a result, changing the citizens' perspectives and opinions about the evils of insurgency.

While counterinsurgency is hinged on fighting war, it must, however, be stated by means of emphasis that it has a considerable and sharp distinction from conventional armed conflict. While victory is mostly established on the battleground in a conventional war, it is barely determined on the frontline in the conduct of counterinsurgency campaign. Victory depends largely on the country's population in the fight against insurgency; this is especially the reason both insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns attempt to win the hearts and minds of the people (Lopez 2007:249).

1.9.6. PEACEKEEPING

According to Agwu (2007) peacekeeping inherently consists of "observer missions and lightly armed forces monitoring ceasefire, operating in an essentially static mode with the consent of the parties involved". In its

conventional notion, peacekeeping could mean containment of conflict through the adoption of a neutral mediation team to encourage belligerent parties to disengage (Dokubo, 2005). Put differently, peacekeeping is a diplomatic approach that provides the platform for conflict prevention and peace making. Thus, peace-making as a third exigency approach of managing conflicts, in Bassey's opinion, is "one of the novel techniques" of "Conflict Diplomacy" that has significantly gained wide currency in the international system. In their own view, Demureto & Nikitin (1997) described peacekeeping forces as "civilian and military personnel designated by the national governments of the countries participating in the peace operation".

Drawing on the works of the aforementioned scholars, it could be deduced that the concept of peacekeeping generally involves deployment of military and civilian personnel to troubled nation states, basically, to curtail violence in order to give room for negotiation and implementation of agreements reached between parties involved. Although, Peacekeeping enterprise seems inherently peaceful as it presumes cooperation. However, peacekeeping operations, by and of itself, may not resolve a dispute; it is considered a temporary expedient measure or a holding action. The fundamental purpose of peacekeeping is to contain violence in order to provide a stable and peaceful atmosphere for peacekeeping efforts.

Hence, peacekeeping venture is basically a 'third-party supervised tools' that facilitates negotiation of a peaceful settlement. Peacekeeping operations may prove ineffective when used in isolation or where other techniques of conflict management are inefficient. Hence, it should be understood that peace-

keeping operations do not resolve dispute in isolation but only freezes the status quo (Osimen et al, 2015).

1.9.7. TERRORISM

Although it has been a herculean task to have a universally accepted definition of the term 'terrorism' as available scholarly literature submits that there are perceptible and idiosyncratic features that discern the act of terrorism from all other forms of political violence (Jackson, 2008). Hence, terrorism is "premeditated politically motivated, use, threatened use, of violence in order to induce a state of terror in its immediate victims, often to influence another less reachable audience such as a government". (Barash and Webel, 2014) This definition is apparently apt, as it highlights the cogent choice and instrumentality of terrorism. Also, according to Deflem (2009), terrorism is defined as a pattern of behaviour organized towards handling a grievance independently, where violence unleashed on the people by a particular group or certain individuals so as to caught the attention of the authority whom ordinarily cannot be reached without an engagement in a non-violent means (Deflem, 2009). Conceivably, act of terrorism could spring up as a consequence of perceived policy of oppression, marginalization, and suppression on the part of government. These perceptions, arguably could motivate groups to mobilize in retaliation (Brym and Araj 2006). Furthermore, Laquer (2003), contends that citizens could be lured into terrorism as a result of intolerable conditions, desperation, political alienation, and unemployment.

In line with the above positions, it is possible to deduce that terrorism is logical and instrumental because it is a premeditated strategy of violence. Moreover, it is a pattern of political communication that is perceived – just like public diplomacy - as a rhetoric or propaganda. This is especially true because there is a clear distinction between the targets and victims in any terrorist violence (Bradley, 2008).

1.10. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

Having enumerated the list of tables, acknowledgement page, acronyms, and an abstract, which displays the overall proceeding of this research work, other parts of this thesis is structured into five sections. The first section sets the stage by succinctly outlining the fundamentals and background to the study. This includes the study's statement, its objectives, and the significance of the study. Other parts of the chapter include research questions, scope of the study, its limitations, conceptual operational definition of terms and structure of the study.

The second chapter delves into the theoretical background of the study, and examines the general IR theories of insurgency. Several relevant scholarly works on the subject matter was adequately reviewed. And the appropriateness of each theory was assessed in explaining the motivation behind Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, in an attempt to establish grounds on which states degenerate into conflict and anarchy, the theoretical perspective upon which this thesis is hinged remains post-colonial theory.

The following chapter deals extensively with employment of Nigeria's diplomacy in conflict resolution in Africa; which includes eradication of apartheid regime in Africa, and Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Furthermore, this discussion is followed by x-raying the factors responsible for Nigeria's diplomatic commitments in Africa. Subsequently, Nigeria's diplomacy in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency was explored, and the stage was set with a short introduction of the Boko Haram group. And an analysis on the limits of Nigeria's diplomacy rounds up the chapter.

The subsequent chapter critically analyses the constraints that have bedevilled Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Africa as explained by some scholars. This is followed by focusing on the weak state thesis and the implications of corruption as an enabling factor to insurgency, and the discourse is equally examined based on Boko Haram's motivations. And the main argument of this thesis vis-à-vis the justification and establishment of a real and convincing causal mechanism that have bedevilled Nigeria's diplomatic engagements as regards the fulfilment of her afro-centric principle in Africa.

The fifth and the final chapter outlines a brief summary of the study, which is followed by conclusion of the thesis, and finally proffers some fundamental recommendations. The research work is epitomized with the bibliography and annexes given at the end.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW

In varying attempts to proffer a convincing explanation on the motivations behind the rise in insurgencies in the world, IR scholars have put forward two general theoretical arguments as the causal mechanisms that have influenced major insurgencies and civil wars (Collier, Reagan and Norton 2003, Jones 2008).

Some scholars contend that fundamentally, insurgency is a product of grievances, while others argued that opportunity is a more convincing factor in terms of motivation for insurgency (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:563).

The above-mentioned – grievances and opportunity – theories will now be explored respectively so as to establish a coherent and explicit understanding behind the motivations of Boko Haram insurgency. Hence, this discussion begins first by exploring the opportunity theory.

The premise upon which opportunity theory is hinged is the perception that violence could be explained vis-à-vis its attachment to profitable-material and non-material-opportunities. In a clear term, the theory assumes that ‘political mobilization is explained in terms of calculus of risk, cost and incentives’ (Zeynep 2011: 2634).

This submission discerns that the decision of a potential insurgent to engage in insurgency is motivated by the potentiality of costs and benefits attached to participation in violent political activities. Olson, in his own submission,

contends that the probability of a would-be insurgent engaging in a rebellion remains all time high if the expected prosperity offers better benefits than what the status-quo offers (Zeynep 2011: 2634). This is primarily because economic viability is significant in making insurgency feasible, as the fundamentals of insurgency, such as procurement of arms, and recruit payments are achieved with the aid of these resources in order to sustain the survival of the organization (Reagan and Norton 2003:8; Collier and Hoeffler 2004:569, Fearon and Laitin:14).

Hence, opportunity theorists consider social movement a 'rational response' to circumstances and not an emotional reaction to grievances. In sum, this approach perceives domestic violence as being triggered by incentives rather than grievance, anger and deprivation, which in Lichbach's opinion are not sufficient conditions for conflict behaviour (Zeynep 2011: 2634).

In a study conducted by Collier and Hoeffler in 2004, they report that there are basically three common sources of opportunity: 'extortion of natural resources', such as oil, diamonds, agricultural and non-agricultural products and other raw materials, donations from Diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments. They argue further that nation states with 32% of GDP from natural resources exports have close to 22% risk of political violence and civil war, whereas states without such exports commodity risks is no more than 1% (Jones 2008:13).

In other words, exportation of natural resources - in some resource-dependent states such as Nigeria - increases the likelihood of social violence by raising the chances for extortion, which in Jones' argument makes violence attractive and

feasible. As a result, he contends that, “launching an insurgency is therefore a rational decision that is influenced by the economic opportunity costs of violence”. (Jones 2008:13)

Indeed, these arguments as raised by the afore-mentioned scholars raise some quite significant concerns in attempts to establish an in-depth understanding of insurgency through the concept of opportunity-oriented theory.

However, despite the much stronger empirical support this theory had received, it has been argued that opportunity theory is ‘one-sided’ in its explanatory power. “The actual political mechanisms through which the opportunity variables operate still are unclear and fail to explain why certain groups take up arms but others with similar opportunities do not”. (Zeynep 2011:2638)

Zeynep contends that:

It is unreasonable to expect people to take up arms against the state just because there are some opportunities for mobilization and the likelihood of success is high. People need to have a strong motivation and belief in their cause to participate in a dangerous venture. They need a strong bond (that is identity to mobilize) because it separates them from others and binds them together to pursue common goals.

(Zeynep 2011:2638)

Moreover, opportunity-based explanations appeared to be too restrictive, and much incentive oriented, not minding other important variables that hold significant places in this approach.

Eisinger's work on the study of insurgency agrees with the opinions of these scholars on incentive related explanation, he, however, diverges somewhat slightly from their direction. He posits that the "extent of collective political violence is determined by the political environment" (Eisinger 1973:11), while Zeynep adds that "relative power and resources capability, opportunity structures and mobilization processes" are as well important (Zeynep 2011:2634).

Therefore, in launching an insurgency, rebels may be motivated by opportunity structures but not in primary and explicit terms; as the causal mechanism is more complicated than opportunity theory is capable of explaining.

In explaining the Boko Haram insurgency through the opportunity-based explanations, there exists weak evidence to the fact that Boko Haram could have been primarily motivated by opportunity factor. This is evident in the fact that the country's natural resource bases are located outside the confines of the north, and moreover, most of the attacks that have been conducted were largely restricted to the northern part of Nigeria, not in the Niger-Delta areas where the bulk of these resources is located.

Some observers might argue that the Boko Haram insurgency has been informed by the loot of other non-export oriented materials such as the group's engagement in armed robbery. This claim, too, sounds untrue. The loot lacks the explanatory power to account for the timing and motivation of Boko Haram. Boko Haram insurgency had been financed to considerable degrees before the insurgents became involved in looting. If Cramer's argument is anything to go by, then, the primary motivation for insurgency is not equivalent

to how the insurgency is being financed (Cramer 2002:1856). As a result, the looting aspect of the Boko Haram lacks any explanatory power to the cause of the insurgency. The loot came as a result of the insurgency and not the other way round.

More importantly, most of the Boko Haram's funding has been argued to have come from sources other than looting. These sources include zakat, aid-from wealthy northern elites and businessmen. Moreover, the loot is arguably used for the welfare of the slain-members' wives and welfare of other members as well, as a result, it could not serve the motivation purpose concurrently.

Nevertheless, logical connection between the northern elites and politicians alike and the hard core of Boko Haram is yet to be established. A Nigerian journalist, who has covered the group for long remarks that attempts to link the two, is illogical, as the northern elites and politicians constitute the core set of people the group purports to fight. This view does not take away the fact that some politicians may seize this advantage; however, taking advantage of events does not seem to be the same as giving it a direction (Walker 2012).

As a result, opportunity-based explanations lack a logical justification in terms of accounting for the causal mechanism behind Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

The second IR theory is that insurgencies begin as a result of group grievances. Regarding the basis of collective violence, Zeynep et al (2011) describe grievances as 'justice-seeking behaviour'. They contend that the spirit of 'justice-seeking behaviour' influences collective violence, and also, anti-state activity is a function of varying degree of resentment, injustice and frustration

experienced by individual members of the society. They posit that “if frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain to occur”. (Walker 2012)

As the perceived injustice gap widens - relative to expectations - the risked civil strife and discontent will increase (Gurr in Zeynep 2011:2631). However, if the state lacks the political will or unable to handle such condition properly, a large-scale collective political violence ensues (Regan and Norton 2003). In other words, a sense of common and shared identity brings people together and seals the bond between them.

As Collier and Hoeffler had observed in their study of objective measures of grievance, they argue that out of the four objective measures of grievance - political repression, ethnic or religious hatred, economic inequality, and political exclusion - ethnic and religious differences are largely perceived as a cause of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:563). Zeynep contends that grievances are necessary conditions for civil conflict, as it nurtures an idea of group identity and generate a strong sense of in group/out group distinction over time, which in turn leads to politicisation and activation of discontent (Zeynep 2011:2631).

Based on grievance explanations, some observers of political developments in Nigeria have attributed the motivation behind the rise of Boko Haram insurgency to religious and ethnic grievances. While some reports have it that Boko Haram had claimed that it seeks an establishment of Islamic State in Nigeria, with the introduction of Sharia Law, others contend that the political

repression of the Northerners under the presidency of two former southern presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan has led to the insurgency (Sango 2011).

Beginning with the religious argument, its proponents contend that this is informed by the group's bombing of churches and police stations across the North to wipe out the Christians in the country, and dictate the pace of engagement with the Nigerian government vis a-vis the establishment of sharia state.

Gaya-Best's explanation on the significance of religion in Nigeria sums the justification of this argument properly. He contends that religion plays a very significant role in Nigeria in terms of political mobilization than ethnicity for the parties involved because it is considered the primary identity of most Nigerians (Gaya-Best 2001:66).

Despite the significance of religion - in mobilizing, inciting and legitimizing terrorist activities - Gurr argues that religion cannot be considered as the single cause of insurgency, rather, "religious motivations are interwoven with economic and political factors". It is just that the acts of terrorism need an all-encompassing identity, either a religious or secular ideology as a means to mobilizing people to the cause of terrorist actions (Gurr 1970:92-3).

To understand the root causes of Boko Haram, arguments based on religious grievances could be reductionist. This argument fails to establish how the group's grievances have been transformed into violent and coordinated terrorist attacks basically on the demands to establish sharia law in the country.

The loose translation of the group's name 'Boko Haram' as 'Western Education is a sin' by some analysts based on their philosophy that western style system -

that is promoted by Nigerian government - corrupts Islamic influences and domestic society, and that anything western should be eradicated has erroneously led many scholars to view the insurgency through a religious lens.

Gurr contends that religion:

is just a badge of ethnic identity, it serves to solidify alliances and divisions to identify enemies and friends. In this way, religion has made several conflicts more intractable, but the underlying conflict has little to do with religion. (Gurr 1970:82-3)

Most of the northern states, in fact, have independently begun the implementation of sharia in their respective states. Furthermore, the group's attacks have failed to recognise religion; in fact, more Muslims according to Joji have been victims than Christians. One of the notable places where these attacks have been conducted is Yobe state, which has close to 95% Muslims. The reprisal attacks according to reports have largely been as a result of provocation of the killings of some its members without trials and aiding of arrests of its members, which come from - the Muslim and Christian - public, according to the group's perception (Joji 2012).

Moreover, Yinka argues that:

Boko Haram members and most Fulani herdsmen share Islam. But the ethnic composition of Boko Haram is believed to be very different from the Fulani people and has been known to turn against Muslims that do not share their extremist views. (Yinka 2012:1)

Richardson, on his own, argues that one of the fundamentals of terrorism is basically to communicate a political message and not violence for the sake of

killing. He argues further that “the victim of the violence and targeted audience are not the same. The victims are only used as a means of altering the behaviour of the larger and targeted audience, usually the government” (Louise Richardson 2006:22), and insurgents have been known to kill innocent citizens in the course of achieving their goals.

Hence, Boko Haram may have resulted in the indiscriminate bomb attacks on virtually every strata of the society as a strategic instrument to create high psychological impacts and provoke a reaction from the government in acceding to their demands.

Secondly, on ethnic repression, analysts have raised a political and ethnic dimension of these motivations, as they claim that Boko Haram is nothing but ethnic politics by other means. They argue that Boko Haram insurgency is perceived to be rooted in the political marginalisation of northern politicians during the last two political dispensations.

The uneven distribution of power and wealth, in terms of political appointments and allocation of juicy ministries in the country, most especially, the forceful change in the unpronounced power sharing rule - in the constitution of the former ruling party of Nigeria, PDP - from the North to the South appeared to have fuelled the insurgency.

Based on this view, some observers have argued that northern politicians may have resulted in waging a political and ethnic battle against the President through the Boko Haram insurgency (Ajayi 2012). One of the proponents of this argument is the former National Security Adviser, General Andrew Azazi; who posits that some political elites from a section of the country remain unsatisfied

with the abandoned formula in the then ruling party, with the former President Jonathan's victory and his undeclared second term ambition, as this has highly disenfranchised them politically. Hence they have resorted to the employment of Boko Haram to express their displeasure, and as such, destabilize and distract the Jonathan administration and mount political pressure as well (Ihebuzor 2012:1).

Though, ethnicity appears to hold a central position in Nigerian political landscape, and has been argued to be at the background of most crises in Nigeria (Rosanwo 2012); however, it is a misleading account to attribute the motivation of Boko Haram to the confines of ethnicity, because even in the midst of the sect's members, there appear to be fears of ethnic concerns. During the course of his interrogation with the police, the group's former spokesperson, Abu Qaqa, acknowledged the division in the sect along ethnic lines, as it appears that the group is composed of different ethnic backgrounds such as the Kanuris and the Non Kanuris-Hausa, Fulani and others. He exclaimed further that the "Non-Kanuris in the group have serious concerns on the arrest of their members which appears to them that there is 'sectional betrayal' of the Non-Kanuri members from the hands of the Kanuris". (Abonyi 2012:2)

Furthermore, the group, according to reports, has been on ground peacefully since 2002 - though during the reign of a Southern President - with no noticeable attacks. The attack that brought Boko Haram into limelight was launched in 2009 during the reign of a staunch Northern Muslim President and ever since, they have increasingly indulged in the acts of violent bomb attacks

across the North. If the sect's mobilization has been on ethnic grounds, apparently, they might have exercised a considerable degree of control during the regime of the late President, whom was considered an ardent advocate of Islam and the North.

Hence, grievance based explanations along this line hold little account in explaining the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Apparently, all nation states host some dissatisfied elements in the country, nevertheless their dissatisfaction or frustration does not literally translate into breakdown of law and order. Collier and Hoeffler also agree that it proves problematic to quantify ethnic hatreds (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), and Cramer, on his own account, argues that ethnic division matters though, but needs to be overlapped with other factors to transform itself into rebellion (Cramer 2006).

In sum, insurgency in general, and the Boko Haram insurgency in particular might be seen overall as a struggle to change the status-quo, however, what influenced their decisions to tow such path remains largely complicated.

To understand this motivation requires studying each theoretical analysis of insurgency in the context of Boko Haram and determine which theory has a convincing explanatory power to account for the timing and emergence of Boko Haram. And this will be established in the course of this thesis.

2.2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

For the purpose of this research work, this thesis adopts Post-colonial theory in an attempt to establish grounds on which states degenerate into conflict and anarchy. On many accounts, post-colonialism has its credit in Edward Said's

Orientalism in 1978. Orientalism, however, was said to be an extract of Michael Foucault and Antonio Gramsci's writings, with a host of other works integrating extensive range of additional theoretical approaches. A few other prominent scholars and thinkers such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987), Homi Bhabha (1994, 1990), Chandra Mohanty (1997, 1991), Sara Suleri (1992), and Aijaz Ahmad have equally reflected on Said's approach (1992) (Hill, 2005).

Post-colonialism is hinged on the grounds that conflicts are mostly tied to the 'conditions and structures of external domination and its local or national impact mostly on anthropology, education, literature, religion, history, politics, economics, gender studies, sociology, and human rights studies. The theory is a paradox that exists in virtually all the former colonies, as it contends that the correlation between repression and freedom is conflicting in perpetuity. Some of the crux of its argument is that conflicts become apparent first on the identification of the features of post-colonialism (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2017). Thus Identity becomes a prominent crux of analysis for postcolonial studies, as a result of the significance of identity production to colonial domination. The production of the identities of the coloniser and the colonised within colonial discourse and ideology, according to Hill, was accomplished through juxtaposition of one against the other (Hill, 2005). And to rub salt into the wound, the colonised and the coloniser's identities are presented as inalterable. Apparently, this is an attempt to define the identity of the colonised by "by both vices, having 'no sense of honour', and characteristics deemed ignoble, like 'manual dexterity' and being good 'tillers of the soil' whilst the identities of the Western coloniser are defined by virtues, such as 'honour,

decency, and 'nobility'. Thus, the colonised is maintained, according to Ranger (1983), in "the subordinate part of a man/master relationship". (Ranger, 1983)

Although the British colonisation years ended in Nigeria in 1960, which forced the colonial authorities to physically vacate the shores of Nigeria. However, the fundamental structures of the Nigerian state and the limitations of the protectorate they created are still component parts of the Nigerian state and other institutions and structures they left behind (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2017). Because the British coloniser and indeed, the Western powers, consider the identities of Nigeria as unrelentingly negative, thus, economic dependency was foisted on the country. The implication being that Nigeria's economy was incorporated into the global economy in a manner that the country's economy became fully dependent on the economy of the Western capitalist in a manner that is inimical to the creation of robust bureaucratic institutions - that enhance the proper functioning of the government - and buoyant economy that is capable of making adequate provision of basic needs such as qualitative education, sound health care system, and good road infrastructure to the people of Nigeria. This has been basis of Nigeria's economic dependency from independence till date (Afolabi, 2016; Doyle and Sambanis; Rodney, 1973).

Consequently, aside from the institutional conflicts the unfavourable situation engenders, it equally stimulates inherent instability within the confines of extant dynamics of political, economic and social institutions.

Put differently, the failure of Nigerian independence to attain economic and political independence in its real sense, and to have sovereignty over her natural resources, engenders conflict regardless of whether the involvement of

former colonial powers – in advancing their national interests in Nigeria – is palpable or not (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2017).

In addition, Post-Colonialism examines the connection between the prevailing forms of globalization and the former colonized territories. It interrogates the genesis of globalization and the embodied interests of its champions. Hence, when Nigeria's interest, and that of her political elite, and their connection with the liberal globalization – that advances the interests of the former colonial masters through the instruments of multinational corporations – becomes unequal, the condition of national imbalance and anarchy is imminent.

The Post-Colonial theory maintains that the exploitative tendencies of the liberal democracy, and the undue interference of their actors in the country's domestic affairs engender social inequalities and breed social tensions. And as such, exploitation cannot be discarded as inconsequential in the root cause of social conflicts (Itumo, 2014). This is especially true when governmental institutions are now being surreptitiously controlled by foreign multinationals under the rubric of developmental aids, and securitization agenda in the country. Thus protracted conflict is inevitable because the same conditions they seek to address are becoming worse by the day. And it is imminent for the populace to react based on their perceptions and interpretations of the conditions. This is nothing but an attempt to bring about a social transformation and economic reorder in Africa using liberal peace as a justification, which will imminently trigger invidious and intractable proliferation of wars and conflicts in post-colonial Nigeria and all Third World countries.

CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's diplomatic engagement in the continent has not only attracted the attention of other nation states, but has also been the focal point international organizations ranging from advocacy groups and aid agencies to development and financial institutions.

Considerably, Nigeria's diplomatic finesse and savour did really constitute and accord the country a special place and a prominent role amongst the comity of nations in international politics. Invariably, it enhanced her contribution to the stability and development of Africa. By every criterion, Nigeria remains a luminary on any diplomatic issues both within and without the region.

Given her economic strength, population size, military wherewithal, foreign policy directions, and diplomatic engagements in the sub-region and the continent at large over the years, Nigeria has been considered a regional hegemon of sort. Distinctly, these factors have really facilitated Nigeria's prominence not only in Africa but across the globe (Ogunnubi et al, 2017; Dodeye, 2016).

The stunning rapprochement between Washington and Lagos in the late 1970s, for instance, was equivocally a pointer to the Nigeria's diplomatic prowess in international arena.

Nigeria's diplomacy did come to the fore during former American President Carter's visit to Lagos in 1979, when amicable solutions and agreeable

settlements were reached on several pending diplomatic issues between America and Africa on the one hand, and Washington and Lagos on the other hand. For example, when General Obasanjo was delivering his speech, he did not minx words when he candidly defended Cuban presence in Angola. Men from Havana, Obasanjo argued, should rather be perceived as a stabilizing force in Luanda. The attendant volte-facing of America's earlier disposition on the Cuban issue was interpreted by several African progressive scholars and analysts as a vibrancy of Nigeria's diplomacy. The implication largely remains that nation states such as Nigeria, that had supported the Soviet-aided Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) could presume that they took a bold and appropriate measure on the issue, and that Washington had conceded the shortcomings of her own policy (Mayer, 2016; Ogunbadejo, 1979).

This new rapprochement had symbolic and compelling impacts on Nigerian-US relations; a relation that would later afforded Lagos and Washington an opportunity to start afresh and unlock a pragmatic exploration of issues and policies relating to America, Nigeria, and Africa at large. The then American Ambassador to Nigeria, Donald Easum, epitomized the change in this manner:

We take Nigerian views very seriously, and not just on African issues but on issues of global concern. We consult and discuss together such problems as the North-South economic relationship, or the Law of the Sea, or Zimbabwe and Namibia, or the question of political rights and equal opportunity within South Africa itself. Nigerian views on these issues are an

increasingly important factor in the formulation of US policies.

(Ogunbadejo, 1979)

Whatever the promising anticipations for Nigerian-U.S. economic relations could have been, it still has to be understood within the broader context of cooperation and favourable political and diplomatic relations between the two nation states.

In spite of the era of estrangement between the two nation states under the Ford Administration, significant and rapid advancement was experienced between them. This was evidenced in the speedy invitation and warmth hospitality accorded Nigerian Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo by President Carter in his first year in office (Ogunbadejo, 1979). However, President Obasanjo, in spite of the warmth reception, stood tall and refused to bow to soft American power on the issues of Southern Africa, rather, the official visit afforded the Nigerian government to vigorously push for the liberation of Southern Africa and to create an enabling environment for mutual cooperation in other areas. (Ogunbadejo, 1979)

Furthermore, during President Obasanjo's five-day heroic visit to Washington, he was accorded a high profile reception, where he met and spoke with the U.S. government officials, academic and business leaders; Nigerian communities in the U.S., the Senate International Relations Committee, the Congressional Black Caucus, the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, and the United Nations General Assembly. The crux of President Obasanjo's speeches was Nigeria's view and disposition on Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Moreover, he did not shy away from reaffirming

that issues concerning freedom and human dignity in Africa occupy a pivotal and unique position in the policies and principles of the Nigerian government. 6 (Ogunbadejo, 1979)

President Obasanjo's talks with his American counterpart, Carter covered a whole lot of bilateral issues such as economic, political, and an action plan for further economic cooperation in support of Nigeria's five year economic and development plan (Ogunbadejo, 1979).

In all of this political and diplomatic scenario, as the United States of America took a remarkable and drastic step to cementing her diplomatic and political relations with Nigeria, the question frequently asked across the country and Africa is, "what is the United States interests in this diplomatic rapprochements with Nigeria after the hostility and confrontation between the previous President Ford's administration's policies towards Africa?" apparently, the warmth of Nigeria-U.S. relations is basically facilitated, apparently, to guarantee Lagos' support in repressing Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa. Moreover, America needs Nigeria's goodwill to assure the continent that the U.S. had terminated the previous "Ford Administration's policy of neglect" (Ogunbadejo, 1979). Basically, the general implication of this scenario remains largely that Nigeria has been able to transform herself to a vital diplomatic tool that can be proactively employed to pursue a successful foreign policy in Africa and international politics.

One significant factor prompted this prominence and US stance on Nigeria; crude oil. U.S.-Nigerian economic strings are apparently being inevitably linked

as a result of the country's economic wherewithal, specifically the role of Nigerian oil, has significantly enhanced Nigeria's influence.

In consonance with the above fact, when the United States commitment to principle of African foreign policy was put to test during the Somali crises, (Chesterman & Byers, 1999) the implication became that Washington was compelled to opt for 'pivotal states' in her 'African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) (Lamin, 2008: 224). Based on such understanding, Nigeria emerged the anchor for Washington's policy in West Africa, distinctly in relative to handling conflicts and crises in the Mano River Union sub region, whilst South Africa become the focal point in Southern Africa and the Great lakes region (Nnanyere, Chukwu Ogo and Kelechi, Johnmary Ani. 2015).

In addition to Nigeria's diplomacy at the international level, Nigeria's diplomatic commitment to regional peace and global security cannot be overemphasized (Ogunnubi et al, 2016; Osimen et al, 2015). This is especially true as the country's abundant – human and natural – resources had been channelled on several occasions to providing developmental aids and ensuring peace and development in many African states (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018). Nigeria's supply of electricity to the Republic Du Benin, Chad Republic, and Niger republic at no cost whatsoever depicts this scenario. Also, the country's gas supply to Benin, Togo and Ghana for power generation through the "678 kilometre West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) that has the potential to supply the entire continent" aptly depicts her penchant for provision of developmental aids to several West African countries (Ogunnubi et al, 2016; Souare, 2002).

Thus, Nigeria's viewpoints on any African issues are not only almost always taken with all forms of intentness by both regional and global actors, but the country is also considered a regional hegemon of sort in Africa (Ogwu, 1999; Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Mazrui, 2006; Nnanyere, Chukwu Ogo and Kelechi, Johnmary Ani, 2015).

A former Nigeria's permanent representative to the United Nations who doubled as the country's foreign affairs minister once aggrandized Nigeria's status in Africa as thus; "one out of every four Africans is a Nigerian. Obviously, anything that affects the right of the black people to live peacefully and freely on their own continent affects Nigeria". (Garba, 2005)

Craig (1984), similarly argues that:

Nigeria is a regional power in West Africa whose economy represents about 55% of West Africa's GDP, and its population of about 167 million provides the largest market in Africa. In 2011, Nigeria's exports to Africa countries was 10.7% of the total value of exports, with exports to ECOWAS countries contributing 3%. On imports, 8.2% of the value of imports was from African countries with ECOWAS countries contributing 1.3%. (Craig, 1984)

It is a truism that one of the fundamental objectives of most foreign policies - that of Nigeria inclusive - largely remains the promotion of the country's national interests in her relationship with international actors in the global system. Consequently, Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Africa - ever since attainment of independence in 1960 - revolve around the country's Afro-centric

principles and objectives. Hence, Africa remains the centre of Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomatic engagements (Ogwu, 1999; Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Mazrui, 2006; Nnanyere, Chukwu Ogo and Kelechi, Johnmary Ani, 2015).

In a clear term, the basic and guiding principles of Nigeria's foreign policy thrust coupled with the promotion of her national interests - in her bilateral as well as multilateral relationships - largely remain a consideration of her consciousness of the external environment. Furthermore, an incessant and crucial component that has remained pivotal to Nigeria's foreign policy framework has always been Africa (Muhammed, 2014).

Tafawa Balewa once declared that:

So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think that we are not interested in the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organization, but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighbourhoods. (Balewa and Epelle, 1964)

Hence, Nigeria has been quite unequivocal on the principles of her foreign policy thrust in Africa ever since. The Balewa's detailed speech at the parliament on August 20, 1960 marks the articulation of the guiding principles of the country's foreign policy. Also, the principles were elaborately reiterated in the Prime Minister's address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on accession of Nigeria's admission to the Assembly as its 99th member (Isiaq, 2012) in October of the same year as follows:

- i. The defence of Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence;
- ii. The creation of necessary economic political, social and cultural conditions to secure the independence of Nigeria and other African countries;
- iii. Promotion of the rights of all blacks and others under colonial domination;
- iv. Promotion of African unity;
- v. Promotion of world peace built on freedom, mutual respect and equality for all peoples of the world;
- vi. Respect for the territorial integrity of all nations;
- vii. Non-partisanship in East-West ideological rivalry and freedom of association and action in the international system.

Fundamentally, these objectives centre on non-alignment, multilateralism, non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states, Africa centre-piece, and legal equality of states (Olusanya & Akindele,1986 in Nwosu, 1995; Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018).

Resultantly, from the year 1960 till date, successive Nigerian – military and democratic - governments have predominantly anchored the country's foreign policy and diplomatic engagements on Afro-centric principles. And every regime had equally expressed keen interests in fulfilling these fundamental principles. Indeed, issues that are related to foreign affairs and diplomatic relations have almost always been prioritized in such a manner that it frequently became a crucial and fundamental part of inaugural speeches of

most of the successive administrations. Save for strategies and tactics employed by each regime to achieving these goals, every Nigerian administration have been religiously committed to these principles and objectives (Nwosu, 1995).

This position is vividly noticeable in each Nigerian government's resolve to ensure adequate attention was committed to the fight against racism and colonialism in every part of African soil. This may partly explain the penchant of Nigerian governments in her commitment to offer both financial and technical assistance to needy African states.

For instance, some of such assistances were seen in; one, the design and implementation of the policy of Technical Aid Corp TAC scheme by former Foreign Affairs Minister, Prof Bolaji Akinoyemi under the Babangida regime. Nigeria is quite aware of the significance of this scheme in creating long-lasting ties and promoting cultural exchanges between Nigeria and the beneficiary nation states. Hence, the TAC scheme was primarily conceived to achieve an efficient and effective coordination of Nigeria's aids to Africa. The initiative practically involved secondment of Nigerian professionals such as engineers, doctors, teachers, lawyers, etc. to various African, Pacific, and Caribbean nation states at Nigeria's expense.

The initiative, undoubtedly, advanced Nigeria's status as a major financier to African economic transformation and development. It has been reported that as at 2001, Nigeria's commitment to the TAC initiative had been sustained with a total expenditure of over 22.5 million USD (Daura, 2010; Inamate, 2001; Kolawole, 2005; Nwosu, 1995). Second, the establishment of Nigeria Trust Fund

(NTF). It was a tactical machinery established in 1976 by Obasanjo government with a startup funds of \$80 million. This Trust fund, in Craig's words, was strategically designed to advance the development of the low-income member states of African development bank (AFDB) (Craig, 1984; Daura, 2010). As posted by AFDB on its website in 1996, "the NTF had a total resource base of \$432 million" (AFDB). Thus, Nigeria lends money to Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) members at an interest rate of 4% which can be paid within a period of 25 years, with a five-year grace period (Muhammed, 2014).

Nevertheless, it is worthy of note to emphatically state that as both international and domestic environments remain largely unstable, every regime endeavour to be mindful of the preponderant state of affairs in international system. The implications remain that as much as definitive aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives are retained, changes ensue occasionally as events in both domestic and international affairs are never static (Nwosu, 1995).

3.2. NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS IN AFRICA

Considerably, Nigeria has almost always been at the fore front of championing some salient courses primarily to engender peace, security and development in the Continent in several respects. The South Africa, Sierra Leone, Chad, Somalia, and Liberia experiences were quite distinct and evident in Nigeria's unequivocal varying commitments to championing the course peace and security promotion in Africa.

Nigeria's penchant for regional peace and global security manifested in the year 1960 when she first contributed troops to the UN peacekeepers to Congo (ONUC) barely days after her independence (Isiaq, 2012). Soon, she became one of the largest contributing countries to the United Nations operations. In line with her records, she had actively participated in over 25 United Nations missions, and played key roles in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISCOM), and other non-UN missions in Africa deploying military staff officers, unarmed military observers, military contingents, police advisors, formed police units, and civilian experts amongst others (Osimen et al, 2015).

Indeed, Nigeria has always exhibited her enthusiastic preparedness – in terms of finance and military - and favourable disposition to intervene in various African conflicts on several fronts. Such countries include Liberia, Congo, Chad, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mali, Rwanda, and Sudan. Also, in Angola as in Congo, both the supremacy of Nigerian political advantage and superpower were once more exhibited (Adebajo, 2000; Nnanyere, Chukwu Ogo and Kelechi, Johnmary Ani. 2015).

Being the predominant regional hegemon of sort, Nigeria has equally been the major contributor of – military and financial – resources to ECOWAS peacekeeping operations in the sub-region. These contributions had risen to the tune of 8 billion USD in her several missions in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Amidst the climax of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars in the 1990s, Nigeria's contribution to the ECOMOG's forces – in terms of logistics, military, and civilian personnel - was above 70% of the whole mission (Osimen et al, 2015).

Nigeria's deployment to the medical and signal teams to the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in 2003 was 1,500 troops. In 2004, Nigeria equally deployed 1,500 soldiers to Darfur as part of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In recent times, the regional hegemon also provided another 1,200 soldiers to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), and another 200 police personnel to AMISCOM, with another 120 police officers were deployed to Liberia in 2004 (Osimen et al, 2015).

Although, Akanbi and Akinola (2007) go so far as to contend that peace-keeping adventure remains largely a herculean task, which no single nation state can embark upon, not to mention of enforcement of peace agreements and provision of developmental aids to these countries (Akanbi and Akinola, 2007). However, as this thesis points out, Nigeria's unequivocal commitment towards bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements in Africa and beyond, born of a profoundly intrinsic sense of distinctiveness and uniqueness, remains largely an exemplifying and distinctive features of Nigerian foreign policy and diplomatic engagements in Africa.

Furthermore, Nigeria's diplomacy, according to Chan, (2017), had been successfully deployed in several occasions since 1979 (Chan, 2017). Such deployments, according to him, include the country's diplomatic engagements at both unilateral and multilateral levels to contain conflict, to influence United Nations debates and actions such as the arms embargo against Yugoslavia. Also, the United Nations sanctions against former Liberia warlord, Charles Taylor was equally a remarkable diplomatic engagement. These sanctions came at the

request of ECOWAS, but was visibly influenced by Nigeria. (Williams 1991: 269-70; Chan, 2017).

Also, a close look at the record of how Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa's administration timely approved and released Nigerian soldiers for optimal participation in the United Nations peace-keeping force in Congo, and how the country accepted the representative responsibility on behalf of the region, and the colossal sacrifices undertaken along the line furnishes us with a perception not only of how significant Africa seems to be to Nigeria but also how it continues to shape Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomatic outlook (Nwosu, 1995).

Again, the unwavering commitment for Africa's centre piece policy was kept alive and same resolve was demonstrated by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1986 during establishment of the Concert of Medium Powers (Nwosu, 1995). Nigeria did really encourage and promote African Common Market which was marked by the April 1980 Economic Summit in Lagos.

Furthermore, Nigeria expressed so much concern over the lingering civil war in Republic of Chad which led to rounds of diplomatic meetings and proposals such as the dispatch of the disastrous 1979 "expeditionary force" to Ndjamena, that pitted the country against Libya (Shaw,1984). This is probably why Daniel (2011), had emphasised that with the country's abundant human and natural resources, and her finesse diplomatic engagements in Africa, Nigeria remains a centre of activities and attention, not only in the sub-region but in Africa as a whole (Daniel, 2011).

For the sake of clarity, the formation of OAU, and its subsequent metamorphosis to African Union, AU, became a successful enterprise primarily because it was actively championed by Nigeria alongside South Africa. It is worthy to note that the metamorphosis and the sponsorship of the Sirte Summit – a Summit that prepared the groundwork for metamorphosis of OAU to AU - was though proposed by Libya akin to Washington with the capital in Tripoli. However, South Africa and Nigeria's influence and their vehement resistance truncated Tripoli's idea of a single state, which later led to the transformation of OAU to AU. The consequence being that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was subsequently launched – as an initiative proposed by Africans to find African solutions to African problems - in Nigeria whilst the Secretariat was situated in South Africa (Francis, 2007:131, Nnanyere, Chukwu Ogo and Kelechi, Johnmary Ani. 2015; Pogoson, 2009).

These exploits have indeed provided the much-needed incentive for other African countries to admit Nigeria's legitimacy as a vibrant leader in the region. Perhaps, it was this factor that brought about the muting of a Pax-Nigeriana idea introduced by an ex-foreign Affairs Minister, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, primarily to capture the essence of the country's leadership role in the promotion of African Unity and development (Adebajo, 2008).

In a like manner, various Nigerian governments and administrations have exhibited enduring commitments and keen interests towards continuous camaraderie with the extant regional and international institutions. This is reflected in the country's call for international institutions such as the United Nations to embrace Africa as equal partners and associates with members from

other continents. This position was conspicuously apparent in Nigeria's demand for a United Nations Secretary-General of an Africa extract. Nigeria also pushed for the democratization of the United Nations system and enlargement of the permanent membership of United Nations Security Council for Africa to be well represented (Nwosu, 1995).

In addition, Nigeria's unending enthusiastic demeanour towards formation of new international institutions, and international organizations' membership and her commitments to issues with reference to the UNSC, AU, OPEC, and ECOWAS further demonstrates her level of commitment to play the role of a hegemon of sort in Africa.

For instance, Nigeria's contribution under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, towards the establishment of Organization for African Unity, OAU in 1963, was quite critical and significant. The regional organization could have become a still birth without Nigeria's active participation and unflinching support. Moreover, the military regime under General Yakubu Gowon exhibited same enthusiasm in 1975 when the idea to form a sub-regional organization that was later named ECOWAS via the 1975 Lagos Charter was muted and signed in Lagos amidst much excitement. Former President Ibrahim Babangida will later serve as a three-time ECOWAS Chairman, while its secretariat in Abuja was mainly financed by Nigeria (Bach, 2004; Bach, 2007; Yakubu, 2011).

Aside from the fact that Nigeria hosts the ECOWAS secretariat, court of justice, and parliament, she is regarded as the leading financial donor to ECOWAS (Muhammed, 2014). This is because Nigeria considered ECOWAS as an institutional framework for the development of West Africa and the

improvement of the quality of lives for its people (Bach, 2007; Muhammed, 2014).

As a result, Nigeria spearheaded the establishment of ECOMOG in terms of financial support to coalesce the region's security forces in a bid to curtail the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Muhammed, 2014). The regional integration, as championed by Nigeria, has in the actual sense yielded some results, which include; ECOWAS passport, free movement of persons, and a customs union (Muhammed, 2014).

Nigeria really made judicious use of her membership of these multilateral institutional frameworks. She has been able to project her influence in the region and the global community employing these institutional frameworks (Saliu and Omotola, 2008). Even when Nigeria lost her international legitimacy and prestige in the comity of nations as a result of her being perceived as parochial state under General Abacha presidency, Nigeria was soon reintegrated into the international system in 1999 as a result of President Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy, and handed the chairmanship of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM), as well as the hosting right in 2003, and membership of G77 in the year 2000. Nigeria also became African representative as a non-permanent member of the UNSC on five different occasions in 1966/67, 1978/79, 1994/95, 2010/11, and 2014/2015. Although Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana had served in the same capacity twice in 1962/63, and 1964/1965 respectively, however, it is worthy to note that these representations were based on their Commonwealth membership, while

Egypt's representation in 1946, and 1949/1950 was basically on the slot of the Middle East region (Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

In honour of Nigeria's unwavering diplomatic commitment in Africa based on her track record at the UN, the country was almost unanimously elected with 186 votes of 193 to secure her fifth term in office as the African representative at the UNSC. In a swift reaction to this development, Nigerian government enthusiastically expressed her feelings as thus: "this is a glowing expression of support and encouragement for Nigeria's active participation in the promotion of peace, security and political stability in Africa and other parts of the world". (Ogunnubi et al, 2016)

Reciprocally, Nigeria was able to make judicious employment of these platforms to reassert her interests in African affairs and, of course, the Global South (Saliu and Omotola, 2008). Furthermore, with these number of representations, apparently, Nigeria has become a force to be reckon with for one of the slots in the yet to be inaugurated UNSC permanent membership for two African nation states (Saliu and Omotola,2008).

3.3. NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE ERADICATION OF APARTHEID REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA

One of the most prominent exposition of Nigeria's Afro-centric policy thrust and crucial diplomatic engagements in Africa is, however, the country's dynamism and unwavering commitment to eradication of apartheid regime in South Africa. Nigeria's contributions

towards this venture was quite significance, as it was not only in terms of huge financial spending, but also strategic commitment at the expense of the country (Nwosu, 1995).

As part of critical measures in the pursuit of her Afro-centric principles, and championing African course, Nigeria primarily assumed the responsibility of eliminating the apartheid regime in South Africa on the one hand, and ventured into the situation in Southern Africa on the other hand (Nwosu, 1998; Ubi & Akinkuotu; 2014; Nnanyere & Kelechi; 2015). Also, Nigeria supported the Southern African Liberation Movements with provisions of logistics and military hardware to combat racism and colonialism in the sub-region (Ogunsanwo, 1986). In the same vein, Nigeria extended scholarships substantial number of Southern African citizens to study in Nigeria. This was done primarily to ensure that these nation states within the Southern African sub-region are fortified with indigenous manpower at independence (Nwosu, 1998).

In a bid to ensure this eradication objective is achieved, Nigeria took good number of bold and drastic steps along this line. One of such, and indeed most critical, is the formulation and pursuit of different and coordinated economic policies that were intermittently perilous to the country's development, basically in view of her commitment to eradicate apartheid regime in south Africa (Garba, 1987:101). One of such remarkable policies includes the adoption of the initiation of the Southern Africa Relief Fund, SARF, by President Obasanjo's administration as an official policy in the struggle against apartheid regime in South Africa. And the policy was soon launched in December, 1976 (Chidozie, Agbude & Oni, 2013: 243; Garba, 1987).

Furthermore, a huge amount of 10 million USD was bankrolled in 1986 by Nigerian government to support liberation struggles and eradication of apartheid in South Africa. Immediately afterwards, another lump sum of 50 million USD grant was hurriedly approved to be spread within the period of 1986 and 1991 (Offiong, 2000:140-141).

In addition, Nigeria encouraged and allowed De Clark – in his bid to dismantle apartheid regime in South Africa – to pay a historic visit to Abuja in 1993. The primary aim of the visit was to encourage De Clark and assure him of Nigeria's unflinching support (see Adenekan, 2008).

As a result of this unwavering commitment, Nigeria almost estranged her diplomatic ties with many of her allies, and became acquainted with several nation states she had nothing in common. However, in spite of the attendant threat and hostility that resultantly emanated from the then South African government, Nigeria refused to renege on her commitment to employ all her diplomatic arsenals to eliminate apartheid regime in South Africa (Nwosu, 1998; Nnanyere & Kelechi; 2015).

Whilst several governments in the continent paid an avowal of adherence to see to the end of apartheid regime in South Africa, not only did Nigeria remain consistent and fervent in its resistance to the regime. But also took a bold step within that period and solicited the support from other African nation states and mounted pressure on the international community against the South African racist regime (Nnanyere & Kelechi; 2015).

This critical position was reflected in Nigeria's public criticism of the West during President Carter's visit to Lagos in 1978. Not only did the then Head of

State, General Olusegun Obasanjo faulted the position of the Western states such as America and United Kingdom, for being more than lukewarm to proposals to eliminate apartheid regime in South Africa, but equally accused them for the pursuit of policies of unequivocal collaboration with Pretoria, in both economic and military issues (ogunbadejo, 1979).

The Nigeria's standpoint was apparently reflected in President Carter's four-day trip to Lagos in March, 1978, where he delivered a critical speech, in which he exhaustively addressed the American policy towards Africa, notably on the state of affairs in the Namibia, Horn of Africa, Zimbabwe and South Africa, along with the U.S. relations with Nigeria on bilateral cooperation on issues such as technology, education, investment and trade, agriculture and rural development (Ogunbadejo, 1979).

Even after the demise of apartheid regime in South Africa, Nigeria was still opened to sound bilateral diplomatic relations with South Africa. To actualize the bilateral relations and advance their mutual understandings, the two states initiated South Africa-Nigerian Bilateral National Commission (BNC) which was run at the vice-presidential level, instituted as a platform for discourse and agreement on critical issues such as political, economic, social and continental (Nnanyere & Kelechi; 2015). This diplomatic relationship is apparently a reflection of the two regional powers. Their roles in Africa cannot be discarded as inconsequential in the scheme of things. Nigeria and South Africa alone, apparently, bear the responsibility for more than a half of sub-Saharan Africa's economic capabilities and are equally responsible for the largest organized group of soldiers in the continent. (Adebanjo & Landsberg, 2000).

3.4. NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN LIBERIA (1990-1998 AND 2003)

One of the most prominent expositions of peace-keeping efforts in the region is, however, the Nigeria's dynamism in the ECOWAS peace-keeping operations in Liberia between 1990 to 1997 (Chan, 2017). Nigeria's diplomatic engagement in Liberia – which was designed and aimed towards the sustenance of Nigeria's Afro-centric principles - was not only significance in terms of military contribution, but also huge financial spending (Nwosu, 1995).

Actually, these peace-keeping efforts were undertaken by the regional grouping, adopting soldiers under the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG banner. However, the crop of soldiers that formed the ECOMOG troops were basically drawn from Nigerian soldiers, who acted on behalf of Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS (Chan, 2017).

As Yushau (2002) notes, Nigeria's financial and military capabilities in the sub-region, perhaps, could not be more appropriately demonstrated than the country's intervention during the civil wars in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Yushau, 2002). The level of carnage that was taking place in Liberia then was not just devastating but pernicious more than what the regional leaders could ignore. The country was experiencing a total breakdown of law and order as control of major part of Liberia had been seized by Charles Taylor and his rebellion forces of National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (Muhammed, 2014). The Liberian situation became further deteriorated

following the emergence of a different gang from the folds of NPFL. The new faction was led by Johnson, who had a critical disagreement with Charles Taylor as a result of the NPFL's modus operandi (Yushau, 2002).

The Liberian crisis, as captured by Osimen et al (2015):

Was preconceived in the womb of the Commonwealth and Americo-Liberian oligarchy whose contraptions of power resulted in the unbearable monopoly of political power to the total exclusion of the exploited indigenous Liberians. The oligarchy system was genetically being modify by the military coup of 1980 which brought the government to No Commissioned Officers (NCOs), having Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe as the Chairman of the People's Redemption Council, marked another water shed in the history of the country which degenerated into conflict interest thereby, resulting to destruction of lives and property.

The tensed political climate which led to the collapse of law and order in Liberia signaled that Liberia might slide into anarchy in early 1990s. This situation prompted both governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO) to call for timely intervention of the United Nations and the international community to stem the threats to peace and security in Liberia, Mano River and perhaps West Africa before it degenerated further, with a consequence that may spill over neighboring countries, and the sub-region if not handled craftily and carefully. The call for intervention seemed to be the best way to go, considering the availability of about 2000 of the United States' marines off

Liberia's coast. When it dawned on regional governments, however, that the international community may not be prepared to assume such responsibility, a consensus was reached by 15 heads of governments of the sub-region to form ECOMOG. Then, ECOWAS' involvement in peace-keeping and peace enforcement was still at ad-hoc status which was to a great extent influenced by Nigeria's own policy orientations (Bach, 2007). The decision to intervene is equally perceived as a unique opportunity for Nigeria and, indeed, a few West African leaders to assume the responsibility and experimentation of the concept of Pax-Africana as posited by Ali Mazrui on *ad hoc* basis (Bach, 2007).

This responsibility was later left on the shoulders of a few countries such as Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone to contribute forces (Osimen et al, 2015; Yushau, 2002).

However, at the height of operation, Abuja contributed close to 12,000 troops out of the proposed 15,000 soldiers. Nigeria equally spent close to \$10 billion for upkeep and maintenance of her troops.

Nigeria's active participation, - in ensuring peace and stability to war-ridden Liberia - nevertheless, did earn her quite a number of admiration and accolades from several governmental, non-governmental, and diplomatic quarters. Even Boutros Ghali, the then UN Secretary General, was quite overwhelmed in his commentary on Nigeria's roles in Liberia by noting that:

The case of Nigeria is important because in the various missions (peacekeeping), the expenses are paid by the United Nations, but in the case of Liberia, the expenses were paid by Nigeria which allied the ECOMOG's effort that successfully

restored democracy in Liberia and Sierra Leon. (Ibadapo, 2010)

At the end, the troops succeeded in restoring peace to Liberia, and consequently, the warlords were brought to the table to negotiate peace which led to the July elections of 1997 (Muhammed, 2014).

Although, analysts may have argued that these peace-keeping operations failed to end the war and violence in these nation states, nonetheless, it is worthy to note that the operations did really blast its way into a transitory form of peace in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Moreover, it went a long way to cement Nigeria's diplomatic efforts in peace-keeping as capable of militarised initiatives (Chan, 2017).

Furthermore, it should be understood that peacekeeping enterprise, by and of itself, may not resolve a dispute out rightly; it is considered a temporary expedient measure or a holding action. The result of a 2008 research of 648 terrorist organizations between 1968 to 2006 conspicuously showed that overreliance on conventional military powers had recurrently been unavailing as military force in isolation had barely been effective in crushing terrorism (Jones and Libicki, 2008).

However, whilst it is a public knowledge that military approach in isolation may not effectively resolve a politically motivated violence (Rupert, 2007), a well-equipped and adequately deployed forces can momentarily make the required condition necessary for terrorist organizations to operate unhealthy. The Afghanistan experience where the US military forces successfully impeded the

growth of Al-Qaeda movement by way of ousting the government that backed them aptly match this scenario (Dodeye, 2016).

The fundamental purpose of peacekeeping operations is to contain violence in order to provide a stable and peaceful atmosphere for mediation and negotiation efforts. Hence, peacekeeping venture is basically a 'third-party supervised tools' that facilitates negotiation of a peaceful settlement. Peacekeeping operations may prove ineffective when used in isolation or where other techniques of conflict management are inefficient. Hence, it should be understood that peace-keeping operations do not resolve dispute in isolation but only freezes the status quo (Osimen et al, 2015).

Considering the huge resources Nigeria had expended on the Liberian peace-keeping operations, the salient question on everyone's lips is why would Nigeria committed so much to the operations, considering her domestic challenges. However, it should be stated that Nigeria's active participation in ECOMOG's peacekeeping operations in Liberia is significant in two folds. First, it was a commendable attempt to show how sub-regional organization could muster resources, come under a regional banner, and intervene in conflict-ridden states. Second, it created a platform that brought a total retrospect of the policy of OAU's non-interference in the domestic affairs of states to the fore. This policy was one of the underlying principles of the OAU prior to its metamorphosis into AU.

However, unfolding events in the continent made African leaders to appreciate that domestic conflicts, if left unchecked, could constitute a threat to regional security. This principle was contained in the 1991 Conference on Security,

Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa. It affirmed that the “security, stability, and development of every African country is inextricably linked with those of other African countries”. (Yakubu, 2011) Put differently, a threat to peace and security in any African state reduces the stability of other nation states in Africa.

3.5. NIGERIA’S DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SIERRA LEONE (1997-2000)

Nigeria’s participation in the peace-keeping force that reinstated former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and his government was more than remarkable. With Nigeria contributing the most significant number of the 13,000 troops for the Sierra Leonean peace-keeping operations, the conflict was terminated in less than two years. In 1998, ECOMOG peace-keeping mission under Nigerian leadership with significant assistance from the United Kingdom and an African paramilitary mercenary known as Kamajor, gained entry into Freetown. And eventually reinstated former President Kabbah and his government. This reinstatement was made possible by ECOMOG intervention spearheaded by Nigeria after a democratically elected government was overthrown in a bloody coup on 25 May, 1997 in Freetown. This coup was led by rebels from the country’s long standing insurgency and quite a number of dissident Sierra Leonean military officers (Osimen et al, 2015).

In the year 1999, the disputants were successfully brought to a roundtable where an agreement to bring the impasse to an end was signed in Lomé, Togo,

hence, facilitating the UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) (Ibadapo, 2010).

This intervention, to the Nigerian government, was quite significant in two strategic ways; one, Nigeria had been quite passionate about regional security, hence, the Sierra Leonean peacekeeping operations presented a platform to fulfil her policy of spirit of good neighbourliness and Pan-African policy of maintaining peace and security on the continent. Second, the operation was also a good moment to be seized by the then Nigerian Head of State, General Sani Abacha who had craved for international legitimacy for his dictatorial military regime; a regime that had been quite discredited by international community.

It is necessary, though, to emphasize that the intervention did not go without some troubling aspects – such as employment of mercenary in peace-keeping operations, lack of international mandate, and the extremely authoritarian nature of the Abacha government at the time - however, the initial success recorded by the operations did really help to obscure those aspects (Osimen, et al, 2015).

3.6. NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUDAN

Prior to the climax of the Sudan crisis, Nigeria had been quite involved when it was imminent that law and order was going to break down in the country. She had engaged in the search for peace in Sudan by hosting several Peace Talks in Abuja, Lagos, and Kano in the 1980s and 1990s with the sole objective of facilitating the resolution of the long infuriated conflict (Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

In recent times, Nigeria's former President Olusegun Obasanjo was also quite proactive in exhibiting Nigeria's commitment to resolving the Sudan conflicts. Pursuant to Nigeria's spirit of good neighbourliness, President Obasanjo expediently deployed military personnel to Sudan. Also, the instrumentality of Nigeria's diplomacy was put to use by canvassing other African nations for the popular catchall phrase "African solutions to African problems", an initiative that was born out of passionate commitment to resuscitate a 'marginalized and exploited continent' that had been economically and politically crippled and frustrated by centuries of slavery (Fiquremariam, 2008).

President Obasanjo rallied round support for the deteriorating humanitarian crisis that was being experienced in Darfur where Janjaweed – a government-backed militia group – had killed over 300 thousand non-Arab Sudanese; a situation that was perceived as an execution of policies that appear to be genocide against the non-Arab Sudanese. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of OAU member states - which had in the previous years restricted the organization from mounting required pressure on the previous Sudanese governments, which was predominated by Arabs located in the Northern part of the country - was tactically overlooked by the new AU under the leadership of President Obasanjo. This bold step facilitated the involvement and active participation of the AU, and international community in finding a peaceful and enduring resolution to the Darfur conflicts.

Parts of the decisive steps taken by President Obasanjo - in his capacity as AU Chairman and Nigerian President - in finding a peaceful resolution to the Darfur crisis include the appointment of his immediate predecessor, President

Abubakar Abdul Salam as his special envoy to Darfur. This appointment is quite critical in one sphere amongst others; it's a clear indication of Nigeria's *savoir faire* for a functional engagement in Sudan, in such a way that was designed, apparently, to inject sound judgement and credibility into the peace-keeping process.

Immediately after the groundwork consultations with all concerned stakeholders in the crisis, a first-round of inter-Sudanese Political Talks was hosted by Abuja on 23 August, 2004 with the approval of the AU. Several stakeholders such as the Nigerian and Sudanese Governments, the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were all well represented.

While the international community was still in the process of debating over the nature of the Darfur crisis, Nigeria's hosting of rounds of peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) at different times in Lagos and Kano, is founded on Nigeria's efforts to comprehend the nature of Darfur crisis having listened to both parties' positions. Osimen et al (2015) submitted that "the seeds that have now germinated in the signing of a comprehensive Peace Accord between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were sown in those peace talks". (Osimen et al, 2015)

However, aside from Nigeria's Pan-African policy of maintenance of peace and security in Africa, a fundamental question that keeps begging for an honest answer is what is the significance of the developments in Darfur that makes Nigeria to become so concerned about their domestic affairs?

In an attempt to do justice to this question, this thesis might go down a bit on a memory lane as regards the historical relationship between Nigeria and Sudan. Both nation states share a long historical relationship in religious learning and exchanges. History has it that there are almost 3 million Sudanese whose ancestral home is Nigeria, but decided to take permanent residence in Sudan. It has been widely reported that there are second and third generation Nigerians living in Sudan whose forefathers left the shore of Nigeria over the years to observe the Holy Pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia by land. As a result of the associated untold hardship experienced by the pilgrims back then, quite a number of them chose not to proceed through the long and difficult journeys, hence, they decided to reside permanently in Sudan (Ugwu, 2008).

However, Chan had argued that any critical and analytical exploration into the diplomatic engagements of Nigeria in Africa will reveal but one thing; Nigeria's hegemonic interest in the sub-region and Africa at large. This hegemonic interest, according to Chan, perhaps, has been predominantly revealed by country's several deployment of Nigerian troops since 1963, and various other peace-keeping efforts in which Nigeria had participated (Chan, 2017; Ogunnubi et al, 2016; Oshewolo, 2021). Furthermore, they equally argued that Nigeria's aspiration to represent the continent in the yet to be approved permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) may also partly explain Nigeria's pattern of behaviour in her Afro-centric policies. It will be reminisced that Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa are among the three leading contenders for the proposed two permanent seats for Africa at the United Nations Security Council. Such pursuit for veto power in the Security Council could be

suspiciously perceived as the motivation behind Nigeria's veil Afro-centric policy in Africa. This contention opens up the difficult issue of burying country's national interest in a disguised manner. Nevertheless, if Nigeria did this for her own selfish hegemonic and possibly, national interests in the region rather than being motivated by a genuine concern for peace and stability in the affected countries, what will be its implications for the economic and political integration projects in West Africa?

It is imperative to establish that Nigeria is quite conscious of her environment and the significance of her actions in the region. She is also aware of the consequences of her inaction. Just as the requirements of successful political actor. As long as the line between aspirations and national interests on the one hand, and moral purposes is blurred, then it might be challenging to critically criticize the country's position. An individual may crave for justice even if the world perishes, a nation state nevertheless has no moral right to proclaim such as a result of the security and welfare of her citizens. Hence, whatever the situation seems to be, it is not far-fetched to argue that to carry out a successful peace-keeping operation in the region without Nigeria's involvement and contributions is almost impossible. This argument aligns with the submissions of Tavares (2011) and Ogunnubi et al (2016) that it is extraordinarily difficult to engage in any peace-keeping operations in Africa without the involvement, participation, and support of Nigeria. It equally aligns with Peter's position (2010) that the Guinea Bissau unsuccessful peace-keeping operation was a critical experience and a pointer to the supremacy and indefatigability of Nigeria's involvement and contribution towards the

formation of ECOMOG. The military establishment of Mali, Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo that mobilized troops for this mission could only contribute 600 soldiers, where the operation will require 1,500 soldiers for the mission." The mission was eventually brought to an abrupt end". (Yushau, 2002)

3.7. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA TO NIGERIA

At this juncture, this thesis considers it imperative to relate Nigeria's strategic position in Africa in an attempt to establish the basis for the strategic importance of Africa to Nigeria.

It is not far-fetched that amalgamation of considerable number of elements of national power possessed by the country may have been responsible for Nigeria's manifest destiny in Africa. Such factors include Nigeria's strategic location, population, natural resources, military and economic wherewithal. These factors will now be addressed consecutively.

3.7.1. GEOGRAPHY

One of such critical factors that have motivated the country to committedly assume regional responsibility is her geographical location. Nigeria's location within the continent made it indispensable that the "Africa centre-piece" policy should not only be pursued extensively but also be continued. Certainly, Olajide Aluko had argued that Nigeria's Afro-centric principle is apparently more of necessity than choice. Thus, Nigeria's location has made it inexorable that the most ideal choice for the regional hegemon in ensuring a quite robust and well-

heeled foreign policy is, apparently, to first secure Nigeria's immediate external environment; Africa (Nwosu, 1995).

This choice became imperative for Nigeria as a result of the necessity for her to win hearts and minds of neighbouring countries. This is especially true as most of her neighbours are absolutely francophone countries with contrasting colonial backgrounds (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018). Furthermore, these nations states are ostensibly smaller in population, natural resources and land mass than Nigeria. Such relations with other African nation states reflect a crucial reality; Nigeria has a critical geopolitical stake in upholding stability in the sub-region and Africa as a whole (Bach, 2007; Nwosu, 1995).

One of the most reasonable step considered by Nigeria – that has been regarded as 'potential neighbourhood bully' by smaller francophone states - to guarantee these countries of their security is through conveyance of her peaceful image and demonstration of her resolute attention and unwavering commitment to African affairs (Adebajo, 2000; Bach, 2007; Ogunnubi, 2014; Nwosu, 1995). This reciprocity of Nigeria's neighbours and the unflinching support the country received from the OAU, which facilitated her victory against the Biafra during the 1960 civil war makes the necessity for "Africa centre-piece" in Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomatic practice indispensable (12) (Nwosu, 1995). Although, it must, however, be noted that the late President Murtala Muhammad's caustic diplomatic patterns resuscitated Francophonie member-states' concerns about Nigeria being a potential bully. This diplomatic (Gambari, 1978; Fawole, 2003). This is especially true as Nigeria's anticipation that ECOWAS will provide a conduit to exert her influence

was really frustrated by quite number of factors; one, unanimously-driven decision-making approach, frequent interruptions in the implementation of decisions, and the Francophone states cemented BEHAVIOUR (Gambari, 1978; Fawole, 2003). This frustration became heightened in 1983 as a result of President Buhari's expulsion order which compelled close to two million West African illegal immigrants to return to 'home nation-states; countries where good number of them never lived amidst confusion and chaos. Furthermore, Nigeria's land boundaries to neighbouring Francophone states were shut for a period close to 16 months by the Buhari-led military regime on allegations of thriving cross-border trafficking through the borders of these countries (Bach, 2007). Apparently, these diplomatic behavioural pattern was perceived as an abrupt detachment between rhetoric and action in spite of Nigeria's prominence in the sub-regional organization.

3.7.2. POPULATION

Nigeria's population remains a strength and asset to the country, as it positions her as a co-lead state actor – along with South Africa – in African foreign diplomacy (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018).

In 1960, Nigeria's population rose from 45.2 million to approximately 200 million in the year 2020; an increase of 342% over a period of 60 years (Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics). Comparatively, her population equals that of Italy, Britain, and Spain combined. Put differently, Nigeria's population accounts for 47% of the population of the entire West Africa and approximately one-sixth of the whole continent's population. Also, her population accounts

for one-fifth of the sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of the global population, Nigeria is approximately home to 2.35% of the entire world.

In other words, the implication remains that one of every 43 persons on the surface of earth is a Nigerian (Trading economist, 2015). Although, the life expectancy of an average Nigerian is put at 55 years by World Health Organization, however, by 2050, it is expected to rise to 61 (Sachs, 2007).

Although Ogunnubi et al (2016) have stressed more on the quality and not quantity of population. Population measured, in their own submissions, in terms of age distribution, size, education and health is pivotal element for the assertion of power in the international system. However, it should be emphasized that limitations such as quality of health, and education, human capabilities and development in no way undermine Nigeria's status in the context of her position in Africa. Her population remains a critical factor in advancing the country's foreign policy objectives and diplomatic engagements in the sub-region and Africa at large. The pivotal roles being played by regional powers such as China, Russia, and India cannot be discarded as inconsequential in spite of their apparent limitations and domestic complications, and Nigeria cannot be an exception.

Putting this population strength into consideration, Nigeria unquestionably has been a blessing in projecting her influence to play a pivotal role in Africa. Just as it makes her have edge over other African states; specifically, in terms of economy, as it already has a ready-made market for investments and goods and products from other African countries and the world at large (Nnanyere & Kelechi; 2015).

Apparently, the primary rationale why Nigeria is considered the 'giant of Africa' according to Oyeniya (2013) is her demography, and the availability of large market for goods and services, as well as ample source of human resources required for development. In his own submission, Fawole notes that "the country's demography has since independence invoked in its leadership a historic sense of responsibility and an equal perception by other states of Nigeria as an inspiration for development within the continent". (Ogunnubi et al, 2016)

With a considerable large landmass of about 924,000km² coupled with a 853km long shoreline (Bach, 2007), the capacity of Nigeria's vast market and its potentiality as a longstanding trade ally to most African countries are not taken for granted by any nation state in Africa, and perhaps, industrial nations. The country's readily accessible market has the capacity to contain abundant finished products from other countries (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018).

The Economist (2014) remarks that 'roughly one in five of sub-Saharan Africa's - 1.1 billion (Statista, 2019) people lives in Nigeria. Its population is growing at a rate of 2–3% a year. Its people are young, ambitious and increasingly well educated'. This is undoubtedly one of the fundamental ingredients that drive the location of a country for investment drive.

Over and above Nigeria's huge market size, the country provides growingly sophisticated buying elite and a growing industrial sector (Nnanyere & Kelechi; 2015). Good number of manufacturing companies and business corporations - such as South Africa's telecommunications company MTN – have experienced Nigeria's market potentials. MTN's initial capital for investment in Nigeria was

just 285 million USD, and before a twinkle of an eye, its customer base had risen to 32 million in just five years of operation. It is reported in 2012 that over 29% of MTN's global revenue emanates from its Nigerian branch (Oyeniya, 2013).

Subsequently, this capability gives Nigeria an advantage of keeping a large military that has the wherewithal to venture into and guarantee African peace-keeping initiatives (Nnanyere, Chukwu Ogo and Kelechi, Johnmary Ani. 2015).

3.7.3. NATURAL RESOURCES

Owing largely to abundant – human, material, and natural endowment, Nigeria is regarded as the giant of the region. She is considered the leading oil producer in the continent with an output of 2.1 million barrels per day (Statista, 2021), coupled with a vast reserve of billions of barrels. In addition to the crude oil, Nigeria is equally endowed with an approximate of 120 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves (Bach, 2007) with restorable gas reserves of 45 tcf; which makes it to be considered the 9th largest source globally (Bach, 2007). The ratio of the country's gas reserve-production is approximately 125 years; a sharp contrast with less than 30 years for oil. Since the commencement of the 1990s, the Gulf of Guinea has equally been ranked one of the globe's auspicious energy frontiers for quite number of oil multinationals.

This endowment, indeed, has put Nigeria in a vantage position which might be challenging for any ECOWAS and African countries to compete with her (Muhammed, 2014).

Although, crude oil seems to be Nigeria's chief natural resources, however, the country is equally blessed with about 33 different solid minerals – such as bitumen, gold, hides and skins, rubber, tin and wood, emerald, columbite, cement, coal, zinc, iron-ore, cotton, sapphire, textiles, peanuts, palm oil, etc. - in about 450 locales. These natural resources, when fully exploited, have the capacity to expedite the country's position, and make her the leading economy in Africa (Ogunnubi et al, 2016; Souare, 2002; Akpuru-Aja, 1998:26).

3.7.4. ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES

Although Nigeria may have been perceived to be a mixed economy, middle income, and emerging economy with enlarging commercial, telecommunications, and banking services, and entertainment sectors according to Robert (1987), however, her discreteness was considerably amplified in the 1970s not on the account of any other factor but the startling expansion of her economic source – from palm oil to crude oil. At the early 1980s, Nigeria's crude oil production per day ranged between 0.5 to 2.0 million barrels per day with a price of 35.50 USD per barrel at peak periods in 1982 (Shaw, 1984).

As stated in the CIA fact book, Nigeria has the largest oil reserves in Africa after Libya (Anjum, 2011). Nigeria is equally ranked among the world's topmost four largest crude oil exporter and the biggest oil producer in the globe with dependable reserves of 37.5 billion barrels; an equivalent of 31.77% of net African oil (Aluko and Ogunnubi, 2018; Ekanem, 2011). Nigeria owed a great deal of her ability to wield considerable power and

play a great role in international affairs during this period chiefly to the oil boom of the 1970s.

As at 2011, Nigeria was rated 30th globally in terms of “private public partnership” (PPP) measured in gross development product (GDP), and the second largest economy in Africa. Her manufacturing sector, though currently underperforming because of the dilapidated state of infrastructure in the country, produces a large proportion of goods and services for the West African region. Also, Nigeria is ranked 63rd World and 5th in African service output and ranked 25th in the World and 1st in Africa in farm output; Nigeria also ranked 6th among OPEC nations and first in Africa (Souare,2005).

Until the rebasing of Nigeria’s economy, her purchasing power parity and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as at 2013 was around 478.5b USD, with an actual growth rate of 6.2%. Throughout this period, her per capita purchasing power parity had reached 2,800 USD, from 390 USD in 2001 (Freemantle and Stevens 2012; Enweremadu 2013).

Nigeria’s growth considerably surpasses the average for sub-Saharan Africa of 5.6% and favourably competes with the global economic growth rate of 2.8% between the years 2009 and 2011 (Enweremadu 2013). As a result of the April 2014’s recalibration of Nigeria’s GDP and pronouncement of rebased figures, her economy undoubtedly became the biggest in the continent with a GDP of 522b USD and a yearly growth rate of 6.2%. (Trading Economist,2015).

Going by the above statistics, it is, undoubtedly apparent that Nigeria’s economic value is not quite conditioned by proceeds from the exploration of crude oil as against Ihonvbere and Shaw’s argument (1983). Crude oil’s

exportation only accounts for 14% of Nigeria's GDP. Other non-oil sectors that conditioned Nigeria's revenue generation include agriculture, manufacturing and imports services.

The recent economic reforms embarked upon by the federal government did quite reposition Nigeria to the third position amongst the fastest growing economy in 10 emerging markets (EM!0). Furthermore, a cursory look at the list of 3G nation states (Global Growth Generators) will reveal Nigeria's position as one of just two African states identified as sources of growth and potential investment opportunities by Citigroup. Also, the country has been identified as one of the Goldman Sachs' next 11 nation states, and MINT (Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Thailand) group of most promising emerging markets (Boesler 2013).

Moreover, according to Invest's (2014) related study on investment destination of investors among 30 African markets, Nigeria was considerably cited by over half (51%) of the respondents. According to Forbes (2014), the respondents claim Nigeria has "the best investment prospects for the immediate future".

Craig (1984) also added that Nigeria "has the best-established private sector in West Africa, which is essential for economic growth" (Craig, 1984). Nigeria's huge population - with over half of West Africa's population - has put her also on a vantage position in terms of regional economic integration through the West African market (Craig, 1984).

Craig contended further that "the privatization of many sector of the Nigeria's economy such as communication, energy, banking and a host of others to local and foreign investors promise to further revitalize and transform the country's

economy". The various peacekeeping missions and diplomatic engagements the country has involved is due to the country's relative economic strength (Craig, 1984). The establishment of Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF), a tactical machinery established in 1976 by Obasanjo government with a startup funds of \$480 million with an addition of \$88 million in 1981. This Trust fund, in Craig's words, was strategically designed to advance the development of the low-income member states of African Development Bank (AFDB) (Craig, 1984). As posted by AFDB on its website in 1996, "the NTF had a total resource base of \$432 million" (AFDB). Thus, Nigeria lends money to Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) members at an interest rate of 4% which can be paid within a period of 25 years, with a five-year grace period (Muhammed, 2014).

Non-profitable infrastructural projects were given preference basically in low-income countries. The initial NTF loan, however, was approved to finance the development and expansion of an airport, as considered by African Development Bank (ADB) (Craig,1984). According to Craig, the NTF had facilitated and funded a significant percentage of multinational projects than the ADF and the ADB. One of such loans was the commitment of funds to three multinational projects between the period of 1976 and 1979, contributing "a 12.64% share of the total cost of the Abidjan-Accra Highway, 29.92% share of the Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications Project, and 36.46% share of the Diama Dam Project". (Craig,1984)

A closer inspection of the Nigerian role through the NTF will reveal different and interconnected objectives accomplished by the country. Some of these projects include road network such as Accra-Abidjan Highway; a multimillion

dollar project designed to facilitate business linkages between Ghana and Ivory Coast, and advance the interregional trade potentials between them. Others include, educational projects, infrastructural development, telecommunications, road network, etc.

For instance, “the Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project”, according to Craig, initiated a communications infrastructure between Mali, Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire. This telecommunication project did facilitate an optimal and improved communications between these three states, thereby enhancing expanded transactional flow within the sub-region (Craig).

TABLE 1:

Year	Period	Measurement	Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Services	Trade	TOTAL_GDP
2000	Annual	N'm	4,840,971.20	8,808,652.44	654,027.49	6,709,176.63	2,675,452.58	23,688,280.33
2001	Annual	N'm	5,024,542.11	9,351,860.34	732,511.60	7,416,289.75	2,742,338.22	25,267,542.02
2002	Annual	N'm	7,817,084.50	9,061,670.24	764,328.51	8,394,517.68	2,920,109.32	28,957,710.24
2003	Annual	N'm	8,364,832.10	10,893,905.26	831,207.14	8,531,195.03	3,088,307.85	31,709,447.39
2004	Annual	N'm	8,888,573.40	11,418,598.38	774,859.94	9,718,300.57	4,220,216.79	35,020,549.08
2005	Annual	N'm	9,516,991.54	11,674,741.16	868,587.00	10,624,122.25	4,790,507.21	37,474,949.16
2006	Annual	N'm	10,222,474.98	11,481,759.72	981,454.90	11,788,354.41	5,521,460.53	39,995,504.55
2007	Annual	N'm	10,958,469.13	11,332,356.55	1,109,313.11	13,161,455.03	6,360,814.10	42,922,407.93
2008	Annual	N'm	11,645,370.98	11,068,224.99	1,254,300.33	14,792,018.78	7,252,600.24	46,012,515.31
2009	Annual	N'm	12,330,325.55	11,353,421.80	1,404,496.02	16,682,413.42	8,085,442.30	49,856,099.08
2010	Annual	N'm	13,048,892.80	12,033,195.91	1,570,973.47	18,966,552.02	8,992,649.98	54,612,264.18
2011	Annual	N'm	13,429,378.77	12,874,246.20	1,817,829.82	19,748,682.42	9,640,904.56	57,511,041.77
2012	Annual	N'm	14,329,705.62	13,028,045.51	1,989,464.28	20,728,998.81	9,853,678.82	59,929,893.04
2013	Annual	N'm	14,750,523.21	13,014,509.97	2,272,376.69	22,673,412.58	10,507,899.27	63,218,721.73
2014	Annual	N'm	15,380,389.34	13,791,247.37	2,568,464.75	24,286,888.77	11,125,795.61	67,152,785.84
2015	Annual	N'm	15,952,220.14	13,319,126.19	2,680,216.00	25,374,779.95	11,697,587.66	69,023,929.94
2016	Annual	N'm	16,607,337.33	12,062,049.20	2,520,852.18	25,071,935.82	11,669,061.39	67,931,235.93
2017	Annual	N'm	17,179,495.29	12,314,676.80	2,545,991.32	24,904,371.28	11,546,445.65	68,490,980.34
2018	Annual	N'm	17,544,147.74	12,513,067.38	2,605,287.77	25,663,648.06	11,473,791.00	69,799,941.95

Source: CBN Data & Statistics (<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/RealGDP.asp>)

TABLE 2:




TABLE 3:


Year	Crude Oil Production bpd (thousand)							
	Nigeria	Iraq	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Libya	Kuwait	Venezuela	United States
1980	2,055	2,514	1,662	9,900	1,787	1,656	2,168	8,597
1981	1,433	1,000	1,380	9,815	1,140	1,125	2,102	8,572
1982	1,295	1,012	2,214	6,483	1,150	823	1,895	8,649
1983	1,241	1,005	2,440	5,086	1,105	1,064	1,801	8,688
1984	1,388	1,209	2,174	4,663	1,087	1,157	1,798	8,879
1985	1,495	1,433	2,250	3,388	1,059	1,023	1,677	8,971
1986	1,467	1,690	2,035	4,870	1,034	1,419	1,787	8,680
1987	1,341	2,079	2,298	4,265	972	1,585	1,752	8,349
1988	1,450	2,685	2,240	5,086	1,175	1,492	1,903	8,140
1989	1,716	2,897	2,810	5,064	1,150	1,783	1,907	7,613
1990	1,810	2,040	3,088	6,410	1,375	1,175	2,137	7,355
1991	1,892	305	3,312	8,115	1,483	190	2,375	7,417
1992	1,943	425	3,429	8,332	1,433	1,058	2,371	7,171
1993	1,960	512	3,540	8,198	1,361	1,852	2,450	6,847
1994	1,931	553	3,618	8,120	1,378	2,025	2,588	6,662
1995	1,993	560	3,643	8,231	1,390	2,057	2,750	6,560
1996	2,001	579	3,686	8,218	1,401	2,062	2,938	6,465
1997	2,132	1,155	3,664	8,362	1,446	2,007	3,280	6,452
1998	2,153	2,150	3,634	8,389	1,390	2,085	3,167	6,252
1999	2,130	2,508	3,557	7,833	1,319	1,898	2,826	5,881
2000	2,165	2,571	3,696	8,404	1,410	2,079	3,155	5,822
2001	2,256	2,390	3,724	8,031	1,367	1,998	3,010	5,801
2002	2,118	2,023	3,444	7,634	1,319	1,894	2,604	5,744
2003	2,275	1,308	3,743	8,775	1,421	2,136	2,335	5,649
2004	2,329	2,011	4,001	9,101	1,515	2,376	2,557	5,441
2005	2,627	1,878	4,139	9,550	1,633	2,529	2,565	5,182
2006	2,440	1,996	4,028	9,152	1,681	2,535	2,511	5,088
2007	2,350	2,086	3,912	8,722	1,702	2,464	2,490	5,077
2008	2,165	2,375	4,050	9,261	1,736	2,586	2,510	5,000
2009	2,208	2,391	4,037	8,250	1,650	2,350	2,520	5,350
2010	2,455	2,399	4,080	8,900	1,650	2,300	2,410	5,482
2011	2,550	2,626	4,054	9,458	465	2,530	2,500	5,645
2012	2,520	2,983	3,387	9,832	1,367	2,635	2,500	6,497
2013	2,367	3,054	3,113	9,693	918	2,650	2,500	7,441
2014	2,423	3,368	3,239	9,735	471	2,619	2,500	8,708
2015	2,317	4,054	3,300	10,046	404	2,562	2,500	9,431

Source: United States Energy Information Administration

(<https://www.indexmundi.com/energy/?country=us&product=oil&graph=production>)

uction)

TABLE 4: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION – BARREL PER DAY (THOUSAND)



3.7.5. MILITARY CAPABILITY

To a large extent, Nigeria’s peace-keeping endeavours within and outside Africa – since independence – has always been defined and fashioned by her military preparedness. Her commitment to secure peace and security in the region is inherently linked to her military capabilities (Ogunnubi et al, 2016). One significant element that stands Nigeria out in the continent is her military strength which is accentuated by her antecedents in peace-keeping missions within and outside the continent. In his own words, Adebajo (2008) remarked that “Over 200, 000 Nigerian soldiers have been deployed to peacekeeping missions around the globe, and the country has contributed troops to nearly 40 major UN and regional peacekeeping missions in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East”. Moreover, the country’s former president Obasanjo submitted that Nigeria had spent close to \$13 billion on peace-keeping operations and enforcement across the continent in a period of 12 years (Esler, 2003).

Alli (2012), as a matter of fact, remarks that the country's substantial military strength cannot be discarded as inconsequential in her significant hegemonic role in the region. Put differently, Nigeria's penchant for regional peace and security has been greatly influenced by sufficiency and preparedness of her military.

Comparatively, Nigeria's military strength is incomparable to that of her neighbours, as she enjoys considerable military wherewithal with a moderately fully-furnished armed forces that have the capability to protect the country against any possible internal insurgency or external threat (Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

As Tables 5 and 6 show, the country is rated 36th in the GFP military power indicator in 2012. Furthermore, as reported by SIPRI, Nigeria is ranked 3rd in Africa in terms of Military Expenditure between the years 2005 and 2014 with an estimated aggregate strength of 200,000 military personnel, and an average of 300,000 paramilitary personnel. Nigeria has continued to improve upon her stock of armament over the years, while engaging in various military escapades aimed at developing preparedness for combat without much restraint (Omede,2012).

Going down memory lane, Nigeria has been the only nation state in Central Africa and West Africa that contributed troops and sustain military operations abroad before the Persian Gulf war (1989-1990). Nigeria began her military industrialization project since 1964 with formation of the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), targeted at strengthening the country's self-dependence in manufacturing of small arms and ammunition, and its

maintenance, so as to reinforce her defence, security and strategic foreign policy objectives with global best practices (DICON, 2010).

Between 1969, Nigeria's importation of ammunitions from the UK rose from 2.4 USD million to 14.7 USD million. Equally, Lagos acquired 'four batteries of Russian 122mm artillery (Stremlau, nd).

The rate of military imports from Britain suddenly jumped from \$2.4 million during the third quarter to \$14.7 for the final three months of 1969.² In addition to the British equipment, which accounted for approximately 90 percent of the small arms and ammunition used by the Nigerian infantry, Lagos purchased four batteries of Russian 122mm artillery.³ The large guns were reported to have a range of thirteen miles, and were said to be destined for emplacements that would permit blanket shelling of Uli airstrip.

Nigeria's equipment in Kaduna dates back to 1970s. These instruments were responsible for the production of West German-designed BM-59, and PM-12 handguns, HK G-3 rifles, 7.62 mm and 9 mm Parabellum armament (Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

In line with Nigeria's national foreign policy goals, over 17,000 military personnel have been deployed by Nigeria to contribute to peace-keeping and building in countries such as Kuwait, Rwanda, Iraq, Angola, Western Sahara, and Liberia. Just as in the Congo, Cambodia, India-Pakistan, Somalia, Mozambique, Lebanon, and Chad.

Table 5. Nigeria's Military indicators.

<p>Military manpower</p>	<p>Total Population: 162,470,737</p> <p>Available Manpower: 72,319,838</p> <p>Available Manpower: 72,319,838</p> <p>Military manpower Total Population: 162,470,737</p> <p>Available Manpower: 72,319,838</p> <p>Reaching Military Age Annually: 3,455,147</p> <p>Active Frontline Personnel: 100,000</p> <p>Active Frontline Personnel: 100,000</p> <p>Active Reserve Personnel: 0</p>
<p>Land System</p>	<p>Tanks: 363</p> <p>Armored Fighting Vehicles: 1407</p>

	<p>Self-Propelled Guns: 48</p> <p>Towed Artillery Pieces: 680</p> <p>Rocket Projectors (MLRS): 0</p> <p>Portable Mortar System: 300</p> <p>Air power Total Aircrafts: 294</p>
Air power	<p>Total Aircrafts: 294</p> <p>Helicopters: 84</p>
Naval power	<p>Total Strength: 37 (including auxiliaries)</p> <p>Aircraft Carriers: 0</p> <p>Frigates: 2</p> <p>Destroyers: 0</p> <p>Corvettes: 4</p>

	Submarines: 0 Coastal Craft: 16 Mine Warfare: 2 Amphibious Assault: 0
Military budget (in USD)	Defence Budget: \$2,215,000,000

Source: Global Fire Power (2013)

Table 6. SIPRI Military expenditure database of Major African Countries from 2005–2014 (\$USm).

COUNTRY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	TOTAL AVERAGE
NIGERIA	674.2	776.2	971	1616	1504	1990	2385	2316	2419	2265	1691.64
EGYPT	2659	2953	3307	3780	4017	4407	4464	4558	4360	4961	3946.6
SOUTH AFRICA	3567	3506	3526	3286	3593	4188	4594	4490	4135	3895	3878
ANGOLA	1365	1970	2032	3164	3311	3501	3639	4145	6091	6841	3606.2

Source: Ogunnubi (2015); see SIPRI Report (2005–2014)

As a result of these extensive regional and international engagements, there is no gainsaying in the fact that Nigeria has earned a considerable degree of international prestige and respect among the comity of nations. In fact, Bach (2007) contends that, to a large extent, Nigeria's foreign policy marker and diplomatic engagements provides the grounds on which she is being considered as a regional power.

Admittedly, these factors and other factors such as quality of the country's foreign policy and diplomacy, and exceptionally, Nigeria's oil-induced wealth, are quite critical to the basis of Nigeria's national interest and diplomatic engagements in Africa and her position in world affairs.

Having established Nigeria's strategic position in Africa, coupled with the basis for the strategic importance of Africa to Nigeria, the thesis will now proceed to the discourse analysis on Nigeria's diplomatic engagements vis a vis Boko Haram insurgency.

3.8. NIGERIA'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

In an attempt to engage in Nigeria's diplomacy in the fight against Boko Haram insurgent group, this thesis seeks to briefly set the stage with fundamentals of insurgency which will be followed by a brief introduction on Boko Haram.

It is widely believed that one of the strategic weapons employed by the insurgents is an attempt to legitimize grievances, such as the issue of corruption, lack of transparencies, and accountability, economic, social and political problems, as well as religious and tribal favoritism, to establish the illegitimacy of the administration (Lopez 2007:249).

Some scholars such as Tse-tung have argued that inferior nations in terms of military capabilities often result to the use of guerrilla warfare to emancipate themselves from more powerful oppressing nation states, such as its employment by China to liberate itself from the imperial Japan (Tse-tung, 1937:1). Although it is necessary to mention here by means of emphasis that, despite its distinct qualities and objectives, Tse-tung later clarified it that guerrilla warfare-on its own- lacks "the quality of independence, and is incapable of providing a solution to the struggle" (Tse-tung 1937:1).

Regardless of the political context in which insurgency operates, what is fundamental to insurgent activities is the disregard of conventional norms of warfare, by attacking a particular audience, mostly the civilians, to send political message-with high psychological impact-to the target audience, mostly the government (Richardson 2006:22).

Richardson further posits that:

If the primary tactic of an organization is deliberately to target civilians, then they deserved to be called a terrorist group irrespective of the political context in which they operate and irrespective of the legitimacy of the goals they seek to achieve.

(Richardson 2006:23)

However, this paper argues that Richardson's view pays little or no significant attention to the fact that a group may be criminal in its activities, yet not a terrorist group. Explanations along this line could make it difficult to distinguish between ordinary criminal organizations and insurgent groups. Insurgent group, such as Boko Haram runs a highly-sophisticated organizational structure with various departments and division of labour, unlike criminal groups who just ensure they protect themselves from apprehension by the government or law enforcement agencies, and pursue tactics and strategies to avoid risk (Forest 2012:4).

Irrespective of this distinction, a central theme that is significant in the definitions of insurgency is the concept of motive. This factor, I argue, distinguishes insurgent groups from just any criminal gangs. Communication of

political message is mostly at the heart of insurgency, unlike criminal groups with the motives of profit generation and maximization (Forest 2012: 4).

Most insurgent groups are known with the habit of adopting violent means to channel their messages, because of their conviction that the desired change may not be achieved without resort to violence. However, beneath every political message lies a motivation that influences the decisions to engage in insurgency.

In sum, the Boko Haram insurgency might be seen overall as a struggle to change the status-quo, however, what influenced their decisions to tow such path remains largely complicated.

To understand this motivation requires studying each theoretical analysis of insurgency in the context of Boko Haram and determine which theory has a convincing explanatory power to account for the timing and emergence of Boko Haram.

Having discussed the fundamentals of the insurgency, this thesis now proceeds to brief introduction on Boko Haram insurgent group.

Boko Haram, which literarily means 'education is a sin or sacrilege' in Hausa dialect, was arguably founded in 2002 by a Northern Influential Islamic Scholar, Muhammad Yusuf, who advocated the implementation of sharia in Nigeria (Ewi 2012).

The group's name, however, later became an impediment to establishing a clear understanding of its motives. Rather than being a representation of Boko Haram's core ideology, Walker (2012) observes that the group was named Boko Haram by some contemptuous elements who felt uninterested in the group's

activities. The group's main opposition, according to Walker, is the 'Yan Boko' (child of the book). These are sets of elites that, according to the group, have been the products of the British's 'policy of indirect rule' which have rendered people-morally and spiritually-bankrupt (Walker 2012).

Boko Haram draws its diverse membership from the predominantly northern Muslims mostly from fresh and unemployed graduates, ex-universities dons, university students and dropouts, and unlettered individuals as well, who utterly reject anything western (Cole 2009).

At the onset, the government of Nigeria, and indeed the international community did not quite consider Boko Haram's threat as consequential until the abduction of the 276 Chibok Secondary School girls in April, 2014. Also, Nigerian government's initial poor response to the terrorists' threat was a final stroke that broke the camel's back, as it facilitated the insurgents' rapid growth from a domestic insurgent group to a full-fledged global terrorist network. The group later formally declared and affirmed her allegiance to the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in March 2005 as a sign of its growth and sophistication (Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

Until recently, when Abubakar Shekau, the group's immediate late leader, began to eliminate his trusted allies and security guards on the allegation that borders on loyalty, Boko Haram's initial targets seemed to be security agencies, churches, mosques, schools, government and international infrastructures and people who go against its doctrine. In fact, the group's attacks and campaign of terror since its emergence in 2009 had really ravaged the country and neighbouring states such as Niger Republic, Cameroun, and Republic of Chad.

Although, an accurate data on number of casualties suffered as a result of Boko Haram's havoc wrecking may not be available, however, the United States' Council for Foreign Relations' dataset through her Nigerian Security Tracker (NST) submitted that Boko Haram-related carnage from May 2011 to August 2015 had resulted in 22,712 deaths (www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/). According to Amnesty International's (AI) report, over 5500 civilians have been killed between 2012 and 2015 (AI, 2015) while over 2000 girls and women were equally abducted in various northern communities. Also, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated about 2.1 million internally displaced persons in January 2015 as a result of the group's violence (AFP, 2015).

This figure matches the Research Institute's (Oslo) parameter for determining insurgency; that the use of force between insurgents and government must have resulted in "at least 25 battle-related deaths per year" (Oskar and James 2007:676), while Collier and Hoeffler's figure rises to '1000 combat-related deaths' per year. They further contended that "in order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these fatalities" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:565).

In the context of the group's ideology, Boko Haram's strict interpretation is based on the ideology of the 13th century notable Islamic Scholar, Ibn Taimiyyah, who championed the course of withdrawal from an unjust and ill-benevolent society, and advocated for strict resistance of such corrupt system and rise violently in arms against it (Walker 2012).

This is in line with Yusuf remarks; that the primary aim of the group is total withdrawal from a morally and spiritually bankrupt society into a spiritual and welfare society, where success and prosperity flourish naturally, and gradually-in parallel to the central government-until it replaces the legitimate state at the end (Walker 2012). This view is shared by Jones, as he posits that insurgency has always involved overthrow or secessionist agenda by non-state actors through the use of unconventional-and occasionally the use of conventional-military tactics and strategies (Jones 2008:9).

Analysts have observed that the structural system of the hard core members of the group, which is run in a cell-like organisation, has made the group a constitution of a “state within a state” (Cole 2009:7). Its complex hierarchical structure makes it difficult and if not impossible for the lowest members of similar positions to recognise each other in the group (Ewi 2012). This view challenges Hoffman’s (2006) view that insurgent groups operate ‘without a precise central command’. It further challenges Dodeye’s (2016) submission that Boko Haram insurgent group operates in a loose cell structure.

It has been reportedly established that Boko Haram has developed an advanced leadership structure - the Shura Council - that oversees several other coordinated sections such as suicide bombing, intelligence and research, welfare, medical and public enlightenment amongst others. Each council member is reportedly responsible for a cell, and the cells are entrusted with different tasks and located in various geographical locations (Sahara Reporters 2012).

The hierarchical structure of the group resembles the contemporary military pyramid structure with the lower hierarchy being occupied substantially by foot

soldiers, controlled by different military officers, while the top constitutes the high ranking military officers (Cronin, 2006). This cellular structure has a well-coordinated network within the hierarchy. Each cell hardly has information about other cells because they only take instructions from their individual leaders who exclusively have contact with the central authority (Beam, 2015). Hence, if the central command loses the control of a particular cell or perhaps, a particular cell is uncovered, such cell has insufficient information about other cells on the one hand, and the central command on the other hand. Thus, the existence of the insurgent group is not really threatened in any way. Consequently, Boko Haram's blend of the cellular and hierarchical structure stimulates efficiency and effectiveness in the context of intelligence gathering, finance, recruitment, support, ease of communication, and systematic enforcement of a long-term strategies (Cronin, 2006). Additionally, Boko Haram's cell structure and hierarchy makes it arduous to eliminate the group completely through military operations.

Having set the scene with a brief understanding of Boko Haram, this paper now proceeds to the concepts of insurgency on a brief note, beginning with its definition.

The task of searching for a conventionally accepted definition of insurgency has become quite daunting and herculean, as it has prompted hot debates over time. As long as the inability to draw a distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists persists, then the concept presumably remains an issue of perception.

Insurgency, according to Jones, is defined “as a political-military campaign by non-state actors who seek to overthrow a government or secede from a country through the use of unconventional-and sometimes conventional-military strategies and tactics” (Jones 2008:9). Moreover, Insurgency, as defined by the U.S. department of the Army Field manual is an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control”. (US COIN FM, 3-24, 1-1) Hoffman, in his own view, defines insurgency as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change”. (Forest 2012; Mazrui, 1985; Sluka, 2002)

The insurgents premeditatedly attack government forces, and population violently to create an unsafe atmosphere in the minds of the people that their government cannot protect its own subjects. The blame over Iraqi police station bombing of 2003, which claimed 26 lives, and the 16 June, 2011 Police Headquarters, and the United Nations Building in Abuja, where 21 lives abruptly terminated, and the May 1st 2014 bombing also in Abuja where 19 people were reportedly killed and the April 15, 2014 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping (276 female students in Northeastern Borno State) were never put on the insurgents that were responsible for the blast, rather on the authority and security forces that failed to protect the general populace. This is a tactical means of isolating the populace from the government to create the feelings

that government forces lack the wherewithal to offer them protection (Lopez 2007:249 and Hoffman 2006:114).

Hence, the population is less concerned about any ideology; nothing preoccupies their minds than issue of survival. Whoever convinces them about its package of protection, gains their support (Hoffman 2006:114). The inability of Adoo insurgent forces to protect the population in Oman, alongside the Omani government's ability to make an alternative and acceptable protection were arguably, two of the fundamental factors that were responsible for failure of Adoo, because they neither possessed the credibility to receive further intelligence from the population nor the ability to stop the population from the provision of intelligence to government forces (Hughes 2009:291-2).

Assurance of protection is not only a fundamental measure in the establishment of legitimacy in counter/insurgency, but also a crucial tactic of isolating the population from either of the parties. If successful, isolation deprives either the insurgents or the government the necessary support it requires from the population (Lopez 2007:249).

Nevertheless, there is an establishment of an argument that isolation may not exclusively deprive the insurgents of acquisition of necessary support from the population. In order to achieve this, the government must be more than willing to establish a genuine and acceptable reason for the population to pledge their support for the state or at least not antagonize the government (Lopez 2007:257).

Although, it is a truism that insurgents would be unable to function effectively without the means of the population and may not be able to have their support

if isolated, yet isolation measure has its own limitations and flaws. It must be established that isolation measure, most especially, if it has to do with search, coupled with the use of barbed wires to separate insurgents from the people, is sometimes potentially counterproductive, as it tends to antagonize some prominent citizens among the general populace (Lopez 2007:254; Banerjee 2009:201-2). According to Montgomery, “mass arrests, wholesale searches, and other seemingly easy methods of population control can only strengthen opposition to the government”. (Montgomery 2005:33) Also, another shortcoming is that, isolation requires substantial number of forces, moderately intelligence, detailed and careful planning, and reasonably exceptional efforts to achieve justifiable results (Banerjee 2009:197).

Despite this limitation, no guerrilla warfare may be successful in the absence of population’s support. “Without winning over the people, an insurgency cannot be defeated”. (Banerjee 2009:197) Hence, counterinsurgency campaigns “are not won or lost according to the number of dead bodies each side produces, rather such campaigns are decided by which side wins the hearts and minds of the people”. (Banerjee 2009:197)

Winning hearts and minds is a herculean task in counterinsurgency campaigns; its realization must constitute the use of political and economic capabilities. Either of both sides must not only be able to make essential services available, but also protect them and alienate the guerrillas from the people as discussed above. There have been significant achievements in India’s government COIN operations with the effective application of principle of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in places such as Nagaland and Mizoram, while her main principle of

fighting insurgency had not only proved impossible but was as well undermined in places such as Sri Lanka, Jammu and Kashmir, where efforts to win 'hearts and minds' of people became unrealistic (Banerjee 2009:201-2).

During her first deployment to Nagaland in February 1956, India's approach firstly took the dimension of a conventional warfare, with the aim to defeat the enemy militarily. Nonetheless, when it passed through hard and challenging times, India came to accept the fact that COIN operation is never a primarily military affair, and victory can never be achieved exclusively with military solution without winning 'hearts and minds' of the population (Kitson 1977:283). COIN operations, according to Vas, "have to be fought simultaneously on five fronts; political, economic, psychological, social, and military". (1986:219)

In his own assertion, Banerjee maintains that:

The Indian army's acceptance of this perspective meant that it acknowledged that the military dimension was only one element, and perhaps often less important one, of the overall response. Rather than military victory on the battlefield, the Indian Army came to accept that the objective of COIN operations was to destroy the political organization that sustains a guerrilla movement. This objective made the population, rather than insurgent forces, the centre of gravity for all COIN operations and underscores the necessity of making sure that military and political efforts are coherent and coordinated ((Vas 1986:219 in Banerjee 2009:194-7)

Popplewell (1995) further argued in same direction when he explained that key factor that earned British victory in their COIN campaigns in cities such Oman, and Malaya was their ability to realize that no such operations could be won without winning hearts and minds of the populace. In fact, the French and America's inability to put this strategy to use did really cost them a great deal in Algeria and Vietnam respectively (Popplewell 1995:336).

Having established basic fundamentals on Boko Haram insurgent group, this thesis will now proceed to a discourse on Nigeria's diplomatic efforts in the fight against Boko Haram.

In attempts to contain the dreadful attacks and carnage of the Boko Haram insurgent group, the Nigerian government had employed several strategic – military, political and socio-developmental - approaches to achieve peace and stability. These approaches will now be discussed accordingly.

3.8.1. MILITARY APPROACH

Indeed, the military approach, which seemed quite visible amongst other approaches, was pursued with all sense of intensity as a result of the group's increasingly pernicious nature. First, a joint task force (JTF) of all the main components of Nigerian armed forces was inaugurated in 2011 by the Nigerian military, navy and air force with the primary purpose of engaging Boko Haram in full-blown warfare.

However, as a result of the group's continuous advancement and sophistication, especially the seizure of several northern territories in the north-eastern part of the country, the federal government decisively resorted

to a full-scale Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). This is a joint military operation that involves other neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Benin, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. Although, the joint operation was earlier established in 1998 primarily to secure the Lake-Chad region, however its mandate was expanded in 2012 to include combating terrorism in the sub-region (Musa, 2013).

Furthermore, there was a collaboration between the community vigilance groups under a code name Civilian Joint Task Force (CITIF) and the government to engage in military operations at the grassroots levels against the insurgents. The basic logic behind the creation of CJTF is knowledge and information; the vigilance groups will be more conversant with the terrain and will easily identify Boko Haram members better than the military (Barna, 2014).

Despite the military dimension, knowledge remains a significant instrument in achieving victory in any insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. Undoubtedly, information remains a highly potent instrument of fighting insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. (see Adenekan, 2011).

In contrast to the widely held opinion within American military force that victory in war is best attained by overpowering technological and military advantage, Robert Scales, a retired major General, contends that “the type of conflict we are now witnessing in Iraq requires an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and motivation”. (Montgomery 2005 in Adenekan, 2011) A former Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Arthur Cebrowski’s argument aligns with Scales’ opinion that “knowledge of one’s enemy and his culture and society may be more important than

knowledge of his order of battle". (Montgomery 2005:24) The societal knowledge and intelligence that may have been gathered through deep interaction with the people have been argued to be the best way to create stability in counter/insurgency campaigns (US COIN FM, 3-24, 4-4 in Adenekan, 2011).

COIN experiences fought overtime in Malaya, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown that acquisition of intelligence and knowledge is very essential to making the application of force effective, because it is a significant instrument in counter/insurgency, as winning the 'hearts and minds' of the population demands a thorough understanding and knowledge of the local society (Montgomery 2005 in Adenekan, 2011).

One of the sixteen premises on which British Coin objectives have been based is the acquisition of 'accurate and timely information and intelligence'. Knowledge and information are essential and strategic factors to achieving success in any COIN operations (Rigden 2008 in Adenekan, 2011). The fact is that, both insurgency and counter-insurgency operate within the same physical and strategic environment. Both sides need as much knowledge and information of the other as possible to act swiftly and subdue it (see Adenekan, 2011).

However, it is puzzling that in spite of the enormous resources committed to the fight against the insurgency, as well as the country's tremendous military stature claims in Africa, the military joint operations cannot still be adjudged a successful operation in the fight against a local and non-sophisticated insurgent group at inception (Ogunnubi et al, 2016). Neither can the outcomes of the

Civilian Joint Task Force be considered favourable by every standard (Uzodike and Onapajo, 2015). The strategy remains somewhat precarious as it conspicuously illustrates a portrait of state ineffectiveness which allows the criminal elements to seize the advantage of a lawless environment (Mahmood, 2014). Boko Haram's late leader, Abubakar Shekau once proclaimed: "is it not amazing that we, who started with sticks and machetes, are today the biggest headache to the almighty Nigerian soldiers? What a shame!" (Audu, 2015). In varying attempts to establish the basis for the incapacitation of the Nigerian military to curtail the Boko Haram insurgency, Pieri and Serrano (2014) had argued that it was a consequence of some fundamental structural changes that occurred in the political and military systems of the country. Ogunnubi et al further contended as thus:

The return to democracy in 1999 was followed by a deliberate policy of de-militarising the state and keeping the soldiers in the barracks in order to prevent a military disruption of the nascent democracy. (Ogunnubi et al, 2016)

This factor had its reflection in the compulsory retirement of topmost hierarchy of Nigerian military, who later got appointed into juicy political positions at the inception of the 4th republic in 1999. It is argued that this factor was responsible for the 'politicization and attendant weakening of the Nigerian military strength and status as the continent's military giant (Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

Moreover, Nigerian military capability has reportedly been eroded by long years of neglect and corruption. The massive corruption ravaging the country,

according to Ajijah and Ibeh (2015), is quite alive in the ministry of defence as well. Their submission is explained as thus:

The huge amount allocated to the defence budget ended up in the pockets of defence chiefs, greatly affecting capacity building. The damage did not manifest until the country had to fight a major battle such as that with Boko Haram. The situation deteriorated to the extent that on several occasions, Nigerian soldiers fled the battlefield because they could not match the firepower of the Boko Haram fighters. For example, 200 soldiers were dismissed in May 2015 for 'acts of cowardice' in the war on Boko Haram. (Ajijah and Ibeh, 2015)

Consequently, Nigeria's image became badly bashed and exposed to ridiculous utterances from supposedly weaker military states that Nigeria had hitherto rescued from insecurity and instability. For instance, the Niger Republic Minister of Defence, Mahamadou Karidjo's remarks about Nigeria could not have been more ridiculous. He was reported to have declared that "our soldiers are not like Nigerians. They don't run" (Adetayo et al, 2015). In the same vein, the Chadian Foreign Minister, Moussa Faki Mahamat was equally alleged to have remarked that "the Nigerian Army has not succeeded in facing Boko Haram. My fondest wish is that they assume their responsibilities...our biggest wish is that the Nigerian Army pulls itself together – that it takes responsibility in the towns". (Baiyewu, 2015).

3.8.2. POLITICAL APPROACH

The political approach is premised on the viewpoint that the Boko Haram insurgency emerged primarily as a consequence of the grievances held by the northerners as a result of the alleged power distribution that purportedly works against the interests of the northern region. Hence, the government considered it rational to dialogue with the Boko Haram insurgents as a means of pursuing a political solution in addressing the alleged grievance. Some of these strategies developed to respond to the alleged grievances include an offer of amnesty amidst other strategies. Also, a special committee was inaugurated in 2014 to approach the Boko Haram leadership and the northern elites and interact with them.

In spite of this laudable strategic approach, it nevertheless failed to yield a successful outcome. While Olojo (2012) submits that the approach failed because the menace at hand is a dangerous amalgamation of political, economic, and ideological issues. Onapajo (2013), on his own, contended that the approach failed for three basic reasons amongst others. First, federal government's political will to find a lasting solution to the menace was quite distrusted by the northern elites; a government led by a southern president Goodluck Jonathan. In accordance with the elites' claim, previous concerted efforts by the northern elites to appeal to the group's leadership had been frustrated by the government (Onapajo 2013). Second, there seemed to be a growing concern in the north that Boko Haram was probably been sponsored by the Jonathan-led government, basically to whittle the northern Nigeria's political influence so as to boost President Jonathan's re-election chances in

2015 (Onaoajo and Usman, 2015). Lastly, the government was quite confused as to which factions of the group the government should negotiate with, because the group had broken into several factions and loose networks (International Crisis Group 2014).

3.8.3. SOCIO-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Furthermore, the federal government initiated a socio-developmental approach to mitigate the northern situation in light of the assumption that Boko Haram insurgency is being driven by the prevalent and extensive poverty, unemployment and socio-economic inequality in the northern part of Nigeria. A remarkable strategy adopted by the government in this regards is the revamping of the popular conventional Almaajiri Islamic Education System in the north in 2012. Basically, the program is targeted at the energetic and healthy youth wing of the Almaajiri. The youth wing is lured and eventually recruited into insurgency in the guise of acquisition of Islamic education, and eventually rendered vulnerable into criminal activities. With this program, it is obvious that the federal government tactically aimed at nothing but; empowerment of the energetic and agile youth with proper western education and eventually dissuade their initial perception about western education as evil.

In line with the government's commitment to the program, over 125 Almaajiri model schools had been established - as at 2014 - with state-of-the-art facilities. However, the fact that this approach seems to be long term whose outcome may not be visible in a short time, rendered this approach ineffective

as expected. Just as there was a growing concern in some quarters as well that an integration of Islamic education with a Western education that has allegedly been the basis of the insurgency may trigger the insurgency (Nwakpa, 2013; Uzodike and Onapajo, 2015).

3.8.4. PRESIDENT BUHARI'S EFFORTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM

At the inception of President Muhammadu Buhari's administration in May 2015, there seemed to be high expectations from both Nigerians and the international community that an effective approach and vibrant policies will be pursued to end the insurgency. These expectations were predicated on President's antecedents, not only as a former military ruler who fought corruption tooth and nail, but also his experience as a retired military chief who played a critical role in combating the Biafran soldiers during the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war.

Thus, President Buhari started on a good note with a series of vibrant and effective approaches and policies to bring the insurgency to an end. This became quite apparent in his first matching order to the Chief of Defence Staff to relocate the Nigerian Military Headquarters to Maiduguri, the heart of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Furthermore, in the President's resolve to curb the insurgency - in a bid to restore the country's lost dignity among the comity of nations - he engaged in quite number of diplomatic approaches to contain the threat. These

approaches were vividly clear in the President's diplomatic visits to seek regional and international cooperation to combat the insurgency.

The President's first ports of call a few days after his inauguration include the nation states in the MNJTF alliance to solicit better collaboration and build capacity for the collective military force so as effectively engage the Boko Haram insurgents. While the President visited Niger on 3 June, 2015, he also visited Republic of Chad the day after. Conspicuously, these visits were quite fruitful, as the host countries pledged their utmost commitment to the task.

Also, during the second round of the diplomatic talks, President Buhari played host to other nation states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in Abuja. The primary reason was to deliberate on the strategic approach to adopt in reengaging Boko Haram around the sub-region. Towards achieving these goals, the Nigerian government pledged a \$100 million donation to the MNJTF, out of which \$21 million was immediately released for take-off (Vanguard, 2015).

In the same vein, as part of the President's resolve to contain the insurgency, he attended the G7 meeting of June 7-8, 2015 in Berlin. His attendance was primarily to solicit support of the World major powers to crush the Boko Haram insurgency. And as expected, the outcome was favourable, as good number of the major powers pledged their assistance to end the insurgency (Vanguard, 2015).

Subsequently, in a bid to promote cooperation and reinstatement of bilateral relations between Washington and Abuja, President Buhari visited America on Washington's invitation between 20 to 23 June, 2015. The reinstatement occurred in the context of strained relations between the two states under the

presidency of Donald Trump and Goodluck Jonathan. Abuja had initially alleged that the US was frustrating Nigeria's efforts on the fight against Boko Haram as America refused to supply ammunitions to the Nigerian military.

It is worthy to note that Washington had previously expressed keen interest on the war against Boko Haram insurgency since the inception of Buhari presidency. For instance, Washington announced \$5 million donation to this fight as part of her new diplomatic collaboration with Abuja to end the insurgency (Premium Times, 2015). This development – to a large extent - is a clear indication that in spite of Nigeria's diminishing status as a regional power amidst the lingering Boko Haram war, the country seems to be on the verge of redeeming her lost image amongst the comity of nations.

The president's shuttle diplomacy, apparently, could be translated as a conspicuous resolve by the Buhari administration to deploy the country's diplomatic prowess to achieve victory in this fight against Boko Haram with the support and acceptance of other friendly nation states. A good instance was the acceptance of President Buhari's insistence that the MNJTF should be led by Nigeria in the face of proposals that the MNJTF leadership should be on rotational basis amongst the participating states. In a clear response to this development, the committee of African Ambassadors announced in August 2015 in Abuja that Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram insurgents has been adopted as a fight on behalf of All Africans (Ehikioya 2015).

3.9. IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM ON NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY.

Over the years, Nigeria has conducted an adequately-funded diplomatic strategies in the international system. Several peace-keeping operations, provision of developmental aids for low-income African countries, and economic assistance to regional and international institutions are some of her diplomatic instruments. Arguably, no other African country has contributed more to the continent in terms of human capital, finance and military resources than Nigeria.

The formation and execution of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence has been carried out in no fewer than fourteen different administrations through the external affairs ministry. From Tafawa Balewa's administration in 1960 to President Obasanjo's administration in 2003; from the administration of President Musa Yar'Adua to the current administration of President Muhammed Buhari, Nigeria's foreign policy projection has been fluctuating with the international politics rather than with the country's core strategic priorities and national interest. The consequence of the fluxy nature of Nigeria's foreign policy is the plethora of conceptual and ideological transitions often displaying an inconsistent schizophrenic outlook at the international front.

For most local and international observers, however, the successes of Nigeria's diplomatic engagements remain largely unimpressive, as her successes were undermined by certain inconsistencies. despite these laudable endeavours of a strong Afrocentric and Pan-African foreign policy, Nigeria's 'big brother' role has often yielded hardly any reciprocal benefit for her citizenry.

Despite Nigeria's sustained assistance and leadership role in the continent, some African countries still subject Nigerians living in their country to hostility and humiliation. For too long, Nigerians have gained very little benefit from the country's foreign policy interests in Africa compared to its numerous investment in the continent.

Until Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi – a former Minister of External Affairs – articulated another foreign policy direction, which sought to end the era of mere provision of assistance to African needy states without a benefit in return to a policy of reciprocity, the country's policy direction was more of a father Christmas.

Akinyemi contended that:

There is no disputing the fact that we have responsibilities to Africa. There should also be no disputing the fact that Africa has responsibilities to Nigeria. If when we say Africa is the centre-piece of our foreign policy we mean that Nigeria should identify with and defend the legitimate interests of Africa, collectively and each African States, individually, then I submit...that it also means that Africa and African States should identify with and defend Nigerian interests...if we owe a responsibility to stand up for and respond to Africa, we are owed an obligation to be consulted and a lot of situations allow for consultation. (Akinyemi, 1986)

This articulation did not go without a pocket of criticism from foreign policy and diplomatic stakeholders though, it nevertheless symbolized a radical change from the country's preceding policy of acceding simply to issues that affects the continent. Nonetheless, it could be argued that Nigeria's reaction was basically

on the ground of the country's national interest as a result of America's dominance in Nigeria's external economic relations (Nwosu, 1995).

A foreign policy approach that improves the quality of life of Nigeria and prioritises the improvement of the domestic situation of the country is needed to take Nigeria's regional hegemonic claim seriously. Nigeria's foreign policy must serve an economic development purpose by seeking to initiate practical economic agendas for the business growth and human capital development of its people. Although Nigeria's foreign policy in Africa has been branded as altruistic, intending to providing greater good for the African people, and sometimes to the disadvantage of its own people, the reality is that other African countries will positively regard Nigeria and its people on the strength of the quality of life and economic buoyancy of Nigeria. Again, while the rest of Africa can benefit immensely from Nigeria's human capital resources, it cannot be denied that Nigeria's economic diplomacy can be built on the diplomatic principle of reciprocity.

This is a clear indication that in diplomatic engagements, the correlation between inputs and outputs is asymmetric. In his submission, Nye submitted "even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product". (Nye, Public Diplomacy and soft power) a nation state could mobilize resources to the best of her ability, however, if those resources are not tailored to the specifics of the national goals, such diplomacy may fail to produce any national power at the end. If care is not taken, the reputation of such state could be maligned. That seems to be applicable to the Nigerian diplomatic engagements. Nigeria's foreign policy actors seem not to be cognizance of the need to ensure Nigeria's

diplomacy is pursued to achieve her national goals and engender economic growth.

Concisely, in spite of the massive resources Nigeria has committed to Afro-centric policy, the country's perturbing domestic conditions – which was precipitated by attendant crisis of the neo-liberal policies - have weakened the country's credibility as a regional stabilizer. Just as it casts a shadow on the functionality of Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in the region. The engagements are remarkable though, but they have limited relevant outputs for the promotion of national objectives and interests of the country, as it did not reflect the genuine essence of the Nigerian federation.

In terms of provision of refuge and asylum to seekers, Nigeria did play a prominent role in the continent as expected of a regional power. This is especially true since the oil booms of the 1970s. According to Ogunnubi et al (2016), the capability to accommodate asylum seekers and refugees remains largely one of the crucial characteristics of a major power in a region. In line with her penchant to show concern to any African issue, Nigeria had offered refuge to several Africans that fled their countries as a result of conflicts. Some of them include Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, Ivoirians. Also, Africans from states such as Angola and South Africa equally fled their countries for political repression and got accommodated in Nigeria. In the same vein, several Ghanaians, Burkina-babes, Cameroonians, Guineans, Togolese, etc. also fled their countries for economic hardship and found in Nigeria their dream homes. The American Committee for Refugees and Immigrants had disclosed that as at 2001, Nigeria had given asylum to an average of 10,000 refugees. This figure

includes 3000 Liberians, 4000 Sierra Leoneans, 3000 Chadians, and other five African nation states (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). Also, in 2007, Nigeria offered asylum for the last batch of refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia to permanently reside in Nigeria (Reuters, 2007).

However, a critical observation of Nigeria's current trend in this sphere reveals nothing but a reverse trend. It is quite disturbing that a former major asylum provider for conflict-ridden states now becomes asylum seeker as a result of incessant Boko Haram attacks especially in the northeast. A report has it that close to 192,000 Nigerians now reside as refugees in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The UN refugee Chief Antonio Guterres - in an acknowledgement of the outrageousness of the refugee crisis ascribed to Boko Haram - expressed that the condition is almost similar to that of the Syrian civil war. Thus, the situation has become so critical that the United Nations was compelled to launch an appeal fund of \$174 million to make provision for Nigerian refugees in their host nation states (Kindezka,2015). The worsening refugee crisis has now become a public knowledge with a negative impact on the country's image.

It is no longer a secret that the inflow of Nigerian refugees into the neighbouring states is fast becoming a security threat which had precipitated humanitarian crisis as a result of incessant Boko Haram attacks in their territories. For example, there was a reported Boko Haram invasion of a construction site in Waza, Cameroon in May 2014, where a Cameroonian soldier was killed, whilst 10 Chinese workers were kidnapped (VOA,2014). There was another instance of invasion of the Prime Minister's home in July

2014, where his wife was kidnapped whilst three others were reportedly killed during the raid (Al-Jazeera 2014).

Apparently, the most fatal of these attacks was the February 2015 invasion of Fotokol town, where close to 300 Boko Haram insurgents unleashed terror on the inhabitants killing close to 90 people living about 500 injured (The Guardian,2015). There were similar attacks in Niger Republic on June, 2015 when the insurgents raided Lamina and Ungumawo villages where close to 40 dwellers were reportedly killed (BBC, 2015). These calculated attacks give nothing but credence to the transnational outlook of the Boko Haram group. And that its violence and security threat is not restricted to Nigeria alone, rather it extended to the sub-region, the Sahel, and the continent as a whole. Its outlook is linked to other groups such as Somalia's Al-Shabab, Mali's Al-Qaidah (Dodeye, 2016).

Furthermore, the maltreatment Nigerian refugees receive from their host countries – as a result of the countries' incapability to cater for many migrants because of their states of economy – is a critical indicator to measure the level of the impact the crisis is having on the country. For instance, an estimated of 3000 Nigerian refugees were reported to have been deported from Republic of Niger in May 2015 in such a harrowing and disgraceful conditions. They were compelled to walk back to Nigeria for three days, which hitherto resulted in several deaths (Umar, 2015).

In sum, the Boko Haram insurgency has not only bashed Nigeria's image in all fronts, based on the ridiculous utterances and treatments she receives from

smaller nation states, but it has equally exposed the country's military weakness in the wake of violent attacks from the group.

...Nigeria needs the ability to realize that her diplomatic engagements exclusively may not be sufficient...without a targeted objective, credibility, and adequate attention to promoting her economic development through promotion of her national interests must be considered conscientiously. ..since foreign policy and diplomatic engagements are conceived primarily as a proactive intervention designed to achieve certain outcomes...Nigeria needs to understand that diplomatic engagements by and of itself may not really be adequate to earn a country the desired position in the international system. A country may only win the world's attention, and perhaps the applause that comes thereof with success, however it is a different thing to exploit the opportunity to promote the country's positive image, national values, goals, and policies to the world. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games constitute a relevant instance for this argument, where the public diplomacy was not followed by any significant improvement in China's reputation (Manzenreiter, 2010). In spite of the fact that nation states have barely enough control over how they are perceived across the globe, it is logical to presume that part of the perception emanates from the communication conveyed to an international audience (Yarchi et al, 2013).

Situations such as this prompted observers to remark that in spite of the enormous resources Nigeria had committed to her diplomatic engagements, the Nigerian political message does not really have forceful impact to convince her primary target audience. In view of all these limitations in the country's diplomacy, the anticipated positive outcomes such diplomatic engagements should give, have not really been seen in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTRAINTS IN NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY; ANALYSING THE CAUSAL FACTORS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

In different attempts to analyse the causal factors that have been responsible for undermining Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Africa, which – consequently -have been responsible for the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgent group, different scholars have articulated varying factors that subvert the success of Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Africa, and attendant motivation of Boko Haram insurgency.

Some scholars contend that 'lack of sustained internal cohesion' as well as some internal complications - such as failed/weak state which leads to other factors such as 'institutional decay, loss of territorial control, illegitimate violence, and lack of commitment to the notion of public goods' – and appalling international status are critical to this understanding. These factors, according to the scholars, play a critical role in infringing on the accomplishments of Nigeria in its leadership responsibility and diplomatic engagements in Africa. Hence, assessing the domestic factor, in these scholars' opinion, is critical to understanding the motivations behind the country's failure (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003).

Contrary to the aforementioned line of thought, a few other scholars have stressed that this unpleasant situation emerged in the wake of the discrepancy between real conduct of the country's affairs and external self-projection. They

argued further that the failure was predicated on the country's inability to translate unequivocal assets, such as economic strength, military potentials, population and the likes into real and concrete diplomatic power (Williams 1991: 269-70 in Bach 2007).

In a bid to establish a convincing understanding of state failure's concept viz-a-viz the core argument of this thesis, this paper considers it essential to explore the thesis' explanation in the context of failed/weak state thesis and corruption, which will be followed by a critical analysis on this thesis' argument.

4.2. WEAK STATE THESIS

One significant causative factor that have been observed and, indeed, emphasized by many scholars and analysts, is the stark indication of state weakness and corruption in Nigeria. This explanation is based on the notion that a weak or failed state lacks the legitimate monopoly of force within its territory to secure the people and their properties. Furthermore, it is also argued that such states lack the wherewithal to provide basic services to the domestic environment and become incapacitated to offer assistance to the immediate external environment.

Oskar and James (2007) contend that "weaker social services and high level of corruption are features of weak states" (Oskar and James, 2007). When bureaucratic and institutional structures of the state are significantly weak, Stromseth et al (2006) argues that "opportunistic elements in society are quick to take advantage" and breakdown of social structures is endemic (Stromseth et al 2006). Fearon and Laitin's study of civil wars and insurgencies between the

periods of 1945 to 1999 discovered that “financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgencies more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept counterinsurgency practices”. (Fearon and Laitin 2003)

In other words, insurgency thrives more in situations where there is absence of adequate provisions of security for the population, robust bureaucratic institutions-that enhance the proper functioning of the government-and buoyant economy that is capable of making adequate provision of basic needs such as qualitative education, sound health care system, and good road infrastructure to the people (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006).

In his own submission, Hironaka (2005) contends that, weak governance is a critical predictor of rebellion, and escalation of protest to violence is a function of relative-power capability of the state and the rebels, because an absolute rein of either-force or violence-makes the other absent (Hironaka 2005:45; Norton 2003:13; and Arendts 1970:56). One of the strategic weapons employed by the insurgents is an attempt to legitimize grievances, such as the issue of corruption, lack of transparencies, and accountability, economic, social and political problems, as well as religious and tribal favouritism, to establish the illegitimacy of the administration (Lopez 2007:249). That is the more reason why most responsive governments in a swift reaction to the challenge of insurgency, respond to stem the tide of this insurgency with all its-military, economic, political, and psychological capabilities to crush and subdue the insurgency (US COIN FM 3-24).

Critical to this idea is that enforcement, legitimacy, compliance and provision of public services to the populace through efficient and effective institutional structures should be a hallmark of a legitimate state. These provisions are presumably the necessary instruments for securing the population's support, loyalty and creating social and political stability that presumably inhibits the chances and reduces the likelihood of creating a political climate of large-scale violence.

In the context of Boko Haram insurgency, the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Africa reports that "Boko Haram capitalizes on frustrations with the leader's poor governance, ineffective service delivery, and dismal living condition for many northerners". (Carson 2012:1)

To put it succinctly, Boko Haram insurgency has arguably thrived due to the incapacitation of the Nigerian government to ensure adequate provision of security, due to its weak security structure that lacks the capability to monopolize the legitimate use of force on the one hand. These scholars argue that the weakness of Nigerian state has not only given the insurgency a fertile ground to flourish but also, has breathed life into the insurgency.

The proponents of this argument, on the other hand, have argued that corruption is the undesirable challenge that inhibits the provision of basic public services. As one Transparency International Global Corruption Report concluded in 2006 that:

Corruption hampers economic growth, disproportionately burdens the poor, undermines the rule of law, and damages government legitimacy...it is often responsible for funnelling scarce public

resources away from projects that benefit the society and toward projects that benefit specific individuals. The most damaging effect of corruption, however, is its impact on the social fabric of society: corruption undermines the population's trust in the state's political system, political institutions and political leadership. (Jones 2008:17)

As a result, the corrupt nature of a regime arguably increases the risk of collective mobilization and monopolization of force at the local level to build a competitive structure against the state which in turn, could incite violence, due to loss of trust in the state's leadership.

4.3. CORRUPTION

Another significant causative factor emphasized by some scholars is the pervasive corruption in the Nigerian system. This explanation is based on the notion that a corrupt state lacks the wherewithal to provide basic services to the domestic environment and become incapacitated to offer assistance to the immediate external environment.

Zeynep equally posits that, "pervasive corruption plays a major role in providing the necessary opportunity structure for insurgency. Its existence signals to opposing groups that the state is incapable of performing its duties" (Zeynep 2011:2640). According to Akude "the effects of corruption" amongst others "served to incapacitate the Nigerian bureaucracy and destroy the country's social fabric" (Akude 2007:11), which in turn have significant effects on service delivery.

Apparently, there is no gainsaying in the fact that argument based along this line has some plausible claims to attraction, as it provides a politically powerful explanation on the link between governance and stability. Nevertheless, social scientists have argued that there is no strong correlation between state weakness and violent crisis. In spite of Kirwin and Cho's assertion that "greater projection of state power will, on a leverage, lower an individual's willingness to participate in political violence", these scholars still agree with Tujenje-Nchi's assertion that there is no considerable effect of poor public service provision and weak presence of state "on individual's proclivity to engage in political violence and participate in demonstrations and protests, as it fails to establish the mechanisms that link sources to outcomes" (Tujenje-Nchi 2012; Kirwin and Cho 2009:6).

Despite the degree of attraction this discourse claims to enjoy, mostly among the neo-liberalists, this research paper argues that the explanation fails to capture in comprehensive terms what has led the Nigerian state into its abysmal incapacitation and failure to make provisions, as the failed or weak state thesis has explained.

Moreover, the failed state discourse has been argued to be subjective and politically deployed to justify Western imposition of neo-liberal policies on developing states. It appeared to be a bit restrictive and ill-conceived. As it failed to consider other important variables that hold significant places in establishing an in-depth understanding of the situation, as most of its assumptions are based on the neo-liberal understanding of governance and stability. The very phrase 'weak/failed state' entails an extraneous proportion,

which is frequently understood in terms of degree of proximity to the Western world. In other words, a state fails only if it was observed through the neo-liberal lens.

Moreover, in his analysis, Williams (1993) posits that the discourse did not only undermine African historical experiences, but also subsume them beneath the authoritarian grasp of Eurocentric unilateral evolutionist logic. As a result, dismissing African experiences as deformed, deviant, aberrant and of lesser quality (Williams, 1993).

Although weak states may have created an enabling environment for terrorism, however, the weak state thesis lacks sufficient explanation for their primary motivation as scholars have argued that failure does not happen spontaneously, certain factors precede the occurrence of such failure.

Furthermore, insurgents have always been ahead of security agents even in the advanced countries such as Europe and America and they have operated across the period of time in both weak/failed and strong states (Newman 2007:463).

The IRA terrorist activities in Britain, which took considerable effort by the British military, cannot be considered as weakness on the path of the British military, nor can we consider Brazil as a weak state despite her degree of success in terms of service provision, still Brazil has some of her cities and sub-states under the control of drug barons, militarized gangs and god-fathers (Adibe 2012:1-2).

While this thesis admits that the rate of corruption in Nigeria is disturbing, it, however, contends that corruption is a global scourge, and no single country-not even the West-is out rightly exempted from the menace. Moreover, the

concept itself is somewhat slippery, according to Willet (2005), “the perception of corruption depends on whether or not an African government or leader serves the ‘interests’ of the powerful nations”. (Willet 2005:580) This is apparently part of the colonized identities that have been permanently created for the colonized by the colonizer.

Thence, by conflating Nigeria’s incapacitation - to curb Boko Haram insurgency, and her ability to fulfil her Afro-centric principles - with corruption, such explanation only reinforces the neo-liberal ‘good governance’ agenda, thus reinforcing the role of mainstream development agencies in perpetrating conflict prevention (Willet 2005:584).

Hence, this thesis argues that there is more to the Nigerian Boko Haram insurgency, and unsuccessful records of Nigeria’s diplomacy than weak state thesis and corruption can explain.

At this juncture, it is essential to ask a fundamental question; why is the Nigerian state weak, and what is the rationale behind her corrupt practices, as this paper argues that it is necessary to locate the underlying factors that incapacitate Nigeria from ensuring adequate provision of welfare to the larger populace in order to establish the motivations behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and the inability of the country to fulfil her manifest destiny in Africa.

Despite the conceptions of the above arguments, nonetheless, this thesis argues that the factor that had bedevilled Nigeria’s capabilities is a bit complicated than commonly assumed by the above explanations. This is

basically because their attempts to look at the motivations failed to go beyond the rebels' rational decision, environment, and the purview of the state.

As these conventional explanations of the rise of insurgency have failed to reveal much closer understanding on the motivation behind Boko Haram, so also is the explanation for the failure of Nigeria's diplomacy. Hence, it is of utmost importance to have contemporary issues of international relations reassessed to take cognizant of other factors beyond the conventional explanations.

While these arguments may partly explain the causal factor, however, these opinions tend to be one-sided. They cantered excessively on the domestic factors, and seemed to pay inadequate attention to other factors that could be responsible for the rebels' rational decision and the failure of Nigeria's diplomacy outside the domestic sphere. As a result, this paper contends that this line of thought is inadequate, as it could result to a relative distortion of an analytical understanding of facts that shape issues and situations.

This is necessary, so as to avoid the act of reducing how knowledge of international security issues is ordered and understood to a 'one cause fits all' diagnosis, by viewing all international relations issue through the western lens, and engaging in the dismissal of other relevant discourse in international relations.

Thus, it is the argument of this thesis that the countervailing pressures that have tormented Nigeria's diplomatic capabilities in promoting peace and security in Africa, which eventually led to the rise of Boko Haram insurgency, should be located outside the domestic context of Nigeria. This thesis contends

that these constraints could be explained within the framework of the neo-liberal policies of the western capitalism; such as trade liberalization, privatization, Structural Adjustment Program, and market economy; championed by the IMF and World Bank. In a clear term, this thesis argues that the undue interference of neo-liberal actors in the domestic affairs of Nigeria, and the attendant implications of their policies on socio-economic conditions, had overwhelmed Nigeria's capabilities on all fronts.

Also, the Boko Haram insurgency could be explained within the framework of neo-liberal policies-such as trade liberalization, privatization and market economy- and the attendant crisis which is justified on ideological grounds by some group of aggrieved elements in the Nigerian society who aspire to resist liberal values and norms using ideological argument as a disguise, due to the policy implications on the socio-economic situations of Nigeria. Cramer contends that there can be no justification in explaining contemporary civil-wars "without the dimension of the interests and activities of international capital linkages" (Cramer 2000:1857).

Furthermore, the policies, this thesis argued, had 'technically' impaired the – military, political and economic – wherewithal of the country in promoting good governance and infrastructural development. Consequently, neo-liberalism - by extension - had abstruse implications on the design and conduct of Nigerian diplomacy, peace and security promotion, in ensuring the fulfilment of her Afro-centric manifest destiny.

Having established the thesis' argument, this paper will now proceed to establishing how these arguments come into play vis-à-vis Nigeria's diplomatic efforts in containing Boko Haram insurgency.

4.4. CONSTRAINTS IN NIGERIA'S DIPLOMACY; JUSTIFYING THE REAL MOTIVATION

In his influential study on 'Man, the State and War' Waltz (1959) concludes that the major causal factor for civil war is best located in the international system rather than human nature or domestic constitution of states. As Kawu puts it, paying scant account to the effect of neo-liberal programs taints our understanding of the causal mechanism of violence and economic challenges in Nigeria.

Drawing on the works of Smillie et al., (2000); Reno, (1998); Cox & Sinclair, (1996), Duffield, (2001) argues that "the emerging political economy of violence perspective suggests that African conflicts are a function of the power hierarchies of the global system and more to do with resource control and economic survival than with struggles over the control of the state, ethnicity, religion or ideology...war in Africa, in all its complex manifestations, functions as an important means of social reordering and transformation – an axis around which new social, economic and political relations are formed at the local and global level" (Duffield, 2001).

In his paper on the 'Roots of African Conflicts, Zeleza (2008), clearly stated that African conflicts and wars are 'remarkably exceptional' as they are rooted in the

pre-independence permutation of the colonial powers (Deng, 1996; Muritala et al. 2018; Nhema and Zelega, 2008; Saliu, 1998) to continue the exploitation of African resources (Muritala et al. 2018; Otite, 2004). In contrast to Tilly's analysis of European state making through war making, a lot of fundamental variables-brought about by the breath of global change in the contemporary world-have remarkably restrained the Third World nation states from plying the course of European states to state building (Wendt and Barnett 1993:321). In his article, discussing the late arrival of contemporary Third World states at international system, Ayooob observes that:

Contemporary Third World emerged into the post-colonial era as sovereign entities with recognized boundaries, only because they had been consolidated into separate colonial proto-states by the European imperial powers in the nineteenth century. (Ayooob 1991:271)

The predominant influence of colonialism and colonialists as well, did not go without its own consequences on Third World state making, both in terms of shaping their politics and security environment as well. The major consequences, according to Wendt and Barnett, were the integration of the local economy into that of the metropolitan, and finally into the world economy. This development led Nigeria to depend heavily on the West as she was a mono product economy whose main produce were cash crops which were almost always exported to the West. Thus, Nigerian economy reacts by default to any development in the West (Ray, 1989).

This development could not be better explained than a disarticulation of local economies and of course formation of weak states (Wendt and Barnett 1993; Afolabi, 2016).

Put differently, the recurring instability, insecurity, protracted intra/inter-state wars, economic and political problems, according to Mulugeta, and Ducasse-Rogier (2004), were systematically created by the western powers to sustain the culture of retention if not extension of their authority and influences on African resources. Natural resources such as petroleum, gold, diamonds, etc. play an important role in this exploitation (Ducasse-Rogier, 2004; Jonathan Hill, 2005; Mulugeta, 2009; Asongazoh Alemazung, 2010).

This in turn, made Africa's primary security threats an internal one. The ethnic mix and segregation of kin and kith further intensified the security threats. Ethnic groups were denied self-determination, and they left behind extremely mercy situations, as in Palestine and Kashmir (Ayoob 1991:271-272) and creation of communal identities in some instances. This -intended-arrangement of course cannot but produce – interstate - violence in the “grey area of the globe” (Ayoob 1991:268). Eventually when the explosion time was ripe, wars and conflicts became inevitable. As wars and conflicts persist, Third World state interactions with their colonial masters were shaped by transfer of modern military technology from the North to the South, which of course, as Klare argues, contributed to the “intensity and duration of regional conflicts” (klare 1987, cited in Ayoob 1991:274).

Hence, no sooner had the conflicts began than its intensity and the level of its destructiveness accelerated terrifically in most African nations (Ducasse-Rogier,

2004; Hill, 2005; Mulugeta, 2009; Asongazoh Alemazung, 2010)... As a result of this prejudiced relationship, three systemic dominance structures existed in the Third World state formation; economic dependence, dependency on security assistance and dependence on global military culture (Wendt and Barnett 1993:322).

Furthermore, in one account of the Berlin Conference of 1884 Christmas eve to the New Year of 1885, Charles (2017) narrated that the European powers agreed to divide Africa formally into colonial territories – doing this according to spheres of influence already achieved, or by the expedient of drawing straight lines on a map. The political cartoons of the day, according to Charles, had the negotiators making merry and drinking spirits while carving up both Christmas turkey and a continent (Chan, 2017). The noteworthy point was that, at that stage, Africa was not considered worth going to war over, and the speed and efficiency of the division was seen as an example of multilateral diplomacy at its successful best.

The outcome – of the Conference, which is today's Africa, comprising of 55 independent states which follow closely the boundaries agreed at Berlin – has meant not only a coming to statehood in the impoverished years after World War II, and amidst the turmoil of the Cold War, but coming to statehood with incomplete, divided, or partial nations within the state territory. New 'nations' had to be created to fit the new states, and somehow not repudiate the history of 2000 earlier ethnic and linguistic groups. It has been a diplomatic triumph to make all this work even as well as it has worked till now, and some states, like Zambia, have been huge successes in nationhood despite 72 pre-colonial

ethnicities and languages. The ferocity of that discrimination was certainly enough to galvanize a one-issue unity. Wider unity, despite Nkrumah's inclinations, would take many years longer...with that form of colonial arrangement in Africa, apparently, it was obvious that it will take some longer years to achieve unity (Chan, 2017).

According to a 2009 study by ISS, 16 wars and violent conflicts had taken place in African countries. These countries include Angola, Algeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Rwanda, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Republic of Congo and Western Sahara between the years 1990 and 1997. The fact that only two of these wars; Rwanda/Uganda and Chad/Libya were interstate may be enough to justify that the invidious and intractable proliferation of wars and conflicts in post-colonial Africa was a calculated attempt to bring about a social transformation and economic reorder in Africa using liberal peace as a justification (Chan, 2017).

Moreover, since the year 1960, there have been 18 fully-fledged civil wars, and 11 were what have been called genocides (Chan, 2017). In the decade of the 1980s, there were over 3 million fatalities of such violence. At the beginning of the 1990s, 43% of the world's refugee population was within Africa, but was handicapped by logistical shortcomings and mobilization problems (Chan, 2017).

In an attempt to achieve the Western powers' ulterior motives, the international donor community created a causal nexus between underdevelopment and violent conflicts, and its attendant security challenges in Africa (Annan, 1998; CFA, 2005; DFID, 2005; OECD, 1998). Subsequently, the

prospect of realizing a Kantian peace was accentuated by the Neo-Liberal chauvinism on the assumption that the challenges of economic and social injustices that many often 'allegedly' fuel violent conflicts in Africa would be resolved by the enthronement of 'free market'. This view rests on neo-liberal discourse that violent conflict is an 'exogenous shock and an unfortunate interruption' to development (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000).

Taking the aforementioned cause and effect chain into cognizance, as well as the free market assumptions, nevertheless, the logic seems rather too simplistic, as this train of thought cannot be pushed quite far. In spite of the much robust support this assumption had received in some quarters, it has been argued that the actual mechanism through which free market variables operate still remains apparently obscure on some grounds. First, it fails to establish why violent conflicts still persist in several countries despite the operationalization of free market. Second, it opens up critical discussions in analysing the assumptions of neo-liberal champions within a framework which emphasized the significance and role of free market in creating stability in Africa and elsewhere.

In actual fact, any informed analysis of a few notable scholars such as Stewart and Fitzgerald, (2000); Sachs, (2001); Nafziger and Arvinen, (2002); Stiglitz, (2002); Willett, (2004), will reveal one critical fact about neo-liberal assumptions; that free market, rather than being a mechanism for addressing the protracted social inequality and injustice in Africa, became a potent Machiavellian strategy - employed by the neo-liberal champions - to achieve a self-perpetuation and hegemonic agenda in Africa. These scholars, in their

words, argued that “there is no tangible evidence to date that free markets alone do anything other than exacerbate social inequalities and feed social tensions, in the world’s poorest developing countries”. Put differently, free market is generally considered an anomaly and a crucial indicator of insecurity, as it had failed a litmus test for political instability in Africa.

As regards the achievement of Kantian peace, the Western liberal democracies - with the United States and other multilateral agencies at the forefront – went thus as far as challenging some fundamental parts of state sovereignty. This interference was justified by placing so much worth and priority on the need to protect human rights in Africa and to introduce democratic values to the continent in the quest for global liberal peace and development.

This development served as an impetus among international donors, NGOs, and multinational financial institutions that conflict resolution and peace keeping operations could be accomplished in the South through various interrelated techniques and approaches comprising the political, social, and economic transformation of violent or collapsed states. Some of these approaches, according to IMF, include “ensuring forceful, far reaching structural reforms in the economies of the members in order (among other things) to correct weakness in domestic financial systems and ensure growth and poverty alleviation” (IMF, 1998). Furthermore, the techniques include a new model of legitimized humanitarian interventions, securitization of development, and third party mediation, which, according to Clapham (1998), were in actual facts designed as a mechanism to foist the Western liberal democratic values on the

global South. These values, as Willet (2005) contended, have precipitated cataclysmic consequences in good number of African countries.

What this development means, nevertheless, is a complete reordering and overhaul of the socio-economic conditions of the continent, which is quite alien to African system; a system that can only be satisfactorily explained by history rather than mere assumptions. Put differently, these measures could be perceived as the West attempts to transform and reorder African society - socially and economically. On the contrary, this is perceived as a critical departure from the continent's historical antecedents of welfarism to the concept of free market, which seeks amongst others, to reduce state's involvement in the running of the economy and society (Dean in Abrahamson 1460 '50'). As Achebe puts it, the neo-liberal policies of the IMF and World Bank have:

Forced the nation to abort socially based development; which has led to greater individualism, privatization and reliance on the market, which in the context of Nigeria's exploitative political economy, is equated to greater desperation and corruption. (Achebe 1984 in Woods 2012:3)

In essence, the liberal theory places strong emphasis on the concept of neutrality and individualism. Individuals are largely perceived to be the best appraiser of their social welfare and the diversity of individual choices is best addressed by the capital market institution, hence state should endeavour not to place a barrier to those choices unnecessarily (Peacock and Rowley 1972 in Williams). In a similar vein, Abrahamson pointed out that the fundamental basis

of neo-liberal argument lies in the logic of free market, and less governance by the state; the less the state governs the better it is for the state, and eventually the development aids would be put into optimal and efficient use by the state (Abrahamson2005:1460).

Furthermore, a critical examination into the operations of International Financial Institutions in the affected countries will reveal a major flaw in both its design and pursuits; sovereignty of many sovereign national states was trumped upon. In other words, the IFIs now function in ways that intrude profoundly into the politics and policies of sovereign nation states. Williams goes thus far as to argue that the 'norm of sovereignty' to a greater extent is being outmanoeuvred by the commitment of the international donors to the pursuit of good social and political arrangements and economic development within the affected countries (Williams, 2000).

Subsequently, these international development partners strategically adjusted the scope of their operations along the line. They maneuverer these operations from mere humanitarian programs' funding - that sought provision of protection and relief to victims of violence and wars - to "influencing aid recipient countries' military expenditure, allocations through peace conditionality, to directly transforming security institutions under the rubric of good governance, the rule of law, judicial reform, corruption, and corporate governance, so as to ensure a secure environment for market-based development" (Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Luckham, 2005).

The concept of the new ' threat of poverty and underdevelopment' now gave the international economic institutions the impetus to interfere legitimately in

the domestic affairs of good number of developing countries by co-opting 'Development' as an instrument of security in the names of various programs such as Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and address policies and issues which, according to Woods and Narlikar, were previously addressed by the national government (Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Willet, 2005). Inevitably, the policies directly upset a wider range of social, economic, political and security policies of the government, as many countries ended up losing control of their conventional spheres of influence in terms of public service, and the country's - military, economic and political - capabilities (Reno, 1998). In his words, Reno contended that:

The effective authority of governance moved elsewhere. Into the vacuum of collapsed and delegitimized states the international donor community is attempting to inculcate a normative security agenda that is derived from western discourse and practice. This misfit creates a profound dilemma for the efficacious implementation of 'security first' programs in Africa. (Reno, 1998)

This development, thereafter, increasingly affects the security and development budgets of the government (Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Willet, 2005). This is especially true as various facets of the country's national budgets overtly or covertly go through the whims and caprices of the West. This was the exact situation in during the first National Development Plan in 19...which was essentially prepared by western experts (Nwosu, 1995). Consequently, these measures, according to Adekanye, (1995), had a deep effect in destroying the

government institutions, crippling the States' capabilities to provide necessary social safety nets, education, health care system, and law and order.

In the opinions of most analysts, the policy execution of the neo-liberal programs has a defeatist posture, as most of the 'short term stabilization policies' of the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) which were designed to cut down inflation, improve currency convertibility, and renew debt servicing, did not only require profound national expenditure cuts but also tightening of credit, monetary and fiscal policies (Willet, 2005). For instance, the economic crisis of the 1980s compelled Nigeria to bow to the pressure of the IFIs, and consequently, accepted their stringent conditions. The IFIs insisted that Nigeria must adopt the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) to qualify for loans that will help the country cushion the effects of the prevalent economic crisis and mitigate the effects of declining resources (Afolabi, 2016; Aluko and Ogunnubi,2018; Myers, 1997). Having reluctantly bowed to this soft pressure, the 'economic stabilization act' was therein launched. Nevertheless, rather than achieving the primary purpose of alleviating the crisis, as Duffield argues, the development programs further aggravated the country's economic woes and ushered in a high level of insolvency and underdevelopment in the country (Duffield, 2001; Okoro, 2012; Willet, 2005). In 1978, for instance, the Government was forced for the first time to raise two loans of US \$1,000 million from the international money market to help keep Nigeria's development projects afloat,¹⁹ but it has been unable to avoid the embarrassment of cutting back many development projects in the country (Ogunbadejo, 1979).

Such measures, apparently, cannot but have alarming effects on the economic, social and political arrangements of a recipient state such as Nigeria. Hence, Nigeria had to reassess the cost of her hegemonic ambitions (Myers, 1991). It is in the public knowledge that the neo-liberal policies have always been pursued to promote the political, economic, and diplomatic interests of the West. These are achieved through competitive bargaining power on issues related to security, trade, and diplomatic issues. The exigencies of time and structure of the international system makes it uncharitable to penetrate the developing countries through coercive or military measures, hence, their interests are being achieved through multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. so as to successfully exert the West's will on the rest of the world. And it is the resultant effects of these institutions' policies that create institutional and structural bottleneck for most developing countries.

This view is succinctly captured by Keen, when he contends that the neo-liberal policies encourage inflation and devaluation, reduce the state's services and encourage corruption as a result of erosion of states' salaries (Keen 2012:771). Moreover, a good number of prominent analysts and notable writers that have worked as senior members of staff in the IFIs have given strong evidence to the effect that neo-liberalism and its policies have deepened horizontal inequalities (social, political, cultural and economic), increased indebtedness, crippled domestic institutional capabilities, and rendered nation states more susceptible to the external shocks of commodity price and currency fluctuations" (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000; Wade, 2000; Sachs, 2001; Unctad, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002).

Consequently, as the neo-liberal actors and all their agents strategically took a firm grip on the country's affairs, the government was systematically forced out of the development space and it became extremely challenging for the government to establish virile, stable and viable macro-economic policies that will put Nigeria on the part of sustainable economic growth and development (Afolabi,2016; Ayoola, 2013).

Owing largely to government's withdrawal from the society, as a result of the adoption of neo-liberal policies, the attendant consequences have largely resulted in "poor health access, insecurity, sub-standard education, decay of existing infrastructures. The tax system becomes fragile, while the informal economy continues to expand at the expense of the state" (Rosanwo 2012:28).

The implication, being that, as national interests of neo-liberal champions and actors are being served, apparently, these policies heighten the structural inequalities of the international community (Stiglitz 2002; Wade 2000), as the recipient government loses the effective control of its institutional structures and economic projects. (Williams 2000:573). These projects are not only overtly hijacked but the host country is also forced to embrace some adjustment programs to be able to finance her projects. Adekanye also lend credence to this view, when he contended that the costs of these structural adjustment programs "have been disproportionately distributed to the poor, while the benefits have accrued to the rich. The widening of income inequalities and the social injustice associated with structural adjustment has been a major cause of tension and conflict in African countries". (Adekanye, 1995)

In essence, the neo-liberal development program was not only defeatist, but rather exploitative of the Nigerian economy. As it had not only successfully crippled and incapacitated Nigerian economy, but rather intrinsically connected it to the western economy, and systematically disarticulated it and made it extremely difficult to be disentangled from the western economy. Consequently, the country's economy was 'technically' weakened and became connected to the foreign aid of the neo-liberal actors championed by World Bank and IMF (Ref).

As a result, foreign aid became so prominent in the projection of Nigerian leaders in their resolve to set the country on a path of sustainable economic growth and development. And being mindful of the state of the country's economy, the cost of the country's Afro-centric manifest destiny was drastically re-evaluated (Bach, 2007, Nwosu, 1995). Hence, Nigeria became strategically cautious in the conduct and pursuit of her domestic and foreign affairs, as the domestic economy is very strategic in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives (Nwosu, 1995). And when economic power is expropriated, according to Amadeo, (2020) the prerogative to make logical and propitious decisions is quite unrealistic. The reluctance of the impoverished Britain to send troops to Rhodesia under Prime Minister Harold Wilson was a good instance of such scenario. As Britain went cap in hand to the IMF for her economic survival, she became impotent to intervene in Rhodesia; a situation which gave the armed rebellion – led by two liberation movements - the impetus to flourish (Chan, 2017).

Resultantly, slotting Nigeria's foreign policy objectives, and pursuing her diplomatic engagements - in a manner that will project and promote a multifarious of national values and international objectives - into such a critical terrain, practically and perhaps conceptually, may be an arduous challenge. In other words, a critical pursuit of Nigeria's diplomacy in a manner devoid of international influence seems somewhat impracticable and idealistic. This is especially true as the neo-liberal policies of the 'tied aid' international donors - who attach a potpourri of (morally controversial or often obnoxious) structural, political, and economic prerequisites to the disbursement of funds - had 'technically' robbed Nigeria of the requisite logistics and financial capabilities to promote security, peace keeping operations, curb the spread of conflicts, and most importantly promote her hegemonic ambitions in Africa with rather more vigour and vibrancy; this point would be justified in the course of this paper.

4.5 BOKO HARAM; JUSTIFYING THE REAL MOTIVATION

As a result of the resultant consequences of neo-liberal policies, Nigerian citizens began to lose hope and trust in the 'Nigerian Project'. Hence, the Nigerian national identity became gradually eroded, as people began to retreat inward and search for a more comprehensive identity. Subsequently, the imposition of the liberal system on Nigeria created a political and social space in the heart of the country and has also prevented Nigeria from the establishment of a national identity that overrides regional, religious, and ethnic nationalities in the country.

Thus, the political space had enhanced the citizens to actively embrace alternative identities, when national identity - which apparently was the basis of collective identity and, ultimately, state power itself - has lost its prominence in appealing to the masses' interest. Indeed, the consciousness that had arisen as a result of this trend has a significant effect in the development of a sectarian orientation such as Boko Haram that finds effective political mobilization in using ideological idioms to resist the attendant hardship of the neo-liberal policies in Nigeria. As Kawu posits:

When politics lost sense of ideological direction and people are unable to see the dividends of the mandates given to or stolen by ruling elites, it made sense to a lot of people, when they are told it is because of the OTHER: that other in Nigeria is the other religion or ethnic group. These are very powerful emotional platforms of mobilization and it takes more than courage for people to rise above the guilt of their own side of these often vicious and violent divides! My side is right and the other is wrong, with people unable to find a median point of decent engagement. When this goes on regularly, the crisis can consume an entire country. (Kawu n.d.)

However, in order to ensure a convincing explanation as regards the motivations behind Boko Haram insurgency, it is essential to understand the reason why the reaction to the economic inequalities is more provoked in the north than in the south, despite the general deteriorating economic situation in Nigeria.

First, it must be mentioned that adoption and implementation of any governmental policies, apparently have different and unequal degree of effects on different sets of people in different ways. However, some observers have attributed the intolerance in the North to the twin evil of illiteracy and poverty.

In one analysis by the Central Bank of Nigeria's former Governor, a staunch Northern Muslim, and a deposed Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi; he attributes the Northern intolerance to the pathetic level of illiteracy, due to what he referred to as 'un-even nature of distribution of resources' between the north and the south (Ajetumobi 2012:2).

Rewane, in his own submission ascribes the intolerance to the intense rate of poverty in the north, claiming that the two poorest states in the country- Sokoto and Borno-with the poverty rate of 86.4% and 77.7% respectively are located in the north (This day 10 Aug 2012:3). This view lends credence to Anderson and Fetner's argument; that there is a critical correlation between poverty and intolerance. They argue that the least beneficiary in economic development in the country is more prone to intolerance irrespective of the wealth of the country (Anderson and Fetner 2006:1-2).

In fact, analysts such as Davis, Mc Cutcheon, and Stouffer have also argued that a longstanding finding has revealed a positive correlation between education and social tolerance, contesting that education enlightens people and provides them with many ways of approaching issues (Anderson and Fetner 2006:1-2). To corroborate this argument, the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics' (NBS) report reveals that while there is alarming decline in the standard of living in the northern parts of Nigeria, the southern scenario seems somewhat in the

opposite direction, which according to the statistics, could trigger intolerance in the north (This Day 10 Aug 2012:2).

Nonetheless, these arguments appear to be a gross oversimplification of this discussion and any attempt to reduce the issue of intolerance in the north to one simplified notion of illiteracy and poverty is only likely to result in a relative distortion of a general understanding of the historical facts that shape issues and situations.

While this thesis does not discredit the significance of education in relation to social tolerance, it argues that the evidence for the causal mechanism is not quite convincing as there appears to be no single dimension to explaining all social tolerance (Chong 1993; Gibson 1986; Jackman 1972). To explain the issue of intolerance in the north, it is important to go back in history and trace the government policies that shaped this outlook across a period of time.

The northern political situation has roots in pre-colonialism and successive governments' policies over time. As Graham observes "colonial educational policy in Northern Nigeria was driven by two intertwined policies: fear of the development of a class of educated African as was the case in southern Nigeria..." (Graham 1966 in Mustapha 2004:11). The British government ensured it forestalled emergence of a robust educational system that could undermine the government control in the north due to some pockets of resistance they had experienced in the south, most especially from the press, as a result of the level of education and awareness of the southerners(Graham 1966 in Mustapha 2004:11).Moreover, in contemporary times, Sanusi observes that good number of statutory allocations that are meant for the provision of

social services such as education, health care and good infrastructural facilities are ill-used for other unproductive purposes such as sponsoring 'mallams' on Holy Pilgrimage, setting up hisbah corps, conventions and conferences on Sharia (Sanusi 2002:2).

These policies overtime, have accumulated to produce a relatively wide educational margin between the north and the south, and if Stewart's argument is anything to go by, apparently, the deficiency in access to education could be explained in terms of poor economic opportunities (Stewart 2008:13). Hence, these have prompted the northerners to perceive the colonial government and the southerners as potential enemies.

This deficiency is also enhanced by the variation in topography and natural economic endowments. As Mustapha rightly notes:

Different regions had different climatic and soil conditions, leading to specialization in the agricultural system. Differences in the value of export crops at the global market meant that each region developed a different pattern of wealth accumulation.

(Mustapha 2004:13)

Hence the related development in the regions in terms of infrastructure and social welfare such as education, health, and bureaucratic institutional capacity have largely reflected in the accumulated wealth across a period of time.

These sequences of economic, educational inequality and perhaps social inequalities have been persistent till date, and have largely resulted in the northern part having more impacts of the neo-liberal policies more than the

South which arguably, prompts more reactions from the north than the south, most especially when the impacts become so sharply felt.

Having established the reason for the northern intolerance, the paper now proceeds with the consequences of the neo-liberal policies in Nigeria.

As discussed previously, the neo-liberal policies of the IMF and World Bank have arguably forced deprived social groups into searching for alternative means of dealing with the prevailing circumstances. Hence, an ordinary Nigerian is pushed to the edge of searching for an identity-within the Nigerian identity-by acting and conforming to the norms, values, attitudes and attributes of such group in contrast to other groups and identities (Zakari Ya'u 2000:163 in Jega 2000).

As mentioned earlier, when people began to lose hope and trust in the 'Nigerian Project', put differently, 'National Identity' they appeared to retreat inwardly, hence, other identities, as well as ideas and beliefs were accorded great legitimacy by virtually all and sundry.

As Kawu observes:

When politics lost sense of ideological direction and people are unable to see the dividends of the mandates given to or stolen by ruling elites, it made sense to a lot of people, when they are told it is because of the OTHER: that other in Nigeria is the other religion or ethnic group. These are very powerful emotional platforms of mobilization and it takes more than courage for people to rise above the guilt of their own side of these often vicious and violent divides! My side is right and the other is wrong, with people unable to find a

median point of decent engagement. When this goes on regularly, the crisis can consume an entire country. (Kawu n.d.)

As a result, this development has created a political space for people to make judicious use of ideas and beliefs to legitimize social arrangements and to express grievances and pursue interests under the guise of an identity that is capable of achieving a strong social significance from members and the society at large.

Identity politics offer the opportunity for varying sets of groups who aspire to be identified with a particular set belief and system. Thus, a sense of solidarity on the basis of collective actions has been formed around belief systems, kin ties, and ideologies, which remain, according to Rosanwo, the most basic and politically striking identity in Nigeria. He argues further that people's identity remains a power construct that cannot be disregarded, as it does not only guide and influence but also explains the patterns of behaviour of a group or individual in several contexts (Rosanwo 2012:1).

Thus, the cumulative effects of the loss of national identity, as a result of neo-liberal agenda, have created a political space for the build-up of solidarity around Trans-National Salafi ideology by the Boko Haram ideologues for collective actions.

Hence, the Boko Haram insurgency can be located within the framework of associated crisis of the neo-liberal policies, which is justified in terms of identity and ideological argument by some group of aggrieved elements in the society who want to resist liberal values and norms. These individuals endeavour to use ideology to interpret events based on their worldview, as it is argued that

an extremist ideology cloaks far more than ethnic or local economic and tribal rivalries.

However, it is erroneous to assume that similar motivations can explain the radicalization of all the group members, because it appears that the group is not monolithic and every member of the group arguably does not have similar feelings (Didymus 2012). It is argued that while some members of the group may have been motivated by economic inequalities, it is not uncommon to discover others to have varying degree of genuine ideological beliefs, as a result of the spate of the global Islamist ideological jihad against a perceived US and Israeli-led conspiracy against Islam; as articulated by the late leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden (Rohan 2005:2-7).

Al-Qaeda ideologues perceive the West as a machinator in a global conspiracy theory-which seeks amongst others-to eradicate Muslim Identity by the mechanism of a wide spread atheistic practices and philosophies through neo-liberal policies around the globe. Hence, al-Qaeda believes Muslims should endeavour to institute armed struggles against any western identity (Rohan 2005:8).

Since the basis of Boko Haram's justification for taking up arms against the government, as argued by this paper, is as a result of consequences of the imposition of neo-liberal policies, it is not impossible for Boko Haram to recruit members based on the ideological indoctrination of al-Qaeda, who has been perceived as a vanguard of Islamic movement in opposing western systems and beliefs. This ideological indoctrination has great impacts in forcing the views of

al-Qaeda-about the West-on radical groups such as Boko Haram; who ordinarily holds strong grievances against the imposition of neo-liberal policies in Nigeria.

A cursory look at the efforts of Bin Laden to export his view to sub-Saharan Africa has unfolded a connection between him and Mohammad Yusuf, the slain leader of Boko Haram. This is justified in terms of-strategic and explosive-trainings Boko haram members have reportedly received from the al-Qaeda camps both in the Sahel region of Northern Africa and Somalia's al Shabab (Mizrokhi 2012). This connection has received an acknowledgement from an alleged middle man between boko Haram and al-Qaeda, Suleiman Ashafa, who admitted to the allegation of facilitating training for several Boko Haram members in the Sahel, during the course of his interrogation by the security service (Mizrokhi 2012). Moreover, some recovered documents from Bin Laden's Pakistan residence after his death reveals this connection.

Boko Haram assumes that an effort to partake in this global jihad against the US and its neo-liberal policies, would serve two significant purposes; firstly, the religious dimension, which according to the ideology of Qutb is a sacred right, principal loyalty and primary obligation for Muslims (Jones 2008:27),and secondly, serves as a platform on which people are mobilized to fight and die on ideological grounds with the aim of redressing the concomitant economic injustice of the neo-liberal policies. Hahn asserts that:

The-Boko Haram-leadership understands that the Islamist ideology is a great tool for motivating the vulnerable population to pick up guns and die for a cause. When vulnerable individuals are told God condones or supports the insurgent movement, it is easy for

vulnerable individuals to become riled and motivated to fight. Yet this is merely ideology as tool. (Hahn 2011:3)

In sum, Boko Haram insurgency does not fall clearly into the economic grievance or ideology explanation, rather, the two factors have worked together and reinforced each other in a particular manner to provide a convincing explanation in the account of Boko Haram's motivation.

With reference to the above-mentioned issue vis-à-vis Nigeria's hegemonic ambition, the thesis will now address the link between such ambition and the significance of available power.

Going by Gilpin's historical submission (1987), the international contemporary history had only experienced two global hegemonies; Pax Britannica; a British hegemon that dominated the global political space from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century to the eruption of the first World war in 1914. And second, the emergence of Pax Americana almost immediately after the second world War, which has contentiously become unmatched since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the 90s (Gilpin, 1987). Gille (2010) however contended that there are possibilities of regional hegemonies. Nation states – who may lack what it takes to compete on the global stage, but have financial wherewithal and military capabilities that could make them influential and dominant in a particular region. South Africa may fall into this category in Southern African region, just as India may be categorized as a regional hegemon in South Asia (Gille, 2010).

As Kindleberger, Charles (1981) rightly notes, open and liberal world economy requires the existence of a hegemonic or dominant power because it is more

conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed. In such a liberal and open world, economy, the main role of this hegemonic state will be that of a stabilizer, such a hegemonic power will undertake “to provide a market for distress goods, a steady, if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a discount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic”. (David J Myers 1991)

Thus, putting country’s resources and potentialities into consideration, Nigeria is expected to take upon the leadership of Africa, because according to Graham E and Jeffery N (1990), focusing on the political aspects of the term rather than its economic aspects, defined hegemony as primacy or leadership”. This leadership in an international system “can be exercised by a ‘hegemon’, a state possessing sufficient capability to fulfil this role”. This means that for a state to attain the status of a hegemon, such state must be political and economically strong to take the leadership role as it will be the one taking responsibilities for most things that happens, most especially, ensuring orderliness; this therefore makes it necessary for such state to be politically and economically strong to take the leadership role, as we have seen with the United States in the world politics and economy.

However, it is a public knowledge that good foreign policy and diplomatic engagements are only pursued in view of resources and power available to support it with a maximum chance of success (Morgenthau, 2006). It is an incontrovertible assumption that the empirical nexus between leadership and power cannot be discarded as inconsequential. This position aligns with Flemes’

argument (2009) that 'power resources and claim to leadership are amongst the four benchmarks to be passed before a nation state could be regarded as a regional power (Flemes, 2009). Destradi (2010) similarly argues that a would-be regional power should amongst others reach the pinnacle of power in that particular region and should be able to exert her influence (Destradi, 2010). Furthermore, Prys (2010) in his observation contends that a regional power should possess the wherewithal to take care of conflictual situations, political instabilities and economic deprivation in her region (Prys,2010). In his own submission, Schirm (2010) only added that such state should have "material and organizational resources for regional and international power projection (power over resources); (3) activities to honor the claim of leadership and to mobilize power resources; (4) recognition and acceptance of its leadership status by other actors/states in the region and outside of the region; and (5) real political influence in the region (power over outcomes)". (Schrim, 2010).

From the aforesaid, it is clear that any nation states that pursue a high diplomatic policies and objectives that may not be executed successfully with the available power and sufficient resources will run the risk of battering her image amongst the comity of nations. This was a grave error committed by the United States during the peace negotiations in 1919 (Morgenthau, 2006). As Lloyd puts it: "The Americans appeared to assume responsibility for the sole guardianship of the Ten Commandments and for the Sermon on the Mount; yet, when it came to a practical question of assistance and responsibility, they absolutely refused to accept it". A nation may try to play the role of a great

power without having the prerequisites for doing so, such country will court disaster, as Poland did in the interwar period (Morgenthau, 2006).

Consequently, it is conspicuous from the above explanation that a self-reliant economy is a critical stimulus towards the pursuit of good foreign policy objectives that reflect the national interest of any given country. This is especially true as the economy affords the state the independence to do what she wills without any hindrance.

Hence, the national power available to a nation state dictates the limits of her diplomatic engagements and the freedom to pursue such objectives as she wills. Every responsible government will always be mindful of national power available to her and ensure she balances it with her foreign policy and diplomatic engagements, else, she runs the risk of courting a disaster for herself.

The implication remains that Nigeria's hegemonic tendencies could only be reinforced in Africa by her social, economic, and political stability. In clear terms, Nigeria will only be able to fulfill her manifest destiny in Africa, and perhaps, the global community, and have considerable impacts on the regional and global affairs, only when she is socially, politically and economically stable. (FEATURES OF A STABLE STATE) And the implication remains that if such goal is achieved, undoubtedly, the ego of the almighty West is bruised, as such will create an anxiety that Nigeria's interests will undermine the interests of the West, especially the United States and Europe to fully dominate Africa and its affairs. because they will not be able to maintain an autonomy of the political sphere in Africa any longer.

There are anxieties that as Nigeria becomes stable with increased and sustaining political, economic, and military clout, Nigeria's inclination to alter the political equation in Africa could be reinforced consequently. Nigeria was only able to project her influence, most especially in the region and sub-region primarily because of her economic wherewithal. Hence, whatever that is being surreptitiously done by the west, is considered an attempt to whittle down Nigeria's power in a bid to diminish the perceived potential threat from the country.

A cursory look at Nigeria's diplomatic behaviors in 1960s reveals a different pattern entirely. The Nigeria's dependent economy of the Balewa's administration in the 1960s had crucial impacts on the articulation of Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomatic engagements. For instance, the Balewa government was unable to criticize the British and her allies as a result of their phlegmatic disposition towards Nigeria's decolonization policy, just as she could not take any drastic action against British's support for racism. This inability on the path of Nigeria was precipitated by one; the lack economic autonomy as the Nigeria's first National Development Plan was 50% financed by the West. And second, the unpleasant attendant consequences of becoming critical of West's stance on the liberation of South Africa (Nwosu, 1998). As Adekunle Ajala submits:

The issue of aid was prominent in the calculation of Nigerian leaders in their determination to develop the country economically. They hoped that the West will provide a substantial portion of the aid they will require for this purpose. With this at

the back of their mind, they approached foreign affairs with caution. (Ajala in Nwosu, 1998)

This subordination behavioral pattern, however, changed immediately after the oil boom of the 1970s when Nigerian economy gained a considerable measure of autonomy which the oil proceeds conferred on the country (Nwosu, 1998).

A cursory look at the years after the oil boom of the 1970s will reveal how Nigeria's economic strength engendered her to rally other nations and establish ECOWAS under President Gowon. Furthermore, the ECOWAS platform became a viable and potent instrument in the country's hands to play pivotal roles in the sub-region as a result of considerable financial contribution to the regional bloc (Bach, 2007; Ogunnubi et al, 2016).

Considerably, Nigeria's diplomatic finesse and savour then did really constitute and accord her a special place and a prominent role amongst the comity of nations in international politics which, invariably, enhanced her contribution to the stability and development of Africa. Nigeria owed a great deal of her ability to wield considerable power and play a great role in international affairs during this period chiefly to her power potentials.

The implications of this huge proceeds from oil simply meant that Nigeria – despite her dependence on the West for the purchase of her commodity – had developed considerable degree of financial self-sustenance. She no longer had to go cap in hand to the West to finance her economic and developmental projects as was the case beforehand. The new economic environment, thus,

created the resultant wherewithal to challenge the west's actions and policies in Africa and the globe at large (Nwosu, 1998).

The country's effrontery to call on the United Nations to embrace Africa as equal partners with members from other continents, her demand for a United Nations Secretary-General of an African extract, and her push for the democratization of the United Nations system and enlargement of the permanent membership of United Nations Security Council for Africa to be well represented were all clear-cut reflections of her economic and political wherewithal. One of the consequences of such effrontery which was engendered by the country's economic wherewithal was the emergence of the first African Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt. Also, particular mention must be made of emergence of other Africans such as Nigeria's Joe Garba, Emeka Anyaoku, Prince Bola Ajibola, and Rilwan Lukman who won elections to become President of the UNGA, Secretary-General of Commonwealth, Judge of the International Criminal Court, and Secretary-General of OPEC respectively since then.

Also, Joy Ogwu and Adebayo Olukoshi's submission rightly aligns with this fact. They rightly pointed that "Nigeria's foreign policy has always, broadly, been influenced by the country's domestic economic requirements and vice versa". (Ogwu and Olukoshi, 1991)

Furthermore, the courageous and radical actions taken by late President Murtala Muhammad in 1975 was quite critical of the western hegemony. First, to demonstrate Nigeria's total independence, Murtala cancelled the scheduled visit of the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, closed and took

possession of the US information service building and Radio Monitoring Centre in Lagos and Kaduna states. Also, he sent a strong refusal response to the US President when Murtala was asked to halt all foreign involvement in Angola, stating that the military government rejects directives from the US.

Another significant step taken by Murtala's successor, President Olusegun Obasanjo was the outright nationalization of British Petroleum (BP) as a warning of what was to come should Britain proceed to recognize the Muzorewa government in Rhodesia. This bold step did really remind the Britain like the US that the Nigerian government must be closely watched.

In addition, in a rage of diplomatic tit-for-tat, the late Nigerian former military dictator Sani Abacha renamed Eleke Crescent – the location of the US Embassy in Lagos – after Louis Farrakhan, one of the country's propagandists from the Middle-East. This drastic step was taken by Abacha simply to hit back at the US for naming a street corner in New York City after Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, the assassinated wife of Chief Moshood Abiola, winner of the annulled 1993 presidential elections (see Adenekan, 2008).

Also, worthy of note was Nigeria's influence on other African states to boycott the Montreal 1976 Olympic Games in Canada, just as she led them to shun the Edinburgh 1986 Commonwealth Games. Relatedly, when the Nigerian government observed the unholy romance between British Petroleum (BP) and Barclays Bank and racist regimes in the Southern African, the Nigeria nationalised the assets of the BP just as she acquired 80% share in Barclays branch in Nigeria as a retaliatory measure to send strong signals to other

companies that may want to go against Nigeria's interest in Angola (Bach, 1983).

To rub salt in the West's wound, Nigeria - through AU - led a call for reparation to African States regarding what has been taken from Africa during slavery and colonialism. This initiation led to the formation of an African Eminent Persons Group on Reparation to articulate the continent's position on the issue. To make the committee a force to reckon with, the OAU appointed the Nigerian Business Mogul cum politician, Chief MKO Abiola; an internationally respected figure and ally of the West, in order to use his personality (Mazrui, 1994). The then military President Ibrahim Babangida submitted as thus:

We make these demands because the services of our fore-fathers in the American plantation were unrewarded and unpaid for. We make these demands because the exploitation of Africa during the period of colonial rule further impoverished us and enhanced the development of the west. (Olagunju and Oyovbaire, 1991)

Along the same vein, late President Murtala Muhammad once exhibited a dynamic finesse in the country's diplomatic behavior when he delivered his keynote address at the OAU extraordinary Summit in 1976 that the US imperialism will no longer be tolerated by Nigeria, and that America and her allies should stay away from African affairs (Ogunsanwo, 1986). Nigeria's former ambassador to America, Olu Sanu articulated corresponding sentiment when he declared that "we have to be recognized as a regional power in West Africa. This is our region and we have a right to go to war. It is a Monroe Doctrine of a sort". (Mays, 1998)

Nigeria's former military President, Ibrahim Babangida's speech succinctly captured the significance of the country's economic strength in her diplomatic behaviors when he submitted that:

The third phase of our foreign policy initiative is the period of progressive radicalization of foreign policy goals, also coincided with the period of internal political peace, continued Federal dominance of the States and, of course, the period of massive oil money. The foreign policy initiative during this period culminated in the famous speech of General Murtala Muhammad...that "Africa has come of age"... This has become a signal mark of Nigeria's foreign policy.

(Babangida, 1986)

There is no gainsaying in the context of the above explanation that the radicalism and dynamism of Nigeria's foreign affairs and diplomatic behaviors were hinged upon her economic wherewithal. A weak economy without a sustainable financial support, undoubtedly, may not have successfully fulfilled these obligations and taken these radical diplomatic approaches.

Hence, as a result of the defiant diplomatic behavioral pattern of the country especially after the oil boom of the 1970s, the Western conspiracy, - especially the United States whose institutional powers and universal outreach are absolutely exceptional compared to smaller states - had been on a surreptitious mission to curb and inhibit Nigeria's national power available in order to stop Nigeria from gaining the capability to wield much power in the region or emerge a regional power. In an international system that is

constituted and controlled by the western normative family, the West seems to be uncomfortable about the emergence of a politically stable, and militarily and economically strong Nigeria that could undermine the established Western interests in Africa.

Nonetheless, it is tempting to ask what the real interest of the US in Nigeria is. This is an ally state that – in spite of her acknowledgement that the security challenges Nigeria is facing is quite extraordinary - have failed to offer her logistic services to Nigerian military who is going through a critical security challenge. But same US has been much involved in the deployment of several personnel and agencies across the insurgency-ravaged North-east purportedly to bolster the resilience of vulnerable North-eastern communities to violent conflict (Wakilim, 2021).

For instance, Amnesty International (AI) have publicly criticized the human rights records of Azerbaijan severally, yet the western elites rather less hash to that country than they are to other supposedly authoritarian countries (Lora, 2016).

A cursory look at this scenario, however, will reveal the duplicity of the US in her dealings with Nigeria. It equally amounts to compelling Nigeria to strike a balance between her national security and human rights of her citizens. This situation amounts to taking a decision for the country as regards her national interest.

Although, human rights protection is parts of responsibilities of a responsive government, however, of great significance is for Nigeria to spelt out what her national interests are.

It is thus clear that these prevailing – domestic conditions and global circumstances - the thesis argues, impact directly on Nigeria's capacity as a regional power to act in a decisive manner, and in a way that she would primarily have acted. And have impeded Nigeria a great deal in harnessing her power potentials and turn it into actual power. Furthermore, the west prefers an influential Nigeria than a powerful Nigeria in the scheme of things in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. SUMMARY

There are have been plethora of academic debates among political analysts, scholars, and diplomats alike in varying attempts to understand the causal factors that have undermined Nigeria's capabilities to exert more power and control in African affairs, most especially in the area of peace and security promotion. Also, these debates are not narrowed to the above, but rather, to the motivations behind the Boko Haram insurgency employing the two major theoretical arguments; grievance and opportunity explanations as to understand what influences rebels' decision to engage in conflicts and insurgencies, most especially in relation to Boko Haram insurgent group.

This thesis has thus set the stage with the background of the study which is a brief introduction on Nigeria's unequivocal diplomatic commitment in promoting peace, security and political stability in Africa in chapter one. Subsequently, the paper identified why the study is considered a problem, and what informed this inquisition because it is a public knowledge that in spite of Nigeria's significant leading roles and unwavering commitment to regional diplomatic engagements on several occasions in the region, Nigeria's (under) performance and limited successes in its Afrocentric principles have been a subject of debate in several diplomatic quarters. This was consequently predicated on her inability to translate unequivocal assets, such as economic strength, military potentials, population and the likes into real and concrete

diplomatic power. It further points out the significance of the study, which aims at a critical analysis of the countervailing pressures that have undermined the country's performance in fulfilling her manifest destiny especially in areas such as restoring normalcy and ceasefire agreements to several nation states in conflicts.

Furthermore, it seeks to establish the causal mechanism that informed Boko Haram's decision to get involved in insurgency. Hence, the recommendation and conclusion of this thesis will go a long way in influencing the understanding of policy makers and other diplomatic stakeholders in decision making enterprise. Also, it makes them have a more robust understanding of the causal mechanisms that thwart the achievement of the country.

In view of the fact that this thesis attempts a critical assessment of Nigeria's diplomacy in the context of the causal mechanisms that have undermined her Afro-centric policies, and how this phenomenon influenced the understanding of scholars and diplomats' demands that the approach to be employed has to be analytical on the one hand. While on the other hand, such a work demands basically descriptive approach. As a result, the thesis employs both analytical and descriptive analytical approaches. This chapter includes discussion and future research possibilities to offer some clarifications on the research questions:

(R1): what is the role of Nigeria vis-à-vis the employment of instrument of diplomacy in ensuring peace and security in Africa?

(R2): what is the real strategic national interest of Nigeria in Africa?

(R3): what has been responsible for Nigeria's inability to translate her unequivocal assets, such as economic strength, military potentials, population and the likes into real and concrete diplomatic power?

(R4): what is the real causative factors that have motivated the insurgency groups especially in the context of Boko Haram?

Considering the objective and scope for which this thesis is intended, and owing largely to time interval for research process, restricted data and intelligence systems of the government, the research work is hinged on and restricted to issues related to Nigeria's diplomacy in conflict resolution, peace and security development, national interest, and terrorism.

On a final note, conceptual and operational definition of terms and structure of the study conclude the first chapter.

The second chapter delves into the theoretical background of the study, and examines the two (greed and grievance) general IR theories of insurgency as posited by Collier and Hoeffler, and the appropriateness of each theory was accessed in explaining the motivation behind Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, several relevant scholarly works on the subject matter was adequately reviewed.

The theoretical perspective of the work is subsequently anchored on post-colonial theory. The grasp of post-colonialism based on both its theoretical diversity and its commitment to dynamic social and ideological transformation as postulated in this thesis expounds the contemporary geographical connections between the colonised and the coloniser. These linkages of the first world and their ex-colonies is intimately related to post-colonialism's

fundamental understanding of identity of 'the mutual constitution of the self and other.

The critical roles Nigeria played in the region and international affairs - as outlined by this thesis in chapter three - cannot be discarded as inconsequential in the international community as they will continue to fire the imagination of quite number of international actors and non-actors, at least for the nearest future. The thesis had equally revealed how the oil boom of the 1970s consolidated and harnessed the elements of the country's national power - such as, demography, population, quality and quantity of armed forces, industrial capacity, natural resources, and geography - into an integrated whole, and gives them the breath of actual power, and brings the quantum of the country's potential strength to live up to her responsibilities in international scene. As far as Nigeria's power on the international realm was concerned, the advantages of size and quality of population, military strength, natural resources, industrial potential, and geography might as well not quite discernible or give the country's diplomacy a strong bite in the absence of the economic wherewithal.

The chapter equally dealt extensively with employment of Nigeria's diplomacy in conflict resolution in Africa; which includes eradication of apartheid regime in South Africa, and Nigeria's diplomatic engagements in Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Liberia. Furthermore, this discussion is followed by x-raying Nigeria's diplomacy and international community. Subsequently, Nigeria's diplomacy in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency was explored, and the stage was set with a short introduction of the Boko Haram group. And an analysis on the

consequences of Boko Haram insurgencies on Nigeria's diplomacy rounds up the chapter.

The theoretical explanations behind the motivations of Boko Haram – as examined in chapter four - seems quite complicated than what a single explanation will be able to interpret. Subsequently, the chapter delved into examination of these constraints that have impeded Nigeria's capabilities in fulfilling her Afro-centric principles in the sub-region and the continent at large.

Subsequently, the thesis challenged the dichotomous perception of the first and the third world as strong and weak states respectively when their governance system is perceived through the liberal lens. Although weak/failed state debate has been quite on since the late 1980s, but it has been joined by an anatomy of literature works advancing a shared, although not uniform, contention that such conflicts oftentimes culminate a state's failure. The thesis postulates that domestic violent conflicts might not be a potent ingredient to determine the weakness or strength of a state.

It is a public knowledge in international relations that state weakness or failure may barely be understood in the context of just one explanatory framework, as contemporary governance issues are not just complex and entwined with one another, but rather perceived mostly as consequence of complex amalgamation of varying factors.

State weakness or failure is generally perceived based on individual's interpretations to events, policies, institutions, and appeals for public support.

It is a truism that not all failed or weak nation states are adjudged same by analysts of failed state thesis, but what discerns them all as being failed,

basically, remains their ineptitude to live up to the responsibilities of successful states. The definition of success according to the failed state champions is only when a state is assessed through the lens of the liberal peace theory. This line of thought is reductionist, as it amounts to the act of reducing how knowledge of international security issues is ordered and understood to a 'one cause fits all' diagnosis, by viewing all international relations issues through the western lens, and engaging in the dismissal of other relevant discourse in international relations.

These factors, according to the scholars, play a critical role in infringing on the accomplishments of Nigeria in its leadership responsibility in Africa. Hence, assessing the domestic factor is critical to understanding the motivations behind the country's failure. The thesis equally looked at some contrary opinions that stressed that this unpleasant situation emerged in the wake of the discrepancy between real conduct of the country's affairs and external self-projection. They argued further that the failure was predicated on the country's inability to translate unequivocal assets, such as economic strength, military potentials, population and the likes into real and concrete diplomatic power.

The fifth and the final chapter outlines a brief summary of the study, which is followed by conclusion of the thesis, and finally proffers some fundamental recommendations. The research work is epitomized with the bibliography and annexes given at the end.

5.2. CONCLUSION

The thesis thus concluded on the one hand that the liberal values and the associated policy implications, by extension, had abstruse implications on the design and conduct of Nigerian diplomacy, peace and security promotion. In a clear term, this thesis contends that the constraints in Nigeria's diplomacy could be explained within the framework of the neo-liberal policies of the western capitalism.; such as trade liberalization, privatization, Structural Adjustment Program, and market economy, championed by the IMF and World Bank. The undue interference of neo-liberal actors in the domestic affairs of Nigeria, and the attendant implications of these policies on socio-economic conditions of the country, had overwhelmed Nigeria's capabilities on all fronts, and did have long term effects on her social fabric.

In Nigeria's attempts to fulfilling the constitutional provision along with her Afro-centric principles, these policies have technically rendered the country rather incapacitated in terms of power and influences to alter the underlying dynamics of conflicts; and uphold stability and a region devoid of incessant crises and conflicts both domestic and regional.

Furthermore, the thesis argued that committing a substantial amount of financial and military resources to promoting peace, security and political stability in Africa - while the country struggles with the challenges of the war on Boko Haram Terrorist organization and its attendant challenges, and also the socio-economic conditions need much attention would be inexpedient to rationalize with the masses at large. It is the opinions of good number of

Nigerians that the huge amount accrued to this operation could be better utilize to better the lot of the citizens or still, channeled towards the payment of the country's foreign debt.

This is especially true as good foreign policy and diplomatic engagements are only pursued in view of resources and power available to support it with a maximum chance of success (Morgenthau, 2006). It is an incontrovertible assumption that the empirical nexus between leadership and power cannot be discarded as inconsequential.

On the other hand, the thesis argued that a close observation of the two (greed vs grievance) arguments in explaining the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria provides no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion that there have been significant gaps in using the theories to reveal the insurgency.

Hence, the thesis equally concluded that Boko Haram insurgency appears to have been motivated by two international factors; the neo-liberal policies of the western world and the trans-national Islamist Sunni ideology. This is justified on ideological grounds by some group of aggrieved elements in the Nigerian society, who aspire to resist liberal values and norms using ideological argument as a disguise, due to the policy implications on the socio-economic situations of Nigeria. The degree of economic inequalities in the country as a result of the neo-liberal policies has created potentially fertile ground for Boko Haram's recruits and justifications to raise people's consciousness in the fight against the state. In other words, economic grievances have reinforced the political mobilization of the foot soldiers to fight against the state through the employment of trans-national Islamist ideology.

5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

During the last couple of decades, Nigeria has been able to position herself as a regional stabilizer in promoting peace and security in Africa. Indeed, the country is a renowned state with remarkable historical antecedents in the areas of peace, development, and security promotion both in the sub-region and the region. There is every reason to be confident that Nigeria was well on the track for standing as a stabilizer in the continent, considering the country's economic, political, and military potentialities on a global scale. The country's economic growth - most especially after the oil boom of the 1970s - military strength, quality and quantity of population have been contributing factors to the country's hegemonic roles.

These diplomatic engagements reflect two critical realities in the country's foreign affairs; one, that Nigeria has a very significant geopolitical stake in the maintenance of security and stability in west Africa, and Africa as a whole, and two, this choice became imperative for Nigeria as a result of the necessity for her to win hearts and minds of neighbouring countries. This is especially true as most of her neighbours are absolutely francophone countries with contrasting colonial backgrounds. Furthermore, these nations states are ostensibly smaller in population, natural resources and land mass than Nigeria. Hence, such relations with these nation states reflect a crucial reality for Nigeria.

In spite of all the country's potential powers, however, Nigeria has not actually been able to harness these potentialities and translate them into actual power. Nigeria has been involved in recurring anarchic violence since the birth of Boko

Haram insurgency in late 2007. The intricacies of this prolonged rebellion have not only held back the vast Nigeria's potentials but equally engendered threat to Nigeria's commitment to peace and security promotion in the sub-region, Africa, and international community at large. This factor had further affected the country's capabilities to be able to intervene on any major conflicts within and outside the region.

Furthermore, in spite of the unwavering commitment of Nigeria's diplomatic engagements within and without Africa, it is a truism that the country's diplomacy has not actually better the lots of her citizens. And as it appears, the future of Nigeria's diplomatic engagements now hangs in the balance, as these engagements are, apparently, determined by some fundamental factors such as domestic stability, economic development (decreasing dependence on foreign oil reserves), and critical infrastructural developments. And it is a truism that the prevailing domestic conditions in the country out rightly reflect the opposite.

Hence, this thesis recommends that Nigeria seems to be in dire need of adjusting her economic policies to adapt to changing and unstable international conditions by diversification of her economy with specific attention to the agricultural and solid mineral sectors in order to achieve economic stability. This will not only strengthen the country's capabilities, and engender her to play the expected role in the region, but also make her earn the respect and support she deserves from the international community. Because Africa's stability is a reflection of Nigeria's political stability, economic and military

strength. For if she is strong, Africa becomes stable, and if she is weak, inevitably, Africa becomes troubled and violent.

Undoubtedly, Nigeria is quite blessed with vast expanse of agricultural land which constitutes close to 80% of the country's total land mass of 910.8 thousand square kilometres with a 37.3% arable land (Central Bank of Nigeria). With the country's diverse nature of agriculture, several untapped opportunities for the country's growth are abound. Moreover, the government should improve upon her Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP); a program initiated by the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) to create economic linkages 'between smallholder farmers and reputable large-scale processors' for sustainable economic growth. The Central Bank should ensure the program is conspicuously transparent, and that recipients are held accountable and adequately monitored. Equally, the program should be extended to remote areas and should cut across the country.

Furthermore, Nigeria's diplomatic engagement in west Africa, and Africa as a whole should undergo a rapid revolution and be strategically driven not only by merely fulfilling her foreign policy objectives, but should be vibrantly pursued to ensuring well continued and sustainable economic growth. There should be an increased integration between diplomacy and economic development, and image promotion which forms a crucial guiding-principle of a 21st century approaches to diplomatic engagements. This is quite necessary so as to maximize the pursuit of the country's foreign policy objectives, so that at the

end, it will result in a mutuality of interests benefitting both the recipients and the donor.

Those responsible for the country's foreign policy ought to come to terms with the growing dynamic conditions of the international system that is well beyond the control of Nigeria, and endeavour to operationalize economic growth through foreign policy objectives. Hence, the articulation and pursuit of the country's foreign policy objectives should be designed in such a way that breeds optimal impacts on both the recipient and the donor strategic interests. Her diplomatic commitment to Africa should strategically be part of Nigeria's all-inclusive strategy to smartly promote an image of a constructive and rational regional power.

The exigency of time demands that Nigeria's diplomacy needs to be continuously adapted to the dynamic international conditions just as it is adapted to the country's developing demands. Nigeria's diplomatic engagements need to be perceived as just a sphere of the country's means of seeking regional power, while Nigeria should endeavour to pursue other dimensions that will support the country's national interests of ensuring increasing economic growth and development based on new realities as created by the dynamism of international system. Nigeria's diplomacy should be used as a potent instrument to muster resources so as to communicate and attract other nation states' publics.

Nigeria needs to understand that diplomatic engagements by and of itself may not really be adequate to earn a country the desired position in the

international system. A country may only win the world's attention, and perhaps the applause that comes thereof with success, however it is a different thing to exploit the opportunity to promote the country's positive image, national values, goals, and policies to the world.

In addition, Nigeria's economic policy instrument should be imbued with necessary institutional capacity to promote the country's economic interests in the region. A robust and vibrant pursuit of an array of foreign policy and diplomatic objectives that takes cognizance of Nigeria's national interests in Africa should be adopted. Indigenous Nigerian companies should be encouraged to expand their scope of operations beyond the shore of Nigerian soils. The government should stimulate a business-friendly oriented environment and policies – such as provisions of low-interest bank loans, preferential tax treatment, and foreign exchange access - for Nigerian businesses in a bid to support and foster the promotion of Nigeria's image and diplomatic interests abroad and stimulate economic development.

Moreover, the various Nigerian High Commissions abroad ought to be enjoined to be more proactive in the promotion of Nigeria's positive image abroad and to have critical engagements with Nigerians in the diaspora – who could be considered as valuable foreign policy tools - in a bid to raise global sympathy for the Nigerian cause.

Also, Nigeria must show some renewed interest in infrastructural development. The increase violent conflicts in the country have made it imperative that Nigeria needs to map out more infrastructural development initiatives to curb

the infrastructural deficit across the country. There is no gainsaying in the fact that infrastructural development remains a foundation and key to any robust economy. Whenever a penny is spent on infrastructure, the country is on the verge of creating more employment opportunities for her citizens. To a certain extent, job creations may address certain agitations and grievances that have been argued by some scholars to be a fundamental motivation to violence and rebellions.

The government should take cognizance of this fact and devise a strategy in partnership with private sectors – such as the current rail infrastructure being witnessed in the country – that will holistically address the infrastructural deficit across the country which consequently enables Nigeria address effectively the country's and regional challenges.

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